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ABSTRACT
ATET RIZKI WIJOSENO: Three Essays on Banking, Monetary Policy, and Regional Economy
in Indonesia.
(Under the direction of Neville Francis)
This dissertation is comprised of three essays. In the first essay, using monthly panel data, we
study how changes in the BI rate and reserve rate affect bank portfolio allocation in loans, secu-
rities, interbank assets, and deposits. We estimate the aggregate policy impacts and test whether
the impacts vary across periods around the 1997 Asian crisis. Further, we analyze if the policy
impacts differ between banks with different size of assets, level of capital, and type of ownership.
The findings show that an increase in the BI rate and reserve rate have different effects on each
bank portfolio items, across bank groups and sub-periods. The impact of an increase in the BI rate
is to decrease the aggregate share of bank assets in securities, deposits, and interbank assets. In
addition, we find mixed evidence on how loans respond to contractionary BI rate shocks across
sub-periods. The aggregate impact of an increase in the reserve rate is to reduce bank asset alloca-
tion in loans, interbank market, and deposits, while increasing securities-to-asset ratio. We find in
particular that an increase in the reserve rate has a notably stronger contractionary effect on bank
loans than that of the BI rate. Policy actions targeted at reducing the supply of loans are more
effective in curbing loan growth in Indonesia.
In the second essay, we study the transmission channels of monetary policy at the regional
economy level in Indonesia. The findings show that the magnitude and duration of the impact of
monetary policy shocks vary across provinces providing evidence of the asymmetric regional ef-
fects of monetary policy. Given similar shock, we find that the response of bank loans and deposits
vary across regions suggesting the existence of interest rate and credit channels at the regional
level. In addition, we also find different responses of trade openness, housing prices and consumer
expectations across regions providing evidences of the regional exchange rate, asset price and ex-
pectation channels. Further analysis shows that the shares of trade and mining are statistically
iii
significant in explaining the asymmetric provincial responses to monetary policy shocks. We find
that the impact of the monetary policy shocks are more muted for provinces which share land bor-
ders with foreign countries. This result implies that geography is a key factor in explaining the
asymmetric provincial responses.
Finally, in the third essay we construct a banking model to demonstrate the impact of 1997
Asian crisis on banks in Indonesia. We study how banks adjust their portfolio allocation in re-
sponse to changes in the reserve rate, capital requirement, and loan demand. Specifically, we are
interested in testing the hypothesis on whether banks are more sensitive to policy changes in the
more stringent, policy regulated post-crisis environment. We estimate the model based on the In-
donesian bank panel dataset from April 1993 to July 2014. Our findings show that an increase
in the reserve rate and capital requirement have larger impact on portfolio reallocation post 1997.
This paper, in part, contributes to the efforts of better identifying bank behavior in Indonesia by
providing a theoretical model as a means to study bank portfolio reallocation in response to policy
changes.
iv
To my parents, Soeseno and Suwarsilah,
my wife, Dewi Rahmawati, and the boys, Malik, Ammaar, Ghazi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the most Merciful. The completion this intellectual journey
would not be possible without His blessings. First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor,
Professor Neville Francis, for his guidance, patience, and support throughout the process complet-
ing this dissertation. Without his helps, this dissertation would not have been possible. I would also
like to thank my committee members, Professor Anusha Chari, Professor Eric Ghysels, Professor
Jonathan Hill, and Professor William Parke, for their insightful feedback and suggestions. I am
grateful for having financial support from Bank Indonesia. I am also grateful for getting support
and friendship from Dr. Wahyu Nugroho, Dr. Ferry Kurniawan, Dr. Angsoka Yorintha, Dr. Indra
Astrayuda, Dr. Priyo Widodo. Last but not the least, I would like to thank to all colleagues at
Department of Economic, Dr. Christian Posso, Tan Tran, and Harun Sarac.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
1 Banking During Economic Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Overview of Indonesian Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 The Banking System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.1 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.2 Banking Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.3 Reserve Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Empirical Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.1 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.2 Regression Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5.1 The Aggregate Policy Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5.2 The Policy Impact on Bank Group by Asset Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5.3 The Policy Impact on Bank by Capital Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5.4 The Policy Impact on Bank by Type of Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2 Monetary Policy and Banking System in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
vii
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Overview of The Regional Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.1 Monetary Policy Transmission Channels in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.2 Determinants of Differential Regional Effects of MP . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4 Data and Empirical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4.1 Empirical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.1 Bank Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.2 Bank Deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5.3 Real GDP per capita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.4 Discussion of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5.5 Other Channels of Monetary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.6 What factors contribute to the asymmetric regional responses? . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3 Crisis, Debt and the Indonesian Policy Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2 Overview of Indonesian Banking System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 Data and Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.1 Bank panel data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.2 Banking Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5.1 Responses to an increase in the reserve rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5.2 Responses to an increase in the capital requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
viii
3.5.3 Responses to reduction in loan demand (economic downturn) . . . . . . . . 84
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
ix
LIST OF TABLES
1 The Composition of Bank Balance Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2 The Composition of Bank Balance Sheet by Sub Sample Periods . . . . . . . . . . 87
3 The Composition of Balance Sheet of Banks by Asset Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4 Banks by Asset Size - Prior and Post Crisis I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5 Banks by Asset Size - Prior and Post Crisis II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6 The Composition of Balance Sheet of Banks by Capital Level . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7 Banks by Capital Level - Prior and Post Crisis I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8 Banks by Capital Level - Prior and Post Crisis II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
9 The Composition of Balance Sheet of Banks by Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10 Banks by Ownership - Prior and Post Crisis I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
11 Banks by Ownership - Prior and Post Crisis II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
12 The Aggregate Policy Impact on Bank Portfolio Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
13 The Policy Impact - Bank by Size of Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
14 The Policy Impact - Bank by Level of Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
15 The Policy Impact - Bank by Type of Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
16 The Islands and Provinces’ Selected Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
17 The Island’s Industrial Mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
18 Small Firms’ Output to Regional GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
19 Data Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
20 Regional responses to monetary policy shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
21 Provincial responses to monetary policy shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
22 The top 10 cumulative loan responses to MP shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
x
23 The top 10 cumulative deposit responses to MP shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
24 The top 10 cumulative GDP responses to MP shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
25 Housing Prices and Consumer Expectation Responses (island level) . . . . . . . . 108
26 Housing Prices and Consumer Expectation Responses (provincial level) . . . . . . 108
27 Explaining the Asymmetric Responses to MP Shock (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
28 Explaining the Asymmetric Responses to MP Shock (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
29 The Bank Balance Sheet by Sub Sample Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
30 The calibrated model’s parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
31 The estimated model’s parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
32 The steady-state values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
33 Transition Probabilities of Banks by Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
34 Transition Probabilities of Banks by Capital Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Reserve Regulation in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2 Aggregate banks’ reserve-to-asset ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3 Reserve-to-asset ratio by asset size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4 Reserve-to-asset ratio by capital level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5 Reserve-to-asset ratio by type of ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6 Comparing number of banks to the original dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7 Comparing total assets to the original dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8 Comparing total loans to the original dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
9 Comparing total deposits to the original dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
10 Indonesian Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
11 GDP per capita across provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
12 The islands’ IRFs of bank loans to the BI rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
13 The IRF of bank loans to the BI rate (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
13 The IRF of bank loans to the BI rate (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
14 The frequency distribution of cumulative loan responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
15 The regions’ IRF of bank deposits to the BI rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
16 The IRF of bank deposits to the BI rate (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
16 The IRF of bank deposits to the BI rate (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
17 The frequency distribution of cumulative bank deposit responses . . . . . . . . . . 127
18 The islands’ IRFs of real GDP per capita to the BI rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
19 The IRF of real GDP per capita to the BI rate (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
19 The IRF of real GDP per capita to the BI rate (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
xii
20 The frequency distribution of cumulative GDP responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
21 The island IRFs of trade openness to the BI rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
22 The provincial IRFs of trade openness to the BI rate (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
22 The provincial IRFs of trade openness to the BI rate (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
23 The frequency distribution of trade openness’ responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
24 The islands’ IRFs of housing prices to the policy rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
25 The IRF of housing prices to the BI rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
26 The frequency distribution of housing prices responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
27 The islands’ IRFs of consumer expectation to the BI rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
28 The IRF of consumer expectation to the BI rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
29 The frequency distribution of consumer expectation’s responses . . . . . . . . . . . 141
30 Pre-crisis-Responses of bank portfolio to the reserve rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
31 Post-crisis-Responses of bank portfolio to the reserve rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
32 Pre-crisis-Responses of bank portfolio to the capital requirement . . . . . . . . . . 143
33 Post-crisis-Responses of bank portfolio to the capital requirement . . . . . . . . . . 143
34 Pre-crisis-Responses of bank portfolio to loan demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
35 Post-crisis-Responses of bank portfolio to loan demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
xiii
CHAPTER 1
BANKING DURING ECONOMIC CRISES: A CASE OF INDONESIAN BANKING SYSTEM
1.1 Introduction
Representing approximately 80 percent of the total assets of financial institutions in Indonesia,
banking system holds a critical role in the country’s economy development. The 1997 banking
crisis taught an invaluable lesson on the importance of a sound and healthy banking system. This
banking crisis particularly signifies the need for more efforts on identifying bad banking practices
in order to improve banking supervision and policy formulation. This paper in part contributes
to these efforts by providing studies on how banks adjust their portfolio allocation in response to
policy changes during crises and non-crises periods.
Following the Bank Liberalization Act in October 1988, the banking sector in Indonesia has
been growing rapidly. The act which allowed private entity to establish new domestic and joint
venture banking business in Indonesia, boosted the number of banks from 111 in 1988 to 240 in
1994. As the number of banks increased, the role of banks in economic development expanded
significantly as banks became an important source of funding for the economy. During the period
between April 1993 and August 1997 bank’s loans soared, on average at 145 percent of the total
deposits and accounted for 69 percent of bank’s asset. Banks relied on external fundings to offset
the lack of total funding from deposits, as indicated by high level of bank borrowings at 31.44
percent of total assets. During this period of rapid loans expansion, banks maintained low excess
reserves, net interbank assets and investment in securities: each at approximately 2 percent of
bank’s total assets. This behavior and balance sheet composition seemed to be consistent amongst
banks with different asset sizes, capital levels, and ownership prior to August 1997.
Unfortunately, the rapid increase in the number of banks was not accompanied by improved
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bank regulation and supervision. There were increasing problems related to weak banking cor-
porate governance including collusive practices, violations of prudential regulations, and below
standard accounting and auditing practices. These problems were common in part due to weak
banking supervision by Bank Indonesia (BI), the Central Bank of Indonesia. During the early
bank liberalization period, BI was not an independent institution thus banking supervision inter-
ferences were often, especially for business entities, supported by powerful political groups. Bad
banking practices, weak bank supervision and regulation enforcement contributed to weakening
banking fundamentals.
When the financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, most banks suffered huge losses which sig-
nificantly decreased their capital levels. Banks contracted loan offerings and shifted their asset
allocation towards safer instruments including cash, reserves and securities. Loan-to-deposit ratios
(LDR), on average, dropped from 106 percent during the April 1993 to July 1997 period (Pre-crisis
I period) to 92 percent during the August 1997 to May 2000 (Crisis I period). As the economy
continued to decline during the Crisis I period and the public started to lose confidence in banks,
the financial structure collapsed causing a severe bank crisis.
The 1997 crisis marked the start of major overhaul of the Indonesian banking system. In
order to resolve the bank crisis, the Indonesian government conducted bank recapitalization and
restructuring programs. On the policy side, BI became an independent central bank which led to
improved banking supervision. These programs aimed to revive the banking sector and strengthen
its fundamental. In the post 1997 crisis period, between June 2000 and November 2007, average
capital were at 11 percent of total assets. Risk exposure from debt were significantly reduced as
bank’s borrowings dropped from 20.93 to only 2.47 percent of total assets. Unfortunately, as the
economy has not yet fully recovered during the June 2000 to November 2007 period (Post-crisis
I/Pre-crisis II period), there were further reduction in loan-to-deposit ratios from average of 78.3
to 66.2 percent. Share of loans to total asset slightly increased from 46.97 to 49.64 percent.
An interesting finding is that although the 1997 crisis had passed, banks on average still main-
tained high reserves ratio during Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II period. Reserves holding in bank balance
sheet was at 22.33 percent of total assets in the post 1997 crisis, much higher than pre-crisis level
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which was at 2.81 percent. The precautionary pattern was common across banks, in particular
small and medium-size banks. Smaller banks realized that they were hardest hit by the crisis thus
accumulated higher reserves and capital ratios than larger banks. On average, the banking system
was improving.
The financial crisis in 2008 seemed to have had less effect on the banking system in Indonesia.
Despite being global in nature, Indonesian banks performance continued to improve after 2008:
Average bank’s loans were able to bounce back from decreasing trends from 66.2 to 78.3 percent
of the total deposits; Capital and reserves were maintained at 16.35 percent and 22.26 percent of
total assets; healthier bank balance sheet as debt-to-asset ratio went from 2.47 to 1.23 percent.
Between July 2009 and July 2014 (Post crisis II period) banks’ LDR increased on average from
78.3 to 84.7 percent. Banks reduced capital formation and reserve-to-asset ratios. Average capital-
to-asset ratios decreased from 16.35 to 15.88 percent, while reserves holding declined from 22.26
to 14.44 percent of total assets.
Using monthly panel data from April 1993 to July 2014, we study how changes in the BI rate
and reserve rate affect bank portfolio allocation in loans, securities, interbank assets, and deposits.
We estimate the aggregate policy impacts on these portfolio items and test whether the impacts
vary across periods around the 1997 crisis (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods). Further, we
analyze if during these periods the policy impacts differ between banks with different size of assets,
level of capital, and type of ownership.
The findings show that an increase in the BI rate and reserve rate has different effects on each
bank portfolio items, across bank group and sub-periods. The impact of an increase in the BI
rate is to decrease the aggregate share of bank assets in securities, deposits, and interbank assets.
However, the cumulative impacts of similar shocks on securities and deposits are reversed. We
find mixed evidence on loan responses across sub-periods. During the pre-crisis and crisis periods,
an increase in the BI rate has the intended effects of reducing the aggregate bank loans. However,
in the subsequent period similar shocks raise loans. The aggregate impact of an increase in the
reserve rate is to reduce bank asset allocation in loans, interbank market, and deposits. Similar
shocks lead to a higher share of bank assets in securities.
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We find in particular that an increase in the reserve rate has a notably stronger contractionary
effects in bank loans than that of the BI rate. As the majority of banks fundings obtained from
deposits, policy actions targeted at reducing the supply of loans are relatively more effective in
curbing loan growth; a one percent increase in the reserve rate generates a substantial reduction in
bank deposits, whereas the same shock to the BI rate slightly increases bank deposits.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 presents a description of the economy
of Indonesia and its banking system. In section 1.3, we describe the data source, the dataset
construction and present summary statistics. We provide the empirical specification in section 1.4
and the results are presented in sections 1.5. Concluding comments are presented in section 1.6.
1.2 Overview of Indonesian Economy
Indonesia, with an estimated GDP of US$856.1 billion (in 2014) and approximately 250 mil-
lion in population, is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the fourth most populous nation in
the world. The Indonesian economy largely depend on household consumption which account for
54 percent of total GDP in 2014. Investment and government spending contributing to 32 percent
and 9 percent, respectively, while net export represents 2 percent of the total GDP.
Indonesia was an agricultural country until reforms in the late 1980s that attracted foreign in-
vestment into export-oriented manufacturing sector. As a result from rapid development of the
industrial sector, manufacturing products joined trade and agriculture as the main sectoral contrib-
utor to total GDP. In 2014, manufacturing sector contributed to 22 percent of total GDP, while
trade and agriculture each represented 14 percent and 13 percent, respectively.
The late 1980s reform also brought major changes in Indonesia’s financial system. The reform
liberalized the banking system allowing private investors to establish new banks. As the number of
banks increased, the banking sector expanded rapidly, increasing the role of banking system in the
economy. The rapid development of the manufacturing sector and banking industry contributed to
high economic growth, by an average of 7 percent during the period 1980 to 1997.
Despite a well-performing economy, there were serious weaknesses with the economic struc-
ture including massive corruptions, rapid depletion of Indonesia’s natural resources, imprudent
banking practices and weak legal system (World Bank (2003)). The effects of these problems
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became more apparent as the crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. The effects of financial crisis in 1997
were severe. The Rupiah plunged from Rp 2,600 per US Dollar in August 1997 to Rp 8,000-10,000
range at the end of 1998. The banking system collapsed and went into a costly recapitalization pro-
gram at up to 37.3 percent of the country’s GDP (Laeven and Valencia (2008)). Inflation reached
72 percent and real GDP contracted by 13.1 percent in 1998. Low public confidence in government
credibility and the economic system in general resulted in a slow recovery process.
The economic recovery program established during the 1997 crisis slowly brought the economy
back to positive growth. The economy was able to reach 4 percent growth in 2000 although the
value of Rupiah still fluctuated around 8,000 per US Dollar. The bank recapitalization program
resulted in stronger banking system and improved bank intermediation. As a result of the economic
and financial reform, Indonesia was able to rebuild the economy creating a stronger fundamental
including rapid reduction in public and external debt, improved quality of corporate balance sheets
and stronger banking system through higher capitalization and better supervision.
An improved economic structure together with strong domestic demand helped Indonesia
maintained positive economic growth at average rate of 6 percent during the most recent global
financial crisis in 2008. The domestic consumption which include household and government ex-
penditures were the largest contributor, representing for 65.3 percent of total GDP in 2008 and 66.3
percent in 2009. Government expenditures increased from 8.1 percent in 2008 to 9 percent of total
GDP in 2009. While the contribution of household consumption and investment were relatively
stable at 57 percent and 23 percent to total GDP. Export’s share of total GDP decreased from 49.6
percent in 2008 to 42.8 percent in 2009. While in 2009 import accounted for 32.5 percent of total
GDP, lower than 40 percent share in 2008. Although the share of export decreased in 2008, bigger
reduction in import helped maintain a positive net impact of foreign trade to total GDP.
1.2.1 The Banking System
The banking system in Indonesia consisted of only a few state and privately-owned banks
until the implementation of Bank Liberalization Act in 1988 when the numbers soared. However,
despite the significant increase in the number of banks following the 1988 Act, the top 10 private
banks and the 6 state banks together account for 75 percent of total bank-system assets (Pangestu
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(2003)).
Along with the rising number of banks, there were increasing problems related to weak bank-
ing corporate governance including collusive practices, violations of prudential regulations and
weak accounting standard. These problems were common in part due to weak banking supervi-
sion by Bank Indonesia (BI). During the early bank liberalization period, BI was not independent
thus banking supervision interferences were common especially for business entities supported by
powerful political groups.
The fragile banking fundamental collapsed when the financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. The
banking system went into major overhaul in which 70 banks were liquidated and 13 were national-
ized Laeven and Valencia (2008). The economic recovery program following the 1997 crisis gave
BI its independence through the implementation of 1999 Central Bank Act. BI’s independence
eliminated third party interferences that had been common prior to the crisis, thus improving the
quality of banking supervision and regulation. Stronger banking structure and bank supervision in
part contributed to Indonesia’s stable economic growth during the global financial crisis in 2008.
Indonesia together with China and India were the only G20 members that recorded positive eco-
nomic growth during 2008 crisis.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data Source
The primary data contain selected balance sheet information of all banks in Indonesia excluding
the Islamic and Rural Banks. The sample was collected from 241 banks’ monthly reports to the
Central Bank fromApril 1993 to July 2014 which were acquired from The Economic andMonetary
Statistic Department of the Central Bank of Indonesia. In addition to bank data, we also collected
Inflation, Industrial Production Index (as proxy of GDP) and BI Rate (the Indonesian monetary
policy rate) as the aggregate measures from IMF Data Library.
The balance sheet information used in the analysis consist of the following items:
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Assets Liabilities
A1. Reserves L1. Deposits
A2. Loans L2. Capital
A3. Securities L3. Debt
A4. Net Interbank
The assets side of bank balance sheet contains the following items: Reserves (A1) is bank’s savings
or claims to the Central Bank; Loans (A2) refer to all realized lending extended by bank to non-
bank third parties; Securities (A3) include marketable securities issued by non-bank third parties
and purchased/owned by bank; Net Interbank (A4) is the net position of all claims and liabilities
at other banks. The liabilities side consist of the following items: Deposits (L1) is the non-bank
third parties savings which include demand deposits, savings deposits and time deposits; Capital
(L2) is the total amount of bank’s capital; Debt (L3) consists of securities issued (securities include
all short-term and long-term debentures issued by bank to non-bank third parties) and borrowings
(borrowings include all borrowings by bank from non-bank third parties) by banks.
The bank dataset is an unbalanced panel as the total number of banks varies during the 256-
month sample period due to banks’ liquidations, mergers and acquisitions. Since the paper aims at
explaining the change of banks’ balance sheet over time, it is important to base the estimation on a
consistent data series. We apply the following criteria to ensure data consistency.
First, we exclude banks which were liquidated or founded after April 1993. Second, following
Peek and Rosengren (1995), we treat banks which merged during our sample period as one entity
as if the merger occurred at the beginning of the sample period. With these adjustments, we obtain
a balanced panel of 22,528 observations from 88 banks which represent more than 91 percent
of total bank assets in Indonesia over the period. In order to have this balanced panel dataset,
a considerable number of banks were excluded from the sample, in particular during the period
before the 1997 crisis.1
1However, we find that excluding these banks causes minor impact on reducing sample’s representation. Figure
7 shows that there are only slight differences in size and pattern of banks’ total assets over the period between the
balanced panel and the original (unbalanced panel) dataset. In addition, figures 8 and 9 show that data series of loans
and deposits, respectively, in balanced panel resemble those in unbalanced panel.
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In this study, we focus on two major economic crises: the 1997 Asian crisis (Crisis I) and the
2008 global financial crisis (Crisis II). Therefore, we divide the dataset into five sub-samples to
study how bank behavior is affected by these crises: (1) Pre-crisis I (April 1993-July 1997) which
is the period prior the 1997 Asian financial crisis; (2) the Crisis I period between August 1997
and May 2000; (3) Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II period, time between the two economic crises (June
2000-November 2007); (4) The global financial crisis of December 2007 to June 2009 marked as
the Crisis II period; (5) the post crisis II period which runs from July 2009 to July 2014.
In addition to time based analysis, we also conduct the empirical study based on several banks’
groupings: by size, by capital level and by type of ownership.2 The first group, banks by size, is
constructed based on bank’s average total assets. Large banks are those above the 95th percentile
of total assets (11 banks), medium-size banks lie between the 75th and 95th percentiles (32 banks),
and small banks lie below 75th percentile (45 banks).
We create another group to reflect banks’ level of capital based on Capital Adequacy Ratio
(CAR). CAR is calculated by dividing banks’ capital with its total assets. We form the categories
in this group by referring to 8 percent minimum capital requirement in Basel Accord. There are
75 banks averaging more than 10 percent CAR over the entire sample period which are placed in
the high CAR category. Those with CAR between 8 and 10 percent (4 banks) are in the group of
adequately-capitalized banks, while 7 banks below 8 percent CAR belong to the low-capitalized
group.
The third group is the type of ownership group, which based on banking categories published
in Bank Indonesia’s Banking Statistics. The publication lists banks by their ownership type into
five categories: state banks, private domestic banks, regional development banks, joint venture
banks, and foreign banks. The foreign group contains 16 banks from the joint venture and foreign
category. The other bank categories which consist of 72 banks are merged into the domestic group.
2Further details on constructing bank groups are presented in tables 33 and 34
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1.3.2 Banking Data
Following the bank liberalization act in 1988, the banking sector in Indonesia has been growing
rapidly. As the number of banks increased from 111 in 1988 to 240 in 1994, the role of banks in
the Indonesian economy expanded significantly. Banks had been one of the important channel of
funding for the economy.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the Indonesian bank balance sheet over the period
of observations (April 1993-July 2014). On the asset side, loans, reserves, securities, and net
interbank assets together account for 85.73 percent of banks’ total assets; loans representing a
large portion of banks’ assets, on average accounting for 54.61 percent of total assets. Reserves
and securities on average account for 15.72 percent and 6.52 percent, respectively, while the net
value of banks’ assets in the interbank market represents 8.88 percent. On the liabilities side,
deposits represent the majority share, on average accounting for 68.15 percent of total liabilities.
Capital and debt account for 13.63 percent and 7.93 percent, respectively. This table also shows
that the portfolio composition varies widely across banks. Some banks aggressively extend loans
(maximum loan to assets ratio is 489.1 percent) while others have very small or zero assets in loans
(minimum loan to assets ratio is 0.00 percent).3 Similarly, we find high variability of portfolio
allocation in securities, deposits, reserves and debt.
Two other things stand out from the table (1) Minimum reserves of zero. The bank individual
characteristics may in part contribute to the different banks’ portfolio allocation. The foreign banks
with access to internal source of funding may choose not to collect domestic deposits. Having no
deposits, these banks are not required to hold reserves at the central bank. (2) The minimum value
of banks’ capital is significantly below zero. The sharp reduction in the banks’ capital occurred
during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The increasing bad loans during this period greatly
reduced the banks’ capital as they had to cover for the loan losses.
During Pre-crisis I period as shown in table 2, banks’ loans on average accounted for 60.78
percent of total assets allocation, while deposits share averaged 57.02 percent of total assets. Thus
3Total assets include net interbank assets which can be negative allowing loan-to-asset ratio above 100 percent
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banks on average extended loans more than deposits collected. In order to offset the shortfall of
funding from deposits, banks depended on external fundings, as shown by high level of banks
borrowings at 17.72 percent of total assets. As a consequence of its rapid loans expansion, banks
maintained a low excess reserves to total assets ratio at under 1 percent and invested only 2.02
percent of total assets in securities.
In 1997, Indonesia was hit by the Asian financial crisis. The impact of this crisis on banking
system is very apparent as shown by several bank indicators in the second (top) column of table
2. As the economy slowed, the demand for loans plummeted. On the supply side, banks were also
hesitant to extend loans. The combination of weak demand and low supply of loans caused severe
contraction in banks loan. The averaged banks loan-to-asset ratio dropped from 60.78 to 46.97
percent. The increasing loan losses contributed to reduced the capital-to-asset ratio from 14.45 to
9.89 percent. A striking finding is a huge jump in reserve-to-asset ratio from 2.81 percent during
the Pre-crisis I period to 17.04 percent during the Crisis I period. Learning from the current crisis,
bank chose to strengthen its buffer against negative shocks by increasing its reserve holdings. In
addition, the crisis might have shifted bank preferences toward low-risk assets contributing to the
sharp increase in reserve holding.
By comparing bank indicators in column 1 (Pre-crisis I) and 3 (Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II) of
table 2, we find that the 1997 financial crisis may significantly contributed to the changes of banks’
balance sheet structure. During the Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II period, on average, banks improved
prudent banking practices and allocated much higher share of low-risk type of assets compared
to the Pre-crisis I period: reserve-to-asset ratio increased from 2.81 to 22.33 percent; securities
rose from 2.02 to 8.01 percent of total assets; a significant reduction in debt-to-asset ratio from
17.72 to 2.47 percent. The huge jump in reserve and securities ratio in part were contributed by
the combination of these two factors: First, banks loan had not yet returned to Pre-crisis I level.
In the Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II period, loans were at 49.64 of total assets, far below the Pre-crisis
period of 60.78 percent. Second, we find significant increase in deposit-to-asset ratio from 57.02
percent in Pre-crisis I period to 74.95 percent in the Post-crisis I period. Facing increased available
funding while credit market had not yet recovered, banks shifted their investment toward securities
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and reserve.
The bank indicators in the first column (bottom panel) of table 2 show resuming positive banks
performance despite the occurrence of the 2008 global financial crisis: Loan-to-asset ratio in-
creased to 55.52 from 49.64 percent in the Pre-crisis II period; Capital ratio was slightly above its
Pre-crisis I level at 16.35 percent of total assets; Debt ratio was reduced by half from the Pre-crisis
II period to reach 1.23 percent.
Table 2 shows that during the Post-crisis II period, the performance of the banking system in
Indonesia continued to improve. Loan-to-asset ratio reached 60.42 percent, slightly below the level
during bank loans rapid expansion in the Pre-crisis I period at 60.78 percent of total assets. As the
credit market started to recover, banks reduced the reserves allocation to 14.44 percent from 22.26
percent of total assets in the previous sub-period. We also find higher bank investment in securities
from 6.67 to 10.34 percent of total assets.
The overall balance sheet indicator in the Post-crisis II period shows stronger banks and im-
proved intermediation function. Banks were able to maintain high reserves and capital levels while
continuing to increase loans and lowering debt-to-assets ratio. In this preliminary analysis, we find
that the 1997 crisis significantly contributed to the deteriorating banking system, while the 2008
global financial crisis had little impact on the banking business in Indonesia.
Banks by Assets Size
The banking assets in Indonesia is highly concentrated in the top tier banks as the 11 largest
banks represent on average 71.8 percent of total assets, while the 45 smallest banks account for
only 3.5 percent. Table 3 shows the composition of balance sheet across banks with different
asset sizes. We find no significant differences in loans and deposits share between small, medium
and large banks, although we find that small banks have higher asset share in reserves and capital
but much lower debt ratio than the others. The high ratio of average securities to total assets in
large banks was the result of the 1997 banks’ recapitalization program. The troubled large banks
acquired the government issued securities as part of the bailout program causing huge jump in the
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ratio of their securities to total assets.4
Evident from table 4 is that small banks in the Pre-crisis I period accumulated capital-to-assets
ratio at 19.2 percent, much higher than their medium and large banks counterparts, having 9.37 and
9.62 percent respectively. Prior to the 1997 crisis, medium and large banks set a high risk balance
sheet profile by aggressively extending loans and accumulated large amount of debt. Medium
and large banks’s loan-to-deposits ratios were at 115.21 percent and 138.56 percent, respectively,
compared to small banks which were more conservative by maintaining its loan at 95.14 percent of
total deposits. To offset the shortfall of loan funding, medium and large banks accumulated large
borrowings in terms of debt causing their debt-to-assets ratio to reach 26.8 and 28.9 percent of total
assets; compared to small banks at 8.5 percent of total assets.
Table 4 shows that large banks experienced huge drop in capital ratio from 9.62 to -12.25
percent of total assets as a result of crisis, while small and medium banks saw minor adjustment in
capital ratios; small banks capital ratio fell from 19.24 to 15.99 percent; medium banks’ capital fell
from 9.37 to 8.94 percent. Large banks, which aggressively extended loans during the Pre-crisis
I period, experienced massive loan losses. The obligation to charge off those bad loans causing a
significant reduction in the capital ratio of large banks.
Two common changes in balance sheet structure among banks with different asset sizes during
the Crisis I period were (1)reduction in loans and (2)sharp increase in reserve holding. Small
banks’ loans dropped from 58.68 to 45.23 percent, medium banks’ loans reduced from 61.43 to
47 percent, and large banks’ loans decreased from 67.45 to 54.02 percent of total assets. Overall,
during the 1997 crisis, banks shifted large portions of their assets toward reserves. This change
in bank behavior can be seen as precautionary measure against the crisis. Small banks, the most
prone bank category to negative shocks, saw the largest increase in reserve holdings from 2.21 to
18.6 percent. Medium banks raised reserve holdings from 3.02 to 16.82 percent, while large banks’
reserve holdings rose from 4.63 to 11.27 percent.
Following the 1997 crisis, we find that small and medium banks continued to increase their
4The large banks’ statistics in column three of table 4 shows that securities share jumped from 9.56 percent in the
Crisis I period to 32.77 percent in the Post Crisis I/Pre-crisis II period.
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reserve holdings, while large banks maintained the same reserve level as in the Crisis I period.
The third column in table 4 shows that during Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II period, small and medium
banks’ reserves were higher by 6.25 percent and 5.76 percent, respectively, from their Crisis I level.
A striking finding from the Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II period is the huge reduction in debt level
for all bank size categories: Small banks’ debt were down from 8.85 to 1.42 percent; Medium
banks sharply decreased their debt level from 31.55 to 3.38 percent, while large banks managed to
lower their debt from 39.44 to 4.12 percent of total assets.
The banking recapitalization program which was implemented as part of the 1997 crisis resolu-
tion plans contributed to overall stronger and healthier banks’ balance sheet structure. In addition
to reduction in debt level, banks managed to maintain their capital levels above the minimum 8
percent requirement. Large banks, in particular, were able to increase their capital ratio to a safe
level at 8.59 percent, a huge increase from -12.25 percent in the Crisis I period.
Table 5 highlights that the 2008 global financial crisis had little impact on banking system in
Indonesia. The intermediary function improved as shown by increasing loan ratio in each banking
size categories although it had not reached the Pre-Crisis I level. Large banks raised their loan
ratio by 42.3 percent from the Pre-crisis II level at 41.65 to 59.27 percent. Medium banks’ loan
increased from 48.92 to 56.19 percent, while small banks had 54.13 percent of loans ratio, slightly
higher than the previous sub-period rate of 52.1 percent. The overall bank balance sheet during the
Crisis II period was markedly improved as we find reduced debt levels, high reserves and capital
ratios in all banking size categories.
In the third column of table 5, we find that during the Post-crisis II period, small banks had
higher loan ratio and allocated more investment in securities. Loan ratio increased from 54.13 to
58.82 percent and investment in securities jumped from 4.52 to 9.59 percent. At the same period,
we find lower reserve and capital ratios. Small banks’ reserve holdings dropped significantly from
26.02 to 16.81 percent of total assets, while its capital-to-asset ratio slightly downed from 22.58 to
19.84 percent.
Overall we find similar pattern of balance sheet changes for medium banks such as higher loans,
increased securities, and lower reserve rate, but with one distinction to small banks: Medium banks
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raised their capital ratio from 9.86 to 11.36 percent. During the Post-crisis II period, large banks
behavior resembled their medium sized counterpart except with a slight reduction in large banks’
securities-to-asset ratio from 16.08 to 13.3 percent.
Banks by Capital Level
The 75 highly-capitalized banks represent only 34.62 percent of the system assets, thus, the
majority of these banks are relatively small. The middle capital level group comprise of several
large banks as this category represents on average 33.83 percent of total assets although only
comprising 4 banks. The low-capitalized banks on average account for the remaining 31.54 percent
of total assets.
Table 6 shows that there were no significant differences in the share of loans and reserves for
banks across the different capital levels. Although we find that low-capitalized banks on average
hold much higher ratio of debt and a lower deposit ratio. This combination suggest that low-
capitalized banks depend on external borrowings in terms of debt to fund their loans given lack
of funding from deposits. High-capitalized banks on average maintain lower share of securities to
total assets than others.
Table 7 shows that low-capitalized banks largely contributed to the large debt accumulation and
the aggressive loan extension behavior found in the aggregate bank preliminary analysis. During
the Pre-crisis I period, low-capitalized banks funded loans at 206.54 percent of their deposits: the
loan-to-assets ratio was at 72.91 while deposit was only 35.3 percent of total assets. The low-
capitalized banks accumulated large debt ratio at 45.7 percent of total assets, while adequately-
capitalized banks extended 64.41 percent of total assets as loan, recorded deposits share at 61.27
percent of total assets and accumulated debt-to-asset ratio at 22.56 percent. The bottom panel of
table 7 shows that high-capitalized banks were more moderate in extending loans at 100 percent of
their deposits and accumulated only 14.11 debt-to-asset ratio.
During the Crisis I period, we find similar pattern of increased reserve holdings, reduced capital
levels, and increased debt ratios in each bank category. High-capitalized banks reserve holdings
jumped from 2.46 to 17.34 percent. Adequately-capitalized banks increased reserve-to-asset ratio
from 4.2 to 10.32 percent, while banks in low-capitalized category raised reserve holding to 17.54
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percent from 5.06 percent in the Pre-crisis I period.
Low-capitalized banks’ capital ratio plunged to -14.86 percent from 5.56 percent in the Pre-
crisis period, while the capital ratio of adequately-capitalized banks dropped from 9.23 to -4.99
percent. An interesting finding is that loan losses of banks during the 1997 crisis period only
caused small reduction in capital of highly-capitalized banks from 15.79 to 13.66 percent of total
assets.
The bank indicators in the third column of table 7 imply that low-capitalized banks were the
worst hit by the 1997 crisis. Its loan ratio sharply decreased from 61.39 to 38.45 percent, a much
worse performance compared to the adequately-capitalized banks which only suffered slight re-
duction from 48.88 to 40.6 percent. In contrast, high-capitalized banks’ loan ratio showed im-
provement from 45.14 to 51.46 percent.
While the capital ratio of low-capitalized banks improved from -14.86 to 3.41 percent during
the Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II period, it was still far below the minimum 8 percent requirement.
Adequately-capitalized banks were able to raise their average capital ratio from -4.99 to 6.87 per-
cent, while banks in the high-capitalized category managed to maintain their capital ratio at 13.78
percent, a small increment from 13.66 percent in the Crisis I period.
The second column of table 8 support the preliminary conclusion that the 2008 global financial
crisis had little impact on Indonesian banking system. In all bank categories, we find higher loan
ratios, stronger capital levels, and low debt ratios. Adequately-capitalized banks’ loan ratio signif-
icantly increased from 40.6 to 56.23 percent; low-capitalized banks from 38.45 to 46.85 percent;
additionally high-capitalized banks slightly increased from 51.46 to 56.52 percent of total assets.
During the Post-crisis II period, we find low and adequately-capitalized banks were able to
increase their capital ratios, while the capital ratio of banks in high-capitalized category on average
decreased. Along with stronger capital level, banks in each category gained higher loan-to-asset
ratios. High-capitalized banks’ loan ratio, in particular, reached 61.37 percent of total assets which
surpassed the pre-crisis I level at 59.13 percent. As expected, during this period, we also find
reduced banks’ reserve-to-asset ratio in all bank categories. Since the crisis period was over, banks
raised its expectation of having higher economic growth thus shifting their assets from low-risk
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type such as reserve to instruments with better return including loans and securities.
Banks by Type of Ownership
On average, foreign banks account for 12 percent of the system total assets. The share of
foreign bank assets were increasing in particular during the two crises period. During crisis I
period, foreign banks accounted for 11 percent, an increase of 4 percent from pre-crisis I period.
The share of foreign banks’ assets peaked at 14 percent during the 2008 global financial crisis
before returning to 11 percent in the post crisis II period.
Table 9 shows no striking differences in the balance sheet composition of foreign and domestic
banks except in the deposit and debt ratios. Foreign banks on average accumulate much higher debt
ratio while having significantly lower deposit ratio than their domestic counterpart. This summary
statistics suggest that rather than relying on deposits from domestic market, foreign banks depend
heavily on external borrowings in terms of debt to fund their loans.
Table 10 shows several interesting findings relating to the balance sheet characteristics of do-
mestic and foreign banks. Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, domestic banks on average had much
higher capital levels and deposits collection than foreign banks. Domestic banks utilized deposits
to extend loans while foreign banks fund a sizeable portion of their loans from debt. As shown
in the table, foreign banks extended loans at 69.91 percent of total assets, tripling the amount
of its deposit-to-asset ratio at 19.23 percent while at the same time creating very high levels of
debt-to-asset ratios at 64.31 percent.
The 1997 crisis in part contributed to the change of foreign bank behavior. During the Post-
crisis I/Pre-crisis II period, foreign banks shifted its balance sheet allocation by significantly re-
ducing its debt ratio from 74.4 to 5.7 percent, increased deposit collection from 17.79 to 54.99
percent and raised capital-to-asset ratio from 3.58 to 13.16 percent (see table 11). After the 1997
crisis, in both type of banks, we find similar changing pattern of balance sheet structure: higher
reserves, lower debt, increased capital level and larger investment in securities.
The 2008 global financial crisis had little impact on domestic banks. However, the said crisis
hit hard countries where most of the foreign banks’ originated. The crisis limited the external
fundings available as shown in table 11, with the level of foreign banks’ debt ratio plunging from
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5.7 to 0.07 percent. In the Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II period, foreign banks increased their deposits
collection which allowed them to maintain loan ratio at 54.02 percent, slightly down from the Pre-
crisis II period at 56.16 percent. The Post-crisis II balance sheet structure, as shown in column
3 of table 11, indicate the shift in foreign banks’ behavior: foreigns banks significantly reduced
debt and utilized deposits to finance loans while maintaining high levels of capital and reserves as
buffer.
1.3.3 Reserve Requirement
The reserves rate times banks’ total deposits determine the minimum funds that each bank
has to maintain as reserves at the Central Bank. The policy maker in Indonesia differentiate the
reserves rate for Rupiah and foreign currency denominated deposits. For the purpose of this study
we use only Rupiah reserve rate due to data limitation; our dataset provides the total amount of
deposits all converted to Rupiah. Figure 1 shows the reserve rate on Rupiah denominated deposits
over the period of observation where the shaded area marks the two economic crises periods in
1997 and 2008. The trend of reserve rate over the period of observations is increasing. The reserve
rate increased by 3 percent during the period prior to the 1997 crisis. In addition, during the Crisis
II and Post-crisis II period the rate rose by 2.5 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively. However, the
reserve rate was fixed during the Crisis I and Post-crisis I/Pre-crisis II periods.
Figure 2 shows that prior to the 1997 crisis, banks, on average, maintained low level of reserves;
below 5 percent of their total assets. During this period, loans growth were very high. Having low
reserve level was common for many banks in Indonesia.
The average bank’s reserves holding soared as the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997.
Increased reserves rate from 3 to 5 percent on April 1997, the declining economic growth and
increased precautionary buffer during the crisis period are several factors that contribute to the
sudden jump in banks’ reserve-to-asset ratio. After the 1997 crisis, banks gradually reduced their
reserves ratio to approximately 15 percent of their total assets in October 2005.
Banks started to allocate more of their assets in reserves at the end of 2005. The increasing
trend of reserves holding persisted to reach above 25 percent of total assets during the 2008 global
financial crisis. As in the 1997 crisis, banks perceived the recession period and maintained high
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precautionary buffer by accumulating larger reserves. As the crisis subsided, reserve-to-asset ratio
declined as banks reallocate their assets to more profitable investment. In October 2008, the policy
maker increased the reserves rate from 5 to 7.5 percent but interestingly the average reserve-to-
asset ratio kept declining to reach slightly above 10 percent of total assets in April 2014.
Figure 3 shows the reserve-to-asset ratio of banks with different size of assets during the sample
period. Prior to the 1997 crisis, large banks maintained the highest reserves ratio slightly above
medium and small banks. During the 1997 crisis, the trend changed as small and medium banks
accumulated higher reserves ratio compared to large banks.
As shown in figure 4, all banks have low levels of reserve-to-asset ratios during the period prior
to the 1997 crisis. The trend of reserves holding diverge after the 1997 crisis. The reserves level of
adequate and low-capitalized banks tend to coincide while high-capitalized banks maintain large
reserves accumulation at approximately 20 percent of total assets. In contrast to the 1997 crisis,
we find no significant changes in the bank’s reserves level during the 2008 global financial crisis.
Following the 2008 crisis, bank’s reserve-to-asset ratios were reduced to under 15 percent of their
total assets.
Figure 5 shows that foreign and domestic banks have resembling trends of reserve-to-asset
ratio until the end of the 1997 crisis when foreign banks slashed their reserves to approximately
10 percent of total assets while domestic banks maintained theirs above 20 percent of total assets.
Having less dependence on deposits as a source of funding allows foreign banks to keep lower
reserve-to-asset ratio compared to domestic banks and allocate more of their assets to high-return
investment. As shown in this figure, foreign banks on average hold significantly lower reserve-to-
asset ratio compared to their domestic counterparts.
1.4 Empirical Design
1.4.1 Theoretical Framework
In this subsection, we provide a brief review on the literature which study the impact of mon-
etary policy on bank balance sheets, in particular those which focus on the behavior of different
types of banks. This brief review will help to construct a testable hypothesis and interpret our
results in comparison with the earlier findings.
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Bernanke and Blinder (1992) study the propagation of monetary policy shocks through banking
system. This paper provides empirical evidence on how a contractionary monetary policy immedi-
ately reduce bank deposits and securities holding, while reducing bank loans and aggregate output
with a lag. Kashyap and Stein (1995) also estimates the impact of monetary policy on bank balance
sheets but focusing on the cross-sectional differences across bank of different sizes. They show
that given a contractionary monetary policy, small banks have larger reduction in loan volume than
large banks. A tighter monetary policy have greater effects on small banks’ loans which are more
likely to have difficulty raising non-deposit fundings. In addition, given similar shocks small banks
have deeper reduction in securities holdings than large banks. A contraction in monetary policy
initially induces small banks to reduce their loans. If the loans demand were not decreasing, small
banks would be willing to liquidate their securities to maintain loan volume.
Kashyap and Stein (2000) studies whether the impact of monetary policy shocks differs across
banks with varying characteristics. They provide evidence that a contractionary monetary policy
shocks have different effects on loan and security portfolio of large and small banks. They show
that a contraction in monetary policy has stronger impact on reducing loans of banks with less
liquid balance sheets (low securities-to-asset ratio), the characteristic which largely define small
banks. Given a tighter monetary policy, liquidity shrinks and banks with higher liquid assets
are more likely to be able to offset reduction in deposits by selling their securities therefore less
affected by the shocks.
Kishan and Opiela (2000) shows how banks with different asset sizes and capital leverage
ratios respond differently to changes in monetary policy. This paper provides evidence that a
contractionary monetary policy has greater effects on reducing loans of small banks regardless
their level of capital. In addition, this paper shows that small, undercapitalized banks are more
likely to have difficulty offsetting reductions in deposits, stemming from contractionary policy.
Therefore we expect to have larger reductions in undercapitalized banks loan supply than that of
larger and high-capitalized banks.
Gambacorta (2005) examines the cross-sectional impact of monetary policy shocks using a
comprehensive sample of Italian banks. Less capitalized banks experience larger reductions in
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deposits following a tightening in monetary policy as these bank are more likely to have difficulty
raising non-deposit fundings. In addition, loans of well-capitalized banks are less affected by a
contractionary monetary policy shocks as they are observed as less risky and are able to obtain
non-deposit fundings. However, in contrast to existing findings in the literature, this paper shows
that bank size is not relevant in assessing the impact of monetary policy shocks on loans.
1.4.2 Regression Specification
We construct the regression specifications based on Peek and Rosengren (1995) models to
estimate the impact of changes in reserve requirement and monetary policy rate (BI rate) on bank’s
balance sheet allocation in loans, securities, interbank market and deposits. We seek evidence
whether the policy impact differs between crises and non-crises periods. In addition, we study
whether the impact differs across bank of different size of assets, level of capital and type of
ownership.
∆PIi,t
Ai,t−1
=β0 +
3∑
i=0
β1,i∆BI Ratet−1 +
3∑
i=0
β2,i∆Reserve Ratet−i + β3Period Dummyt
+ β4(∆BI Ratet ∗ Period Dummyt) + β5(∆Reserve Ratet ∗ Period Dummyt)
+
2∑
j=1
β6,jMacro V arsj,t +
3∑
j=1
β7,jBank Characteristicsj,t + ǫi,t
(1.1)
The regression in equation (1.1) estimates the impact of monetary policy changes on banks’
balance sheet. The dependent variables in this equation,
∆PIi,t
Ai,t−1
, is the change of bank’s portfolio
items scaled by the total assets. The portfolio items, PIi,t, include loans, securities, net interbank
assets, and deposits of bank i at time t, while Ai,t−1 represents the total assets.
The variables of interest in this regression are the changes in reserve rate (∆Reserve Ratet),
the changes in BI rate (∆BI Ratet−1) and the interaction terms which are used to estimate the pol-
icy impact before and after the 1997 crisis. The regression controls for macroeconomic variables
(Macro V ars): economic growth (g GDPt−1), and changes in inflation rate(∆Inf ). We also
control for banks’ individual characteristics (Bank Characteristics): (1)Excess reserves growth
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(g XReservesi,t), the extra funds that bank keeps in the central bank on top of its minimum re-
serves requirement, (2)AssetGrowthi,t, and (3)Dummy variable on whether reserve requirement
is binding for bank i in period t (RRDummyi,t).
The reserve requirement of bank i at period t is binding (RRDummyi,t = 1) if the nominal
reserves is less than or equal to the required reserves. We obtain bank i nominal reserves data from
the bank’s monthly balance sheet, while the required reserves are calculated by multiplying the
reserve rate with total deposits of bank i at time t− 1.
RRDummyi,t =


1, if Reservesi,t <= Required reservesi,t
0, otherwise
The second regression in equation (1.2) below provides a test on whether banks’ responses
to changes in reserve rate and BI rate vary based on the following categories: (1)size of assets,
(2)level of capital and (3)type of ownership. In addition, we study whether these bank groups’
responses differ between crisis and non-crisis period.
∆PIi,t
Ai,t−1
=β0 +
3∑
i=0
β1,i∆BI Ratet−1 +
3∑
i=0
β2,i∆Reserve Ratet−i + β3Period Dummyt
+ β4BankGroupDummyi,t + β5(∆BI Ratet ∗ Period Dummyt)
+ β6(∆Reserve Ratet ∗ Period Dummyt)
+ β7(∆BI Ratet ∗BankGroupDummyi,t)
+ β8(∆Reserve Ratet ∗BankGroupDummyi,t)
+ β9(Period Dummyt ∗BankGroupDummyi,t)
+ β10(∆BI Ratet ∗ Period Dummyt ∗BankGroupDummyi,t)
+ β11(∆Reserve Ratet ∗ Period Dummyt ∗BankGroupDummyi,t)
+
2∑
j=1
β12,jMacro V arsj,t +
3∑
j=1
β13,jBank Characteristicsj,t + ǫi,t
(1.2)
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The variables of interest in this equation are the changes in reserve rate (∆Reserve Ratet),
the changes in BI rate (∆BI Ratet−1) and the interaction terms. We interact the policy variables
with bank groups (BankGroupDummyi,t) and sub sample periods (Period Dummyt) to esti-
mate whether the policy impact differ across bank groups during crisis and non-crisis period. The
bank groups include banks by size of assets (large, medium and small), banks by level of capi-
tal (low, adequate and high-capitalized), and banks by type of ownership (foreign and domestic),
while the sub sample periods consist of three dummy variables for periods around the 1997 crisis
(pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis).
1.5 Results
In this section we present the regression results of equation (1.1) and (1.2) which estimate the
impact of changes in monetary policy rate (BI rate) and reserve rate on banks portfolio allocation in
loans, securities, interbank assets and deposits. We present the empirical findings on the aggregate
policy impact on these portfolio items followed by estimates which test whether the policy impacts
differ across banks groups and sub-periods. We define the bank groups by the following categories:
(1)Size of assets (small, medium, and large banks), (2)Level of capital (lowly, adequately, and
highly capitalized banks), and (3)Type of ownership (domestic and foreign banks). We divide
the observations into three sub-periods around the 1997 crisis (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis
periods) to test whether the 1997 crisis had impact on shifting banks’ responses to policy actions.5
1.5.1 The Aggregate Policy Impact
Loans
The first column of table 12 presents estimates on the aggregate policy impact of BI rate and
reserve rate on bank loans during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. An increase in the
BI rate generates contractionary effects on loans during all periods except in the post-crisis period.
A one percent increase in the BI rate during the pre-crisis and crisis periods reduces loan-to-asset
ratio by 0.03 percent on impact, while the 3-month cumulative impact of same shocks is to decrease
loans by 0.08 percent. We find that during the post-crisis period the impact of BI rate reverses; a
5We do not include the 2008 crisis into consideration as no significant changes on banks’ balance sheet during this
period (refer to Section 1.3.2)
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one percent increase in the BI rate raises the aggregate loan-to-asset ratio by 0.286 percent.
In the pre-crisis period, we find that an increase in the BI rate has the intended effects on
reducing bank loans. During this period as the economy continued to grow, demand for loans are
high and the credit markets are booming. Banks aggressively extend loans as indicated by a high
average of loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) at 106.6 percent. Banks rely heavily on debt to satisfy lack
of funding from deposits; debts on average represent 17.72 percent of banks’ total assets (see top
left panel of table 2). During this period an increase in the BI rate causes stronger pressure on an
already tight banks’ liquidity which then induces deeper reduction in loans.
During the crisis period we expect monetary policy to have stronger contractionary effects on
bank loans. Given plummeting economic condition, loans demand decrease as borrowers post-
pone new loans. In addition, banks are reluctant to lend as borrowers’ default risk increases. In
this period an increase in the monetary policy rate generates additional contractionary effects on
both supply and demand side of loans. Loan supply reduces as banks face tighter liquidity, while
demand for loans decreases as the cost of borrowing increases.
The 1997 crisis in Indonesia triggered a harsh banking crisis. Fortunately, the bank restructur-
ing program was able to revive the banking system which were severely hit by the crisis. During
the post-crisis period, banks were able to lower their balance sheets’ exposures to debt; the average
bank’s debt-to-asset ratio in this period was at 2.47 percent, much lower than in the pre-crisis pe-
riod at 17.72 percent (refer to table 2). Household confidence in the banking system also increased;
the average deposit-to-asset ratio was rose from 57.02 percent during the pre-crisis period to 74.95
percent in the post-crisis period. Despite having abundant liquidity, banks’ intermediary function
had not fully recovered; the average LDR were only 66.2 percent.
During the post-crisis period, banks and regulators were giving incentives to boost loan growth
by simplifying the loan process and lowering fees. The efforts seem to have been successful. In
spite of being hit by the 2008 global financial crisis (the crisis II period), banks’ LDR increased
to 78.2 percent and later reached 84.7 percent after the 2008 crisis. During this period, the strong
loan growth may conceal the contractionary effects of monetary policy thus in the aggregate level
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we find that an increase in the BI rate coincides with higher loan-to-asset ratio.6
In addition, the first column of table 12 also shows how changes in the reserve rate affect loans:
a one percent increase in the reserve rate decreases the aggregate loan-to-asset ratio by 0.303
percent. However, this impact is only statistically significant with three months lags. We find
that the impact of an increase in the reserve rate on loans during the pre-crisis is not statistically
different from the impact of similar shocks in the post-crisis period.7
The above findings show that during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, a one percent
increase in the reserve rate causes a much deeper reduction in loans than similar shock in the BI
rate. These results suggest that the reserve rate is a more effective instrument than the BI rate in
curbing the aggregate loan growth.
Securities
The second column of table 12 shows that the impact of a one percent increase in the BI rate is
to lower asset allocation in securities by 0.016 percent with 2-months lags. However, the long run
impact of similar shocks is to raise securities by 0.01 percent to total assets. This table also shows
that the impact of BI rate on securities during the crisis period is not statistically different from its
impact in the non-crisis periods.
In addition, we find that during the post-crisis the impact of reserve rate on securities is not
statistically different from zero. However, in the pre-crisis we find that a higher reserve rate posi-
tively affects asset allocation in securities. During this period a one percent increase in the reserve
rate raises securities-to-asset ratio by 0.201 percent.
Interbank Asset
The third column of table 12 shows the aggregate policy impact of BI rate and reserve rate on
bank asset allocation in interbank market. We find that both BI rate and reserve rate have negative
effects on the total bank asset in interbank market. The impact of a one percent increase in the BI
rate is to reduce interbank-to-asset ratio by 0.063 on impact. Similar shocks cause 0.052 percent
6Later in the bank groups level analysis, we test whether this anomaly result holds
7There are no changes in reserve rate during the 1997 crisis period
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3-month cumulative reduction in interbank assets. We find that the impact of BI rate on interbank
assets do not vary across sub-periods.
This findings show that an increase in the reserve rate negatively affects banks asset allocation
in the interbank market. However, the findings show that the impact of reserve rate on interbank-
to-asset ratio during the pre-crisis period is not statistically different from its impact in the post-
crisis period. A one percent increase in the reserve rate during these periods causes 0.623 percent
reduction in interbank-to-asset ratio.
Deposits
The last column of table 12 shows that an increase in the BI rate causes 0.095 percent reduction
in deposits with 2-months lags. However, in the long run the aggregate deposit-to-asset ratio
increases by 0.069 percent following a one percent increase in the BI rate. In addition, we find no
statistically significant evidence that the impact of BI rate on deposits vary across sub-periods.
The findings show that an increase in the reserve rate negatively affects deposit-to-asset ratio
with lags. A one percent increase in the reserve rate causes 0.419 percent reduction in deposits.
We find that the impact of reserve rate on deposits during the pre-crisis period are not statistically
different from its impact in the post-crisis period.
1.5.2 The Policy Impact on Bank Group by Asset Size
Loans
The first column of table 13 provides estimates on how changes in the BI rate and reserve rate
affect loans of small, medium, and large banks during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.
The findings show that a one percent increase in the BI rate during the pre-crisis and crisis periods
induces 0.088 percent reduction in small banks’ loans. During these periods, we find that the
impact of an increase in the BI rate on medium and large banks’ loans are not statistically different
from its impact on small banks.
In the post-crisis period an increase in the BI rate has a stronger contractionary effects on large
banks: a one percent increase in the BI rate reduces large banks’ loan-to-asset ratio by 0.169 per-
cent, approximately two times larger than its impact in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. However,
we find that the impact of an increase in the BI rate on small and medium banks reverses. Similar
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shocks raise loan-to-asset ratio on small and medium banks by 0.33 percent. As the majority of
banks (77 out of 88) belong to small and medium categories, these results lead the BI rate to have
an unintended positive impact on loans at the aggregate level during the post-crisis period.
During the post-crisis period as the economy started to recover, demand for loans were rapidly
increased; the average loan-to-asset ratio rises from 46.97 percent during the crisis period to 60.42
percent at the end of post-crisis period. During this period, given an increase in the BI rate large
banks, which lend mostly to big firms, may expect declining loans demand as these firms were able
to switch to non-bank fundings. In contrast, small-medium banks’ loans demand are less affected
since the majority of these banks’ borrowers are small firms which are highly bank dependent.
This table also shows that the impact of reserve rate on loans in the pre-crisis period vary based
on size of bank assets. During this period, a one percent increase in the reserve rate causes a 0.18
percent reduction in small banks’ loans. Similar shocks have an opposite impact on increasing
loans in medium and large banks by 0.342 percent and 0.164 percent, respectively. Medium-large
banks have competitive advantages over small banks to raise debt to replace reduced liquidity due
to an increase in the reserve rate. During this period, average debt-to-asset ratio of medium and
large were at 26.82 percent and 28.85 percent, respectively, a substantially higher figures than
small banks’ debt at 8.52 percent (refer to table 4).
During the post-crisis period, an increase in the reserve rate decreases loans in all asset size
categories. However, the magnitude of its impact varies. A one percent increase in the reserve
rate decreases small banks’ loans by 0.18 percent, while reducing medium and large banks’ loans
by 0.264 percent and 0.442 percent, respectively. During this period reserve rate has a stronger
contractionary effects than the pre-crisis period as banks are better regulated to maintain a low
exposure to debts. In the post-crisis period, banks managed to reduce their debt-to-asset ratio:
small banks’ debts level were at 1.45 percent (down from 8.52 percent), while in medium and
large banks debts represent 2.63 percent (down from 26.82 percent) and 3.07 percent (down from
28.85 percent) of total assets, respectively (refer to table 5).
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Securities
The second column of table 13 shows that an increase in the BI rate has uniform impact across
sub-periods on small and large banks’ securities. A one percent increase in the BI rate reduces
securities-to-asset ratio by 0.016 percent with 2-months lags. However, the long-run impact of
similar shocks is to slightly raise securities-to-asset ratio of small and large banks by 0.006 percent.
The impact of an increase in the BI rate on medium banks is weaker. A one percent increase in
the BI rate causes only 0.003 percent reduction in medium banks’ securities with 2-months lags.
In the long run, similar shocks raise securities-to-asset ratio of medium banks by 0.019 percent.
This table also shows that the impact of an increase in reserve rate on securities are not statistically
different from zero.
Interbank Assets
We find that an increase in the BI rate and reserve rate have statistically significant impact on re-
ducing bank assets in interbank market. A one percent increase in the BI rate causes 0.012 percent
reduction in small banks’ interbank-to-asset ratio, while decreasing interbank assets of medium
banks by 0.095 percent (refer to the third column of table 13). The impact of similar shocks is
to lower the interbank-to-asset ratio of large banks by 0.085 percent. The findings show that the
impact of BI rate on interbank assets vary by the size of bank assets. However, the magnitude of
its impact on each bank size categories are not statistically different between crisis and non-crisis
periods.
The findings also show that an increase in the reserve rate has a strong contractionary effects
on banks asset allocation in interbank market. However, its impacts are not statistically different
between each bank size categories and across sub-periods. The interbank-to-asset ratio of small,
medium, and large banks reduce by 0.621 percent in response to a one percent increase in the
reserve rate during the crisis and non-crisis periods.
Deposits
The last column of tabel 13 shows that the impact of an increase in BI rate vary by bank with
different size of assets. However, its impact during the crisis period are not statistically different
from the non-crisis periods. A one percent increase in the BI rate reduces small banks’ deposits
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by 0.095 percent with 2-months lags. However, in the long run similar shocks raise small banks’
deposits by 0.018 percent.
The 2-months lags impact of an increase in the BI rate is to raise deposits of small banks by
0.016 percent, while slightly reducing large banks’ deposits (by 0.007 percent). We find that the
long-run impacts of similar shocks are to increase deposit-to-asset ratio of medium and large banks
by 0.129 percent and 0.106 percent, respectively.
This table also shows that changes in the reserve rate have different impacts on deposits of all
bank size categories and across sub-periods. During the pre-crisis period, a one percent increase in
the reserve rate reduces small banks’ deposit-to-asset ratio by 0.842 percent, while causing deeper
reduction of deposits on medium and large banks by 2.059 percent and 2.402 percent, respectively.
In the period after the 1997 crisis, small banks deposits’ responses are the anomaly in the group.
Given a one percent increase in the reserve rate, small banks deposits increase by 0.226 percent,
whereas similar shocks reduce deposit-to-asset ratio of medium and large banks by 0.991 percent
and 1.334 percent, respectively.
The impact of an increase in the reserve rate on reducing deposits are substantially larger in the
period before the 1997 crisis. In this period, external fundings were easily accessible and banks
maintain a very high level of debt-to-asset ratio. Therefore given a higher cost of holding deposits
(due to an increase in reserve rate), the majority of banks reduce a larger portion of their deposits to
be substituted by debts. In contrast, during the post-crisis period regulations and prudential bank
practices which have been implemented following the bank restructuring program limit banks’
exposures to debts. As debts cannot be easily obtained as deposits substituted, we expect similar
shocks to induce lower reduction in deposits.
1.5.3 The Policy Impact on Bank by Capital Level
Loans
The first column of table 14 shows that during the pre-crisis and crisis periods, high-capitalized
banks reduce their loans by 0.084 percent in response to a one percent increase in the BI rate. Dur-
ing these periods, adequately-capitalized and low-capitalized banks loans’ responses to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy are not statistically different from the high-capitalized category. Given
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a one percent increase in the BI rate during the post-crisis period, adequately-capitalized banks
substantially reduce their loans by 0.887 percent. In contrast, similar shocks cause an increase in
the loan-to-asset ratio of low and high-capitalized banks (by 0.37 percent).
This table also shows that given a one percent increase in the reserve rate during the pre-crisis
period, high-capitalized banks reduce their loans by 0.01 percent. In this period the impact of
similar shocks on loans do not vary across banks with different level of capital. During the post-
crisis period we find that an increase in the reserve rate has a much stronger contractionary effects
on loans than the same shocks in the pre-crisis period. A one percent increase in the reserve
rate causes 0.536 percent reduction in loans of high-capitalized banks; adequately-capitalized and
low-capitalized banks’ responses to similar shocks are not statistically different from the high-
capitalized category.
Securities
During the pre-crisis and crisis periods, a one percent increase in the BI rate reduce high-
capitalized banks’ securities by 0.016 percent with 2-months lags, while in the long run high-
capitalized banks increase their securities-to-asset ratio by 0.014 percent in response to similar
shocks (refer to the second column of table 14). In these periods, given similar shocks adequately-
capitalized and low-capitalized banks’ responses are not statistically different from the responses
of high-capitalized category.
During the post-crisis period we find that each bank category has different responses to changes
in the BI rate; a one percent increase in the BI rate reduces high-capitalized banks’ securities by
0.016 percent, but increases the securities-to-asset ratio of low-capitalized banks (by 0.363 percent)
and adequately-capitalized bank (by 0.324 percent); these results are statistically significant with
2 months lags. During this period, similar shocks induce the long-run largest increment in the
securities-to-asset ratio of low-capitalized category (by 0.393 percent), followed by the adequately-
capitalized category (by 0.322 percent) and the high-capitalized category (by 0.014 percent).
Table 14 shows that the impact of an increase in the reserve rate on securities is not statistically
different from zero except for the adequately-capitalized banks. A one percent increase in the
reserve rate induces the adequately-capitalized banks to have a larger asset allocation in securities
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by 0.407 percent; the impacts do not vary across periods.
Interbank Assets
The third column of table 14 shows that the high-capitalized banks reduce their assets allocation
in interbank market by 0.041 percent in response to a one percent increase in the BI rate. The
findings shows that similar shocks cause deeper reduction in interbank assets of the adequately-
capitalized banks (by 0.113 percent). The impact of BI rate on these bank categories during the-
crisis period are not statistically different from its impact in the non-crisis periods. The findings
also show that given a one percent increase in the BI rate during the pre-crisis period, the low-
capitalized banks substantially reduce their interbank assets by 0.62 percent. In the subsequent
periods, we find that BI rate has smaller impact on low-capitalized banks; a one percent increase
in the BI rate causes only 0.032 percent reduction in interbank assets of low-capitalized banks.
This table also shows that an increase in the reserve rate negatively affects banks asset alloca-
tion in interbank market. A one percent increase in the reserve rate reduces interbank-to-asset ratio
by 0.622 percent. The impact of reserve rate on interbank assets does not vary between periods,
neither across banks with different level of capital.
Deposits
The findings show that a one percent increase in the BI rate decreases deposits of high-capitalized
banks by 0.095 percent with 2-months lags. In the long run, similar shocks raise deposit-to-asset
ratio of the same banks by 0.062 percent. The findings also show that the impacts are similar
across periods. In addition, we find that the same shocks have no statistically different impact on
adequately and low-capitalized banks.
The findings also show that an increase in the reserve rate causes reduction in deposits. Given
a one percent increase in the reserve rate, deposit-to-asset ratio of high and low-capitalized banks
reduce by 0.295 percent. Reserve rate has substantially larger impact on deposits of adequately-
capitalized banks; a one percent increase in reserve rate reduce deposits of this bank category by
1.094 percent. We find that the impact of reserve rate in the pre-crisis period is not statistically
different from its impact during the post-crisis period.
30
1.5.4 The Policy Impact on Bank by Type of Ownership
Loans
The findings show that foreign banks have a deeper loans reduction than domestic banks in
response to an increase in the BI rate during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. During these periods,
a one percent increase in the BI rate reduces foreign banks’ loans by 0.176 percent, while causing
only 0.062 percent reduction in loans of domestic banks (refer to the first column of table 15).
During the post-crisis period, the impact of similar shocks on domestic banks is not statistically
different from its impact in the earlier periods. However, we find that given an increase in the BI
rate during the post-crisis period foreign banks show an anomaly responses; foreign banks increase
their loans by 0.923 percent following a one percent increase in the BI rate.
During the pre-crisis period, a one percent increase in the reserve rate induces foreign banks
to decrease their loan-to-asset ratio by 0.119 percent, while causing domestic banks to slightly
increase their loans by 0.002 percent. Given similar shocks in the post-crisis period, foreign banks’
responses are not statistically different from the pre-crisis period’s responses. However, we find
that during this period reserve rate have a much stronger contractionary effects on domestic banks’
loans; loan-to-asset ratio of domestic banks drop by 0.648 percent following a one percent increase
in reserve rate.
Securities
We find that the 2-months lags impact of an increase in the BI rate is to reduce domestic banks’
securities by 0.017 percent, while expanding foreign banks’ securities by 0.015 percent. In the
long run similar shocks positively affect banks’ asset allocation in securities. Domestic banks
increase their asset share in securities by 0.004 percent following a one percent increase in the BI
rate (refer to the second column of table 15). Similar shocks induce foreign banks to raise their
securities-to-asset ratio by 0.036 percent. In addition, we find that the impacts of BI rate on foreign
and domestic banks’ securities do not vary across periods.
The findings show that during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, a one percent increase in
the reserve rate causes foreign banks to lower their asset allocation in securities by 0.361 percent.
During these periods, similar shocks have no statistically significant impact on domestic banks’
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securities-to-asset ratio.
Interbank Assets
The third column of table 15 shows that during the crisis period, domestic banks reduce their
asset allocation in interbank market by 0.046 percent following a one percent increase in the BI
rate. The impact of similar shocks during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods are not statisti-
cally different from its impact in the crisis period. In addition, we find no statistically significant
evidence that foreign banks respond differently from domestic banks.
The findings show that a one percent increase in the reserve rate induce domestic banks to
reduce their interbank assets by 0.621 percent. The impact of reserve rate are common across peri-
ods. The findings also show that given similar shocks foreign banks’ responses are not statistically
different from domestic banks.
Deposits
We find that in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, the impact a one percent increase in the BI
rate is to reduce deposits of domestic banks by 0.096 percent, while having an opposite effects
on increasing foreign banks’ deposits by 0.095 percent; both results are statistically significant
with 2-months lags. During these periods, the long run impact of similar shocks is to cause 0.034
percent increment in domestic banks’ deposit-to-asset ratio, while boosting foreign banks’ deposits
by 0.225 percent.
In the post-crisis, we find that the impact of an increase in the BI rate on domestic banks’
deposits are not statistically different from its impact in the earlier periods. However, similar
shocks induce a significantly different effects on foreign banks’ deposit-to-asset ratio; a one percent
increase in the BI rate during the post-crisis period reduce foreign banks’ deposits by 0.347 percent.
The findings show that an increase in the reserve rate has statistically significant impacts on
banks’ deposits. A one percent increase in the reserve rate during the pre-crisis and post-crisis
periods reduces deposits of domestic bank by 0.322 percent. The findings also show that the
impacts on domestic and foreign banks are not statistically different from zero.
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1.6 Conclusion
Using monthly banking panel data from April 1993 to July 2014, we estimate the impact of
changes in the monetary policy rate (BI rate) and reserve rate on bank portfolio allocation around
the 1997 Asian crisis periods (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis). The findings show that an increase
in the BI rate causes reduction in securities, deposits, and interbank assets during all sub-periods.
Similar shock decreases loans in the pre-crisis and crisis periods, but leading to higher loans during
the post-crisis period. The findings also show that the impact of an increase in the reserve rate is
to reduce loans, interbank assets, and deposits during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, while
having statistically significant impact on increasing securities only during the pre-crisis period.
An increase in the BI rate has the largest impact on reducing large banks’ loans. Given a
higher cost of bank borrowings large banks, which lend mostly to big firms may expect declining
loans demand as these firms were able to switch to non-bank fundings. In contrast, small-medium
banks’ loans demand are less affected since the majority of their borrowers are small firms which
are highly bank dependent. Contrary to the impact of BI rate, an increase in the reserve rate leads
to the largest loans reduction in small banks as these banks will likely to have difficulty raising
non-deposits funds compare to medium and large banks.
After the 1997 Asian crisis, an increase in the BI rate and reserve rate generate stronger con-
tractionary effects on domestic banks’ loans than those of foreign banks. We find that during this
period similar shock induces substantial reduction in foreign banks’ deposits. This finding suggest
that foreign banks switch to lower cost external fundings thus being less affected by higher cost of
fundings in domestic market.
We find that a one percent increase in the reserve rate generates a substantial reduction on
deposits, whereas same shock in the BI rate slightly increases deposits. In addition, we also find
that a one percent increase in the reserve rate has a notably stronger contractionary effects on bank
loans than similar shock in the BI rate, particularly during the post-crisis period. These findings
imply that deposits are major source of bank fundings in Indonesia therefore policy actions targeted
at reducing the supply of loans are relatively more effective in curbing loan growth.
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CHAPTER 2
MONETARY POLICY AND BANKING SYSTEM IN INDONESIA: A REGIONAL
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
2.1 Introduction
A vast empirical literature has documented the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
and its impact to the real economy. Despite the extensive research analyzing the effect of mone-
tary policy, there are limited studies that examine the policy’s impact at disaggregated (regional)
level. The majority of these studies, particularly in the case of developing countries, focus on the
aggregate responses to monetary policy actions.
This paper fills the gap by studying the differential regional effects of monetary policy in In-
donesia. We evaluate the importance of regional heterogeneity for the effectiveness of monetary
policy actions. The aggregate effects of monetary policy depend on the distribution of regional
sensitivities to monetary policy and the distribution of economic conditions at the time of mon-
etary policy action (Fratantoni and Schuh (2003)). Differences in economic conditions across
regions may significantly affect how monetary policy affects the economy at national level. The
contributions of this paper are twofold. First, for the Central Bank, this research maps the differen-
tial impact of monetary policy across regions which eventually leads to a better understanding of
the transmission channels of monetary policy innovations in Indonesia. Second, the results serve
as potential inputs for the central and regional governments’ policy making. The results allow
regional authorities to identify distinct changes in their economic conditions in response to the
Central Bank’s policy actions. The paper may also provide policy input for the central govern-
ment which put focus on empowering the regional economy and promoting its role in the country’s
economic development.
The objectives of this study is to analyze the transmission channel of monetary policy at re-
gional level in Indonesia. We seek evidences whether the responses of regional output to changes
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in the monetary policy rate vary across provinces. This paper extends the existing literature by
providing empirical evidences of the regional impact of monetary policy in a developing coun-
try and examining the role of the regional banking system in the propagation of monetary policy
shocks while taking into account the inter-regions economic relationship and associated feedback
from policy shocks. In addition, this study provides empirical evidences on the impact of monetary
policy shocks channeled through the changes in the regional housing prices and consumer expec-
tation. Further, this paper analyze factors that contribute to the regional asymmetric responses to
monetary policy shocks.
We employ the impulse response function (IRF) from Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework
to document the dynamic provinces’ responses to changes in the monetary policy rate. We find that
changes in the monetary policy rate have different impact on bank loans and deposits across regions
suggesting the existence of interest rate and credit channel at the regional level in Indonesia. The
findings also show that several provinces with large reduction in bank loans due to a contractionary
policy also experience much slower economic activities. This result provides evidence of the
significant role of banking system in the propagation of monetary policy shocks. In addition, we
find that the trade openness, housing prices and consumer expectation change differently across
regions in response to monetary policy shock providing evidences of the exchange rate, asset price
and expectation channels at the island and provincial levels.
The findings show that the magnitude and duration of the impact of monetary policy shocks
vary across provinces providing evidences of the asymmetric impact of monetary policy. Further
analysis shows the shares of trade and mining are statistically significant in explaining the asym-
metric provinces’ responses to monetary policy shock. Given a contractionary monetary policy
shock, provinces with higher shares of trade and mining sector have larger reduction in GDP per
capita. However, we find that the share of manufacturing and the proportion of small firms are not
statistically significant in explaining the differential regional effects of monetary policy actions.
In addition, the findings show that the impact of the monetary policy shocks are more muted for
provinces which have land border with foreign countries. This results imply that geography is a
key factor in explaining the asymmetric provincial responses.
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides the overview of the Indonesian
provinces. The existing studies on the monetary policy transmission are discussed in section 2.3.
We present the empirical methodology in section 2.4. The empirical results from the VAR model
and analysis on the factors that contribute to the differential regional responses to monetary policy
shocks are presented in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. Concluding comments are presented in section 2.7.
2.2 Overview of The Regional Economy
Indonesia, with more than 17,000 islands, is the world’s largest archipelago country. The vast
number of islands were formerly divided into 26 administrative regions (provinces). Later, based
on the Regions Decentralization Act in 1999 several regions had been split into new provinces; in
2012 Indonesia consists of 34 provinces as shown in figure 10.1
Table 16 shows the selected islands and provinces’ indicators of Indonesian provinces grouped
by the country’s six main islands: (1)Java, (2)Sumatra, (3)Kalimantan, (4)Sulawesi, (5)Nusa Bali
and (6)Papua. This table summarizes the different levels of economic development, population
distribution and land area across regions in Indonesia.
The island of Java in which the capital region, Jakarta, resides, is the center of political ac-
tivity and economic development in Indonesia. It is the largest regional economy in the country,
representing 61.39 percent of the total gross domestic product (GDP). Being the largest regional
economy, the residents of Java enjoy the highest quarterly GDP per capita at 15,458.11 thousand
Rupiah. In addition, Java is also the most populous island as it is the home of almost 60 percent of
Indonesian, although accounting for only 6 percent of the country’s land area.
Java includes four other provinces besides the capital region: West Java, East Java, Central
Java and Yogyakarta. Due to their close proximities to the capital, these provinces gain advantages
in access to the country’s major economic infrastructures including road, housing, school, harbor,
and highway. In addition, large concentration of trade, financial, and manufacturing companies
are built and operated in Java. These factors contributed to transforming the provinces in Java
which formerly relied on trade of agricultural products into manufacturing, industrial and financial
1In order to maintain data consistency, we analyze the data based on the 26 provinces by merging the data of new
provinces founded after 1999 into their former provinces
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regions.
Located northwest to Java, the island of Sumatra is the second largest regional economy in
the country accounting for 20.93 percent of total GDP, with quarterly GDP per capita of 9,179.21
thousand Rupiah. Representing 24.08 percent of the total land area, Sumatra is divided into eight
provinces: North Sumatra, South Sumatra, Lampung, Riau, West Sumatra, Aceh, Jambi, and
Bengkulu. The revenue of these provinces are mainly derived from export of agriculture products
including coffee, palm oil, tea, and sugarcane. The island is also among the largest Indonesia’s
producer of oil, coal, tin, gold, and silver.
The island of Kalimantan refers to the part of the island of Borneo that belongs to Indonesia.
The northern part of the island of Borneo is the sovereign territory of Malaysia and Brunei. Kali-
mantan is the second largest island in Indonesia accounting for 27.08 percent of the country’s land
area. This island consists of 4 provinces: East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan,
and Central Kalimantan. More than 75 percent of this region are forest areas, thus forestry-related
products such as timber and processed wood are the mainstay of the Kalimantan’s economy. In
addition, oil, gas, rubber, and fishery are also the main contributors to the region’s economy. This
island’s economy represents 8.33 percent of the total GDP, with GDP per capita at 14,366.99 thou-
sand Rupiah per quarter. The province of East Kalimantan largely contribute to the high average
GDP per capita; East Kalimantan quarterly GDP per capita (31,383.69 thousand Rupiah) is the sec-
ond largest in the country below only the capital region (Jakarta’s is 45,565.70 thousand Rupiah
per quarter).
The island of Sulawesi, located in the east of Kalimantan, consists of four provinces: West
Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, and Southeast Sulawesi. The size of this island is
10.45 percent of the total land area and is inhabited by 7.32 percent of the total population. The
economy of Sulawesi represents 5 percent of the country’s total GDP, with GDP per capita of
7,085.07 thousand Rupiah per quarter. The main products of Sulawesi includes coconuts, nutmeg,
soy, coffee, and rice; the agricultural sector contributes to approximately 34 percent of Sulawesi’s
economy. In addition, fishery, commercial timber, and tourism are important contributors to the
island’s GDP.
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Nusa Bali consists of Bali, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara which are small
island provinces located east of Java. These provinces have the lowest average quarterly GDP
per capita (5,046.75 thousand Rupiah) and represent only 2.67 percent of the country’s total GDP.
Agriculture is the dominant sector in generating revenue for West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa
Tenggara, whereas for Bali, tourism (trade and services sector) contributes to approximately 50
percent of the economy.
Papua is the largest island in Indonesia; the size of Papua island represents 27.59 percent of
the country’s land mass. Despite its large area, the island is only inhabited by (approximately) 6
million, people which represents less than 3 percent of the total population. The island’s economy
accounts for 1.79 percent of the total GDP and its average GDP per capita is 5,984.57 thousand Ru-
piah per quarter. This island consists of two provinces: Papua and Maluku. The island Papua is at
the most easterly part of the country and is the largest island in Indonesia. Mining is the main con-
tributor to the province of Papua’s GDP; the Grasberg Mine, the largest gold mine and third largest
copper mine in the world, is located in this province. Along with agriculture and manufacturing,
mining sector contribute to approximately 60 percent of this province’s GDP. Maluku derives its
income mainly from agriculture, forestry and fisheries. These sectors account for approximately
25 percent of the Maluku’s GDP.
The statistics presented in table 16 imply large differences in term of the size of economy across
regions in Indonesia. The two largest islands’ GDP, Java and Sumatra, account for 82.32 percent
of total GDP; the share of Java’s GDP is approximately three times larger than Sumatra (refer to
figure 11a). The inequalities have widened over time as for many years the economic development
in Indonesia has been centered only in Java; measured by the size of GDP. Income per capita of
islands located farther away from Java show lower levels of economic development.
Figure 11b plots three observations of the frequency distribution of the GDP per capita across
provinces over the last twenty years. Each curve represents the distribution of GDP per capita at
a certain year around its mean. The curve in the beginning of the sample (1993Q2) suggests large
inequalities across provinces as it is heavily right skewed: the majority of the Indonesian provinces
have GDP per capita within one standard deviation below the mean, while a small number of them
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fall well above the mean. In order to depict how the inequalities across regions shifted over time,
we plot the three GDP distributions on one graph by normalizing around the mean of each year’s
observation. Figure 11b demonstrates additional evidence of the large differences in GDP per
capita across regions in Indonesia. However, we find that the inequalities have reduced over time.
In the fourth quarter of 2012, the distribution is less skewed than in previous periods as more
provinces’ GDP per capita are located closer to the mean.
Regions in Indonesia are also characterized with large differences in term of economic struc-
ture; industrial composition differs widely across islands in Indonesia (refer to table 17). Agricul-
tural sector is the largest contributor to the region’s economy except Java. In Java, manufacturing,
which is consider as an interest-sensitive sector, has the largest contribution to the economy, rep-
resenting 25.88 percent of total regional GDP. The share of manufacturing to regional GDP varies
widely in other islands. For example, the manufacturing sector in Kalimantan accounts for 20.13
percent, but only 5.1 percent of Nusa Bali’s regional GDP. The share of construction, which also
considered to be an interest-sensitive sector, also varies across islands. It ranges from a low of 5.21
percent in Sumatra to a high of 8.79 percent in Sulawesi. This table also shows large variation in
the share of mining sector, represented 23.37 percent of regional GDP in Papua, but only 1.46 per-
cent of Java’s regional GDP. The shares of all other sectors including trade, electricity, transport,
finance and services are also varied across regions, but to a lesser magnitude than manufacturing
and mining.
In addition to differences in industrial composition, the proportion of large and small firms also
varies across regions. Table 18 shows that the share of small firms’ output to regional GDP ranges
from a low of 11.72 percent in Kalimantan to a high of 59.20 percent in Nusa Bali. Java, the largest
regional economy, has 29.29 percent of their total GDP produced by small firms. Regions with
large share of mining sector: Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Papua, have relatively small proportion
of output represented by small firms; small firms’ output represent 16.06 and 11.72 percent of
regional GDP in Sumatra and Kalimantan, respectively, while accounted for 16.06 percent of GDP
in Papua.
39
2.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we provide a survey of selected literature which examine the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy in Indonesia. We document findings on how monetary policy actions
affects the real sector providing evidence for interest rate, credit, asset price, expectation, and ex-
change rate channels. In addition, based on the results in the existing studies we review several
factors that may contribute to our key question, the differential regional effects of monetary policy.
2.3.1 Monetary Policy Transmission Channels in Indonesia
The objective of Bank Indonesia (BI) is to achieve and maintain the stability of the Rupiah.
Under the adoption of the flexible exchange rate system, the exchange rate is determined by the
market, thus the mandate of the central bank is to control inflation. In order to achieve its objective,
it is crucial for BI to understand how the monetary policy affect the real economy. The following
subsections discuss the existing studies on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the
Indonesian economy.
Interest rate channel
The interest rate channel provides the mechanism on how the central bank’s policy affects the
real economy through changes in the demand side of the credit market. In the presence of sticky
prices, the central bank’s control over the short-term nominal interest rate directly impacts the real
interest rate. The change in the real interest rate alter the cost of capital which further influences
spending behavior of households and investment decisions of firms. These changes in consumption
and investment affect the level of aggregate demand and production. Thus, the change in the central
bank’s policy instrument directly affects investment spending by varying the cost of capital.
Astiyah and Husnan (2005) investigate the propagation of monetary policy shocks to the real
economy through the cost of capital using the Granger causality test and VAR analysis. The study
includes the possibility of structural break in the Indonesian economy following the 1997 financial
crisis; they divide the analysis into pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. The results reveal that the
real deposit rate and real investment credit rate were more responsive to monetary policy shocks
during the pre-crisis period.
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Before the crisis, consumption growth was not significantly affected by changes in the real de-
posit rate as the latter was relatively low and stable. The abundant sources of foreign borrowing in
the pre-crisis period undermined the effect of the real investment credit rate to investment growth.
The banking interest rate have limited influence on the real sector as investors have alternative
sources of funding from offshore borrowings and other sources such as high-risk paper.
In contrast, after the crisis consumption growth has been significantly driven by the real deposit
rate. Similarly, investment growth has been significantly influenced by the real investment credit
rate as investors now have limited access to foreign and other borrowing sources.
Credit channel
The credit channel provides an enhancement mechanism that complements the interest rate
channel in explaining how monetary policy affects the economy. This channel shows how the im-
pact of interest rate is magnified by the external finance premium (the difference between internal
and external source of funding). Bernanke and Gertler (1995) divides the credit channel into two
categories: balance sheet channel and bank lending channel.
The balance sheet channel focuses on the impact on the borrowers’ balance sheets and income
statements caused by changes in monetary policy, while the bank lending channel explains how
monetary policy may change the aggregate loan supply in the credit market. The balance sheet
channel shows that during a contractionary monetary policy episode small firms, due to higher
agency cost, should receive a relatively lower share of credit (the flight to quality). The reduced
spending, production and investment by high-agency-cost borrowers amplify the impact of tight
monetary policy (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)). The theory explains that in response to
contractionary monetary policy, banks may shift their loans toward lower-agency-cost borrowers
(large firms).
The bank lending channel works as follows. The contractionary monetary policy reduces bank
deposits. If the decrease in bank deposits are not replaced by other sources of funding, then bank
lending will fall. Hence, monetary policy will reduce the aggregate loan supply in the credit
market. Further in countries where banks are a dominant source of funding, the contractionary
monetary policy will reduce both investment and economic activity. The necessary condition for
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the existence of this channel is that bank loan and corporate bond are not perfect substitutes or
some borrowers are bank-dependent. This condition ensures that reductions in bank loan supply
cannot be fully replaced by bond and that borrowers have no alternative source of funding.
The study of Agung (1998) provides evidence on the low sensitivity of bank lending to a
monetary shock in the period before the 1997 crisis. During the tight money period, the loan
growth of banks was higher than the deposit growth indicating that banks could still provide loan
to borrowers by accessing offshore borrowing. Domestic banks, especially large banks, were major
issuers of bonds in international markets during this period.
Asset price channel
The Asset price channel explains how monetary policy influences investment and consumption
decisions of firms and households through real estate prices, stock prices, and exchange rates. A
change in the policy stance, for example, a decrease in the policy rate, induces adjustments in the
short-term money market. Economic agents respond by reallocating their savings towards non-
interest bearing assets such as real estate and stocks. The higher demand for said assets pushes the
prices of these assets upwards which further increases household wealth and consumption. Higher
stock prices increase market value thus induce higher investment. An expansion in domestic de-
mand eventually lead to higher economic growth.
Goeltom (2008) suggests that there is no evidence of a significant role of asset prices in trans-
mitting the monetary policy shocks in Indonesia prior to the 1997 crisis. Nevertheless, after the
crisis the study reports the existence of an asset price channel by analyzing the impact of policy
rate (SBI) on investment (Jakarta Composite Stock Price Index - JSX).
Expectation channel
The expectation channel describes the effects of changes in monetary policy stance on public
expectations of future interest rate, growth, income, and inflation. The changes in expectation af-
fect firms and households savings and investments portfolio decisions. Theoretically, the changes
in the agents’ behaviors will induce changes in aggregate demand, price, wage setting, and infla-
tion.
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Wuryandani, M. I., and H (2001) uses the expectation inflation data from the Bank Indonesia’s
business survey to test the existence of this channel in Indonesia after the 1997 crisis. The analysis
focuses on the post 1997 crisis period in considering the fact that the financial crisis would have
changed the expectation of inflation in Indonesia. Their impulse responses show that the policy
rate (BI rate) has immediate and strong impact on expected inflation: an indication that the market
view the BI rate as a signal of monetary policy. The effect of the BI rate on inflation begins in the
15th month after the shock which implies a long monetary policy lag. The paper concludes that in
general monetary transmission through an expectation inflation channel does exist.
Exchange rate channel
Astiyah and Husnan (2005) conducts a study on the exchange rate channel of monetary policy
in Indonesia using structural VAR. The research investigates the following: First, whether mone-
tary policy shocks propagate to the inflation rate through the exchange rate channel by comparing
the impact of policy shocks to a risk factor. Second, it measures the transmission of exchange rate
changes to the inflation rate through price (direct pass-through) and output (indirect pass-through)
effects.
The findings show that before the 1997 crisis the exchange rate channel in Indonesia was very
weak. The change in the policy rate did not have a significant impact on the exchange rate, and the
exchange rate was not an important determinant of inflation. However after the crisis there were
contrary evidence: changes in the exchange rate have significant impact on inflation. An appre-
ciation of the exchange rate lowers the inflation rate through its direct pass-through effect to the
production cost. The exchange rate appreciation could also increase consumption and investment
thus generating higher output growth through indirect pass-through effects.
2.3.2 Determinants of Differential Regional Effects of Monetary Policy
The existing literature suggests several determinants that lead to differential regional effects
of monetary policy. Carlino and DeFina (1998) argues three factors that may contribute to the
region’s differences. First, regional differences in the mix of interest-sensitive industries; the dif-
ferent composition of interest-sensitive industries which make up each region’s economy allow
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monetary policy actions to have differential regional effects. For example, region with predomi-
nantly capital-intensive industries could be more sensitive to changes in monetary policy. Second,
regional differences in the proportion of large and small firms; given tightening monetary policy,
large firms usually have greater access to external non-bank funding relative to small firms which
depend more on bank loans. As a result, regions with high proportion of small firms could have
larger responses to monetary policy actions.
The third factor suggested by Carlino and DeFina (1998) relate bank size with its ability to
provide loans. Kashyap and Stein (1995) suggests that contractionary monetary policy have larger
impact on reducing small bank’s lending ability than large banks; the latter can find alternative
funding options more cheaply and easily than small banks. Consequently, given contractionary
policy we expect regions with high proportion of small banks to have larger reduction in economic
activity due to lower credit availability. However, Carlino and DeFina (1998) also consider that
cross-regions lending may diminish this impact.2 Supporting this argument, Petersen and Rajan
(2002) documented an increasing trend in the distance between small firms and their lenders in
the United States. Their findings suggest that advances in computing and communications have
increased the availability and timeliness of hard information which in turn allow financial institu-
tions to lend to more distant clients. In addition, Carling and Lundberg (2002) find no evidence
that geographical proximity between borrowing firm and lending bank matter in credit risk man-
agement.
Other studies on the regional effect of monetary policy outside the United States suggest simi-
lar findings. Arnold and Vrugt (2002) studies the regional and sectoral effects of monetary policy
in the Netherlands for the period 1973 to 1993. This paper finds that large regional variation in
monetary policy transmission is significantly related to industrial composition. The same authors
in Arnold and Vrugt (2004) estimate the impact of interest rate shocks on regional output in Ger-
many and conclude that the differential regional effects of monetary policy are related to industrial
composition, but not to firm size or bank size.
2Borrowers may secure fundings from outside their own regions
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There also had been studies on the regional effect of monetary policy which focused on a
specific economic sector. Among others, Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) study the importance of
regional heterogeneity in housing market for the efficacy of monetary policy. This paper argues
that housing is a potential source of regional heterogeneity as it is a critical channel of monetary
policy transmission and a volatile leading indicator of business cycle, however, housing market
are characterized by idiosyncratic and regional factors. The results show significant differences
between the dynamic responses of model with and without housing. They argue that incorporat-
ing microeconomic heterogeneity such as housing market is important in assessing the effects of
monetary policy on macroeconomic conditions.
In the literature of banking and geography, there are different views on the importance of
physical distance on bank-firm relationship. O’brien (1992) argues that deregulation and modern
communications allows banks and other financial institutions not to be in financial centers. In
contrast, Tschoegl (2000) acknowledges that improvement in communication technology allows
banks to disperse from traditional center activities. However, at the same time the banks have kept
in the international financial centers in which involving innovative, customized activities and large-
scale transaction. This paper argues that bank location still matters for economic performance.
Alessandrini, Croci, and Zazzaro (2005) examines evidence that geography of banking may be
relevant at the international, national and inter-regional levels. Instead of using physical distance,
they study the impact of functional distance on bank performance. Functional distance is defined as
the economic distance from a region of a bank which, even physically close to local customers, has
its decisional center and strategic functions far away from it. Their findings suggest that economic
distance affects bank performance in terms of credit allocation, pricing, efficiency, and profitability,
which depend on the degree of development of regions to which banks are proximate; functional
distance has a positive impact on banking performance in the case of less developed areas.
The different effects of monetary policy actions also determined by the types of borrowers.
This argument consistent with broad credit view which emphasizes that information asymmetries
between lenders and borrowers may reduce the availability of loans in the credit market, particu-
larly for small firms. This small borrowers rely mainly on banks’ loan as it is too expensive for
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them to borrow on the open market by issuing securities. Therefore small firms are likely to be hit
the hardest by changes in monetary policy. Gertler and Gilchrist (1991) and Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993) study the different responses of large versus small firms to changes in monetary policy.
Their findings suggest that monetary policy shocks have a larger impact on small firms. In addi-
tion, using data for the U.S. manufacturing sector Oliner and Rudebusch (1993) provides evidence
that a contractionary monetary policy shifted loans from small firms to large firms.
Existing literature provides evidence on the relationship between the economy’ openness and
the effectiveness of monetary policy. Karras (1999, 2001) seek to provide evidence on how econ-
omy’s openness affect the impact of monetary policy on inflation and output.3 The findings suggest
that openness magnify the impact of monetary policy on inflation, whereas suppressing its impact
on output: the higher degree of openness, the smaller (larger) the output (inflation) effects of a
given change in money supply. Berument, Konac, and Senay (2007) also study how openness
affect the effectiveness of monetary policy in changing output growth and inflation. However,
they find no significant relationship between openness and the efficacy of monetary policy; the
direction, significance and nature of its relationship vary considerably across countries.
2.4 Data and Empirical Approach
The dataset consist of quarterly regional economic data and aggregate macro variables over the
period of 1993Q2 until 2012Q4. The regional data include the gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita, bank loans, bank deposits, inflation rate, housing price index, consumer expectation index
and regional export. The aggregate macro variables consist of the monetary policy rate (BI Rate),
inflation rate and exchange rate (USD/IDR). We acquire the regional data from the Economic and
Monetary Statistic Department of the Central Bank of Indonesia while the macro variables were
collected from the IMF Data Library.
Table 19 shows the aggregate and regional data availability in our dataset. The housing price
and consumer expectation indexes were collected from surveys conducted by Bank Indonesia.
The housing price survey compiles prices from a sample of 491 housing developers in 14 cities
3openness defined as the sum of export and import divided by total GDP
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while the consumer expectation survey gathers a sample from approximately 4,600 household
respondents in 18 cities in Indonesia. We use the sum of region’s export and import scaled by
province’s GDP as proxy for regional trade openness. We include trade openness to represent
exchange rate channel of monetary policy.
2.4.1 Empirical Approach
Having painted a picture of the different states of regional banking, industrial composition,
small firms’ contribution and demographics (see Section 2.2), we surmise that a one-size fits all
monetary policy will have differing effects across regions in Indonesia. For example, the different
states of regional banking will dictate the strength of the interest rate and credit channels in the
regions, the region’s industrial composition will determine whether exchange rate channel exists
(tradeable vs non-tradeable sectors), regions with higher degree of bank-dependent industrial sec-
tor could be more responsive to monetary policy, demographics and income will determine the
size/existence of asset price and expectation channels.
We employ Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework to study the impact of monetary policy
shocks in the aggregate and regional level. A VAR is an n-equation, n-variable linear model in
which we regress each variable on its own lags and the lagged values of other variables in the
system. The framework allows us to capture the dynamics in the time series data since each
variable has an equation explaining its evolution based on its own and other variables’ lags. This
method is relatively simple since the only prior knowledge is a list of variables which can be
hypothesized to affect each other intertemporally, and sometimes, intratemporally.
zt = C + A1zt−1 + . . .+ Apzt−p + ut (2.1)
Equation (2.1) shows the VAR specification where p is the number of lags and C represents a
constant and a dummy variable to incorporate the possible structural shift in the Indonesian econ-
omy following the 1997 financial crisis. In this model, we construct the column vector zt to
consist of these variables in the following order: RGDPi,t, RGDP−i,t, CPIt, XRt, BI Ratet,
RLoani,t, RLoan−i,t, RDepositi,t, RDeposit−i,t. We assume that changes in the monetary policy
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rate (BIRate) affects the variables ordered before it with a one-period lag: regional real output per
capita (RGDP ), inflation (CPI) and exchange rate (XR), while immediately affecting variables
ordered afterwards: regional bank loans (Loan) and regional bank deposits (Deposit).
We run the specification in equation (2.1) on all 26 provinces which are grouped into six is-
lands: Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa Bali and Papua. RGDPi,t is the real GDP per
capita for province i while RGDP−i,t consists of the aggregate real GDP per capita of the remain-
ing provinces within the same island of province i plus the aggregate real GDP per capita of the
other five islands. CPIt is the inflation rate, XRt is the exchange rate (USD/IDR), and BI Ratet
is the monetary policy rate. RLoani is the total of bank loans in province i while RLoan−i,t con-
sists of the total loans in the remaining provinces within the same island of province i plus the
loans of the other five islands. Depositi is the total bank deposits in province i while Deposit−i,t
consists of the total deposits in the remaining provinces within the same island of province i and
the total deposits in the other five islands.
The real gross domestic product of each province divided by the number of population,RGDPi,
represents the level of economic activities in each province. Bank loans (Loan) and deposits
(Deposit) account for the level of provinces’ banking development. The independent variables
with subscript −i,t are included to represent the inter-relationship between regional economy and
associated feedback from policy shocks.
2.5 Empirical Results
This section presents the estimation of the VAR models which shows the dynamic responses
of the aggregate and regional economic indicators to monetary policy shocks. We use impulse
response functions (IRF) of the VAR model specified in equation (2.1) to document the impact
of monetary policy shocks on (1)bank loans, (2)bank deposits, and (3)real GDP per capita. We
discuss the impact responses, the cumulative responses, and the same quarter responses of these
three economic indicators at island and provincial level.4 Instead of discussing the significance of
individual responses, we intend to use these IRFs along with the frequency distribution graphs to
4The trough period of aggregate responses
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depict the dispersions of the impact of monetary policy shocks across provinces in Indonesia.
In addition, we consider the propagation of monetary policy shocks through other transmission
channels: exchange rate, asset price, and expectation channel. We construct separate VAR models
to represent these channels using the following data: trade openness (exchange rate channel),
housing prices (asset price channel), and consumer expectation index (expectation channel). The
estimation of these models provides tests as to whether the impact of monetary policy varies across
regions and whether these channels exist at the regional level.
2.5.1 Bank Loans
Island Results
Figure 12 depicts the island loan growth responses in comparison to the aggregate loan growth
responses following a surprise one standard deviation increase in the monetary policy rate (BI rate).
This figure shows that given a higher BI rate the magnitude and duration of loan responses vary
across islands providing the evidence of asymmetric impact of monetary policy shocks on loan at
the regional level.
The largest reduction of loan growth for the aggregate (0.895 percent) and Java (1.037 percent)
occur in the second quarter after a surprise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate. The
largest loan growth reductions for Papua (2.814 percent), Kalimantan (1.120 percent), Sulawesi
(0.823 percent) and Sumatra (0.594 percent) are in the first quarter after the initial shock, whereas
Nusa Bali has its largest loan growth reduction (1.769 percent) in the eighth quarter following the
same shock. We find that these islands’ responses are statistically significant except for Nusa Bali.
The left panel of table 20 shows that the cumulative impact of a one standard deviation increase
in the BI rate is to reduce the aggregate loan growth by 3.243 percent. Similar shocks induce 7.538
percent cumulative reduction of loan growth in Papua, while leading to a much smaller cumulative
reduction of loan growth in Kalimantan (3.428 percent), Java (3.405 percent), Sulawesi (2.464
percent), Sumatra (2.172 percent), and Nusa Bali (1.769 percent).
Table 20 also shows that the immediate impact of a one standard deviation increase in the
BI rate is to reduce the aggregate loan growth by 0.586 percent, while its impact varies across
islands. The largest immediate reduction in loan growth is in Papua (2.814 percent) followed by
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Kalimantan (1.120 percent), Sulawesi (0.823 percent), Sumatra (0.594 percent), and Java (0.464
percent), respectively. In contrast, we find that the same shock raises the loan growth in Nusa Bali
by 0.023 percent on impact. These results are statistically significant except for Java and Nusa
Bali.
The above findings show that a contractionary monetary policy shock has the largest and most
persistent impact on reducing loan growth in Papua, whereas having the least impact in the Nusa
Bali region. In addition, we find that the aggregate loan’s response resembles that of Java; the
dominant share of Java at approximately 70 percent of total loans greatly influences the aggregate
loan growth’s responses to changes in the BI rate. These results show that monetary policy shocks
for the most part have the intended effects on regional bank loans: contractionary monetary policy
shocks lead to reductions in bank lending providing evidence of interest rate and credit channels at
the island level.
Provincial Results
The cumulative impact of a surprise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate is to reduce
the loan growth of all provinces. However, the magnitudes of the impact vary; table 21 shows
that the cumulative reduction in loan growth range from the smallest in West Sumatra (by 0.055
percent) to the largest in Maluku (by 14.71 percent). In addition, we find that a surprise one
standard deviation increase in the BI rate has immediate impact on reducing loan growth for the
majority of provinces (24 out of 26). We again find Maluku to have the largest immediate loan
reduction (by 3.451 percent), while the smallest reduction is in East Nusa Tenggara (0.019 percent).
Central Java and Riau are the anomalies to this group. The immediate impact of similar shocks is
to increase loan in Central Java (by 0.022 percent) and Riau (by 0.582 percent). However, these
results should be interpreted carefully as the confidence bands are wide.
All provinces in Java (figures 13b - 13f) have negative cumulative loan responses to a surprise
one standard deviation increase in the BI rate, however, the magnitudes vary. Table 21 shows
that the cumulative loan reductions of these provinces range from the largest in West Java (4.973
percent) to the smallest in Yogyakarta (0.258 percent). The immediate impact of a surprise one
standard deviation increase in the BI rate is to reduce loans in all Java’s provinces, except Central
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Java. However, given a sizeable uncertainties around these IRFs, caution must be taken when
interpreting these results.
A surprise one standard deviation increase in BI rate negatively affects loan growth of all
provinces in Sumatra (figures 13g - 13n). The cumulative reduction of loan growth in Sumatra
spans between 0.055 percent (in Riau) to 3.835 percent (in Jambi). Table 21 shows that the imme-
diate impact of similar shock on loans varies from the smallest reduction in Bengkulu (by 0.531
percent) to the largest reduction in Aceh (by 2.160 percent).
Given a surprise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate, table 21 shows that West Kali-
mantan has the largest cumulative reduction in loans (by 7.291), a substantially larger responses
than other provinces in the same island: Central Kalimantan (3.467 percent), East Kalimantan
(2.390 percent), and South Kalimantan (2.376 percent). Figures 13b - 13f show that similar shock
has statistically significant immediate impact on reducing loans in all provinces in Kalimantan,
except East Kalimantan.
In the island of Sulawesi, table 21 shows that the cumulative contractionary impacts of a sur-
prise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate on loans range from 0.879 (Southeast Sulawesi)
to 3.835 percent (South Sulawesi). Figures 13s - 13v show similar shock immediately reduces loan
growth in Central Sulawesi (by 0.579 percent) and South Sulawesi (by 0.642 percent); these results
are statistically different from zero.
Table 21 shows that a surprise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate reduce loan growth
in West Nusa Tenggara and Bali by 2.051 percent and 2.494 percent, respectively, while causing
only 0.755 percent loan growth reduction in East Nusa Tenggara. We find that none of these
provinces have statistically significant immediate responses to the BI rate shocks (figures 13w -
13y).
Figures 13z - 13aa show that provinces in the island of Papua (Maluku and Papua provinces)
have distinct pattern of loan responses compare to others. These provinces responses, Maluku in
particular, are much more volatile and longer in duration. Maluku cumulatively reduces its loan
growth by 14.710 percent, while Papua has 4.425 percent cumulative reduction in loans in response
to a one standard deviation increase in the BI rate (table 21). In addition, we find that similar shock
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has statistically significant immediate impact on reducing loans in Maluku (by 3.451 percent) and
Papua (by 1.431 percent).
Table 21 shows that the second quarter responses for majority of the provinces, which coin-
cides with the trough period of the aggregate loan response, are mainly negative (averaging -0.389
percent). These findings provide similar evidence to those found at regional level: contractionary
monetary policy shocks negatively affect loan growth suggesting the existence of interest rate and
credit channel at provincial level.
We construct frequency distribution graphs of the provincial responses to depict the dispersion
of the impact of monetary policy shocks on bank loans across provinces in Indonesia. Figure
14a shows the frequency distribution of the cumulative loan responses to a one standard deviation
increase in the BI rate; the distribution is slightly left skewed. However, the dispersions are not
considerably wide as most of these provinces’ responses still fall within one standard deviation
above the mean. Similar pattern is found in figure 14b in which we plot the impact provincial
responses to a one standard deviation increase in the BI rate.
In figure 14c, we plot the provinces’ responses which coincides with the period of the largest
reduction in the aggregate response. The pattern of the 2nd quarter provinces’ responses is different
from the cumulative and immediate responses. This figure implies a similar 2nd quarter responses
across provinces; the distribution is right skewed, however, the dispersion across provinces are
narrow as the majority of responses fall within one standard deviation below the mean. Figures
14a - 14c give a graphical depiction of the asymmetric bank loans’ responses to monetary policy
shocks at provincial level, for select points in the response period.
2.5.2 Bank Deposits
Island Results
Figure 15 shows that the immediate impact of higher BI rate is to reduce island deposit growth,
however, for majority of the islands the impact reverses in the third quarter after the initial shocks.
There are sizable dispersions around the aggregate response even up until ten quarters after the
initial shock. Table 20 shows that the immediate impact of a one standard deviation increase in the
BI rate is to reduce the aggregate bank deposits growth by 0.043 percent. Similar shocks reduce
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deposit growth in Java (by 0.116 percent), Kalimantan (by 0.232 percent), Sulawesi (by 0.071
percent), Nusa Bali (by 0.233 percent) and Papua (by 0.546 percent), whereas increasing deposit
growth in Sumatra by 0.016 percent on impact.
Table 20 shows that the cumulative impact of a surprise one standard deviation increase in
the BI rate is to raise the aggregate deposit growth by 0.515 percent. The cumulative impact of
similar shocks is to increase deposit growth across all islands except Java. This table shows that
the cumulative expansionary impacts extend from 0.080 percent (in Papua) to 1.174 percent (in
Sumatra). In constrast, the cumulative responses of Java island to a surprise one standard deviation
increase in the BI rate is to decrease deposit growth by 0.133 percent.
Table 20 also shows that the largest reduction of aggregate deposit growth (by 0.587 percent)
occurs in the second quarter after the BI rate shock. The largest reduction in deposit during the
second quarter response is in Sumatra (-0.548 percent) followed by Nusa Bali (-0.402 percent).
We find that the largest second quarter contractionary responses in Java (0.532 percent), Kali-
mantan (0.373 percent), Papua (0.306 percent), and Sulawesi (0.231 percent) are not statistically
significant.
The above findings show that the magnitude and duration of the impact vary across islands
providing evidence of the asymmetric impact of monetary policy shocks on regional bank deposits.
In addition, the results also serve as evidence of regional bank lending channel; fall in deposits
bolster the credit channel by reducing amount of funds available for loans.
Provincial Results
The cumulative impact of a surprise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate is to raise
deposit growth of the majority of the provinces. However, we find that the magnitudes of the
impact vary. The middle panel of table 21 shows that the cumulative increment in deposit growth
range from 0.308 percent (in Maluku) to 1.839 percent (in Riau).
We find mixed evidence on the immediate impact of a surprise one standard deviation increase
in the BI rate on deposit growth; given similar shock, 14 provinces show reduction in deposit,
while the rest of them (12 provinces) display a higher growth in deposit.
Figure 16b - 16f show that responding to a surprise one standard deviation increase in BI rate
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provinces in Java have similar pattern of changes in deposit growth, where there are as many
negative as positive responses on impact. The responses of provinces in Sumatra, Kalimantan Su-
lawesi, and Nusa Bali Papua display no discernible patterns worth mentioning. However, Maluku
and Papua, that displayed sizable drops in loans on impact suffered similar drops in deposits.
The middle panel of table 21 presents the cumulative, impact and second quarter responses of
bank deposits to changes in the BI rate at provincial level. This table shows that for majority of
the provinces the impact and second quarter deposit responses to higher BI rate are negative. The
average impact and second quarter deposit responses to a one standard deviation increase in the
BI rate is to reduce bank deposits by 0.046 percent and 0.164 percent, respectively. Similar shock
increase the provincial cumulative responses on average by 0.805 percent.
The frequency distribution graph in figure 17a shows large dispersion of cumulative responses
at the provincial level. The responses largely vary across provinces, although the entire distribution
is slightly skewed to the left as most of the responses fall within one standard deviation above the
mean. We find similar response pattern in figure 17b; the provincial immediate responses spread
out around the mean, nonetheless most of the them fall within one standard deviation below the
mean. Figure 17c shows that the majority of the second quarter provinces’ responses fall within
one standard deviation below the mean. These figures present further evidence on the asymmetric
impact of monetary policy shocks on deposit growth at provincial level.
2.5.3 Real GDP per capita
This subsection focuses on our key question: does monetary policy affect economic activities
of the regions differently?
Island Results
Figure 18 shows the changes in aggregate and island GDP per capita following a surprise
one standard deviation increase in the BI rate. Given contractionary monetary policy shocks the
magnitude and duration of the GDP per capita responses vary across islands providing evidence of
the asymmetric impact of monetary policy shocks on regional economic activities.
There is no difference in impact responses since monetary policy is restricted to not having
any immediate effects on this variable. However, in subsequent periods we see some divergent
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responses. Three quarters after shock all the IRFs, except that of Papua, behave similarly; Papua
has a milder drop after the initial rise in the second quarter. Thereafter, Papua stays positive
and even obtains a higher peak while the others experience a falls in output growth. Around
eight quarters after shock the responses display more synchronicity but twenty quarters out some
apparent differences remain.
The right panel of table 20 shows that the cumulative impact of a surprise one standard devi-
ation increase in the BI rate is to reduce the aggregate GDP per capita by 0.797 percent. Given
similar shock, the cumulative reduction in GDP per capita vary across islands from the smallest
in Papua (by 0.115 percent) to the largest in Java (by 0.843 percent). This table also shows that
two quarters after the BI rate shocks, GDP per capita for the aggregate and Java region decrease
by 0.018 percent and 0.007 percent, respectively. However, the GDP per capita in all other regions
rise in the second quarter following similar shocks; the largest increase is in Kalimantan (0.099
percent) followed by Nusa Bali (0.085 percent), Papua (0.068 percent), Sulawesi (0.058 percent),
and Sumatra (0.036 percent), respectively.
Given a one standard deviation increase in the BI rate, the largest reduction in regional output
per capita is in Java (-0.208 percent) followed by Sulawesi (-0.192 percent), Sumatra (-0.157),
Nusa Bali (-0.152), and Kalimantan (-0.138 percent), respectively; these responses occur in the
third quarter after the initial shocks. In Papua, the largest reduction in GDP per capita (-0.147 per-
cent) occurs in the seventh quarter after the BI rate rose. The impacts are statistically significant
in all islands except in Kalimantan and Papua. The above findings show that changes in the mone-
tary policy rate have intended effects on the regional economic activities: contractionary monetary
policy shocks lead to reduction in GDP per capita at island level.
Provincial Results
The cumulative impact of a surprise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate is to reduce
the GDP per capita of the majority of provinces. However, the magnitudes of the impact vary
(see the right panel of table 21). The cumulative reductions in GDP per capita extend from 0.046
percent (in Papua) to 2.167 percent (in Maluku). The Aceh, East Kalimantan, and West Nusa
Tenggara responses are the anomaly in this group; the cumulative impact of similar shock is to
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increase the GDP per capita in Aceh (by 0.074 percent), East Kalimantan (by 0.191 percent), and
West Nusa Tenggara (by 0.566 percent).
Figures 19b - 19f show that the impact of higher BI rate is to reduce GDP per capita in all Java’s
provinces. While West Java is the most sensitive to this contractionary policy its bank variables
responses were not as different from their norms (refer to figure 13b and 16b). In fact West Java
was one of the provinces that saw initial increases in both loans and deposits (though small in
magnitude) on impact, counter to what one would expect with such sizable output drop off.
Figures 19g - 19n show that majority of the provinces in Sumatra have similar GDP per capita
responses following contractionary monetary policy shocks. This figure shows that GDP per capita
in all Sumatra’s provinces (except Aceh) decrease in the second quarter after an increase in the BI
rate. The Aceh response is the anomaly of this group. It is positive after the first period and after
the tenth quarter is persistently negative for some time. Even after twenty quarters, when all the
other responses have asymptote to the x-axis the Aceh’s response shows no sign of converging.
Figures 19o - 19v show that for majority of the provinces in Kalimantan and Sulawesi the
second quarter impact of higher BI rate is to increase GDP per capita. However, three quarters
after the same shocks all of these provinces have reduction in their GDP per capita. Four of the
responses are positive for initial quarters, while the other three are clearly negative. There is more
dispersion in these responses compared to those of Java and Sumatra provinces.
The second quarter impact of higher BI rate is to increase GDP per capita for provinces in
Nusa Bali region, while negatively affect GDP per capita for provinces in Papua region (refer
to figure 19w - 19aa). These IRFs display the greatest disparity when compared to the previous
three presented, especially later in the response period, we see wider dispersions in IRFs: figure
19w show that West Nusa Tenggara has a clear positive response and approaches its steady state
from above, while in figure 19z Maluku’s responses is sizably negative and approaches its steady
state from below. Twenty periods out, unlike the other responses, Papua (see figure 19aa) has no
intention of returning to steady state.
Figure 20a shows that the cumulative GDP responses only slightly vary across provinces as the
majority of these responses (approximately 77 percent) fall close to the mean. Figure 20b, which
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plots the provinces’ responses in the fourth quarter after the BI rate increase, implies large variation
across provinces.5 Although the majority of responses are close to the mean, the distribution is
slightly right skewed as some responses fall under one standard deviation below the mean. The
above findings serve as evidence on the different impact of monetary policy on economic activities
at provincial level.
2.5.4 Discussion of Results
Table 22 outlines ten provinces with the largest reduction in loan growth following a one stan-
dard increase in BI rate, while tables 23 and 24 present the ten largest provincial reduction in bank
deposits and GDP per capita, respectively. Except for Jakarta, table 23 shows that contractionary
monetary policy shocks have no cumulative impact on reducing source of funds providing weak or
no evidence of bank lending channel.
These tables show that Maluku is the only province which appears in all three top ten lists,
attesting to disparities in IRFs across variables. The cumulative impact of a one standard deviation
increase in BI rate is to reduce loan growth in Maluku by 13.369 percent. However, the same shock
has positive cumulative impact on deposit growth in said province. These findings imply that re-
duction in loan is not the result of limited source of funds suggesting evidence of a strong interest
rate channel but a weak bank lending channel in Maluku; higher interest rate prevents new bor-
rowings which then reduces demand for loans. In Maluku a one standard deviation increase in the
monetary policy rate has intended effect on lowering economic activity (2.135 percent reduction
in GDP per capita).
Tables 22 and 24 show that in addition to Maluku, West Java, Aceh and East Java are provinces
with large reductions in loan growth that also have slower economic activities due to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock. However, similar shocks have no discernible effect on reducing
bank deposits in these regions. These findings again provide evidence of a strong interest rate
channel but weak or no support for the existence of bank lending channel.
5the maximum impact in the aggregate level
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2.5.5 Other Channels of Monetary Policy
In the following subsections, we complement the study by analyzing the propagation of mone-
tary policy shocks through exchange rate, asset price and expectation channels. In order to estimate
whether these channels of monetary policy exist, we modify the VAR model in Section 2.4.1 to in-
clude the following data series: regional trade openness (exchange rate channel); regional housing
price (asset price channel); regional consumer expectation (expectation channel). In addition, we
use regional (cities) inflation data to account for the role of regional inflation heterogeneity.
We define two VAR models to estimate the evidence of the three other channels of monetary
policy: First, VAR in equation (2.2) estimates the existence of exchange rate channel. Second,
equation (2.3) tests the existence of asset price and expectation channel. We analyze these chan-
nels separately to allow estimation of exchange rate channel using longer data series for trade
openness.6
zat = C + A1z
a
t−1 + . . .+ Apz
a
t−p + ut (2.2)
In equation (2.2), the column vector, zat , consist of the following series: RGDPi,t, RGDP−i,t,
RCPIt,XRt, TradeOpeni,t, TradeOpen−i,t,BI Ratet, Loani,t, Loan−i,t,Depositi,t,Deposit−i,t.
In this model we assume the monetary policy rate (BIRate) affects variables ordered before it with
a one-period lag: real GDP per capita (RGDP ), regional inflation (RCPI), exchange rate (XR),
and regional trade openness (TradeOpen), while immediately affecting variables ordered later:
bank loans (Loan) and bank deposits (Deposit).
zbt = C + A1z
b
t−1 + . . .+ Apz
b
t−p + ut (2.3)
In equation (2.3), the column vector, zbt , consist of the following series: RGDPi,t, RGDP−i,t,
RCPIt,XRt,BI Ratet, Loani,t, Loan−i,t,Depositi,t,Deposit−i,t,RHousingi,t,RHousing−i,t,
RConsExpi,t, RConsExp−i,t. In this model we again assume the monetary policy rate (BIRate)
6Regional trade openness data available since 2000, while consumer expectation index and housing price only
available starting 2001 and 2006, respectively (refer to Table 19)
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affects variables ordered before it with a one-period lag: real GDP per capita (RGDP ), regional
inflation (RCPI) and exchange rate (XR), while immediately affecting variables ordered after:
bank loans (Loan), bank deposits (Deposit), regional housing prices (RHousing), and regional
consumer expectations (RConsExp).
We include TradeOpen−i,t, RHousing−i,t, and RConsExp−i,t in both equations (2.2) and
(2.3) to represent the inter-relationship between regions and feedback from policy shocks. TradeOpen−i,t
includes the average trade openness of the remaining provinces within the same island of province
i and the average trade openness in the other five islands. RHousing−i,t consists of the average
housing price index of the remaining provinces within the same island of province i and the aver-
age housing price index in the other five islands. Similarly, RConsExp−i,t consists of the average
consumer expectation index of the remaining provinces within the same island of province i and
the other five islands.
We calculate regional inflation (RCPIi,t) by taking the average inflation rate of all cities lo-
cated in province i. Similarly, regional housing price (RHousingi,t) and regional consumer expec-
tation (RConsExpi,t) are the average values of these variables for all cities in province i. Table 19
shows the limitation in regional data availability therefore models in equation (2.2) and (2.3) are
estimated using shorter sample sizes than those in Section 2.4.1.
Regional Trade Openness
The findings show that an increase in the BI rate has the intended effects on trade openness
(the share of export and import to total GDP). A contractionary monetary policy leads to exchange
rate appreciation, a stronger financial account, and a weaker current account. Therefore, given an
increase in the BI rate we expect to have reduction in trade openness measure. In addition, we find
that provinces with high export-to-import ratios have higher sensitivities to an increase in the BI
rate.
Figure 21 shows that the overall impact of an increase in the BI rate is to reduce trade openness
at the island level. Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi show similar responses. Kalimantan and Nusa
Bali experience increase in trade openness at first, however, after four quarters their IRFs display
similar pattern. Papua shows distinct responses as its trade openness measure sharply increases
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and stays positive during the first five quarters; the IRF of Papua shows similar pattern afterwards.
Figures 22b - 22f show that an increase in the BI rate has no compelling impact on trade
openness in Yogyakarta, Central Java, and East Java, while in contrast, similar shocks generate
sizable reduction of trade openness in West Java and Jakarta. Figure 22g - 22n show that similar
shocks reduce trade openness in all provinces in Sumatra, although majority of these provinces
display brief increase during the first three quarters responses.
The impact of an increase in the BI rate on trade openness vary across provinces in Sumatra
(figures 22g - 22n). Given a surprise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate, we find a
sizeable reduction in trade openness in Jambi, North Sumatra, Riau, South Sumatra and Lampung.
However, similar shock cause no compelling impact on trade openness in Bengkulu, Aceh, and
West Sumatra.
Figures 22o - 22r show that a contractionary monetary policy induce large reduction of trade
openness measure in South Kalimantan but having moderate to non-sizable impact in other provinces
in island of Kalimantan. Unlike other provinces in Sulawesi (figures 22s - 22v), we find that a sur-
prise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate has no compelling impact on trade openness
in Central Sulawesi. In addition, we also find that similar shocks induce non-significant impact
on trade openness in Nusa Bali provinces, except for West Nusa Tenggara which displays positive
responses during the first five quarters but reduction in trade openness afterwards. (see figures 22w
- 22y).
Figure 22z shows an anomaly responses in the province of Maluku. Given an increase in the
BI rate, trade openness measure in Maluku sharply increases and stays in the positive zone until
the sixth quarters after the shocks; the IRF becomes negative in the seventh quarter responses and
returns to equilibrium approaching the twentieth quarters. Figure 22aa shows that same shocks
have consistent negative impact on trade openness measure in Papua.
Figures 23a and 23b display similar dispersion pattern of trade openness’ responses to mon-
etary policy actions. Both figures show that the cumulative and aggregate maximum responses
widely vary across provinces. Some responses are in the right tail, but overall the distribution are
skewed to the left as more responses fall one standard deviation above the mean.
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Housing Prices
Figure 24 plots the responses of housing prices to monetary policy actions across regions over
twenty quarters period. Given a contractionary monetary policy actions, Nusa Bali is the anomaly
in the group as it shows large positive impact responses. The group’s impact responses are mainly
positive except for Sulawesi that responded negatively at first. However, after eleventh quarters
all the IRFs, with the exception of Sumatra, display similar pattern. Again, caution must be taken
when interpreting these results as there are sizeable uncertainties around the IRFs.
The aggregate impact of monetary policy shock on housing prices is small in magnitude. Table
25 shows that given a surprise one standard deviation increase in the BI rate, the aggregate housing
prices rise by 0.135 percent on impact. In the ninth quarter, the aggregate housing prices decrease
by 0.027 percent. During the subsequent periods as the impact of higher BI rate weakens, the
aggregate housing prices return to its equilibrium level. In cumulative the impact of higher BI rate
is to increase aggregate housing prices by 0.322 percent.
This table also shows that following an increase of the BI rate by one standard deviation, over
twenty quarters period the housing prices in Kalimantan increase by 0.424 percent, while causing
smaller impact in Java (0.358 percent), and Nusa Bali (0.227 percent). In contrast, similar shocks
leads to 1.954 percent reduction of housing prices in Sumatra and 0.061 percent lower housing
prices in Sulawesi. During the trough period of aggregate housing rice response, all islands except
Kalimantan and Sulawesi have negative responses.
Figures 25b - 25e show that given a contractionary monetary policy shock, housing prices in
Java’s provinces increase on impact. These figures display sizable changes in housing prices for
all provinces in Java, except Central Java. The responses of provinces in Java vary in magnitude.
However, after tenth quarters all the IRFs show similar pattern. Figures 25f - 25i show mixed
evidence on the impact responses of provinces in Sumatra; given an increase in the BI rate, housing
prices North Sumatra and South Sumatra decrease, while in contrast, same shocks increase housing
prices in West Sumatra and Lampung.
Similarly, figures 25j - 25m show that in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Nusa Bali regions the
initial housing price responses vary across provinces. However, these responses tend to converge
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to steady state level after eleven quarters.
Table 26 shows that given a surprise one standard deviation increase in BI rate, the changes in
housing prices vary across provinces. The cumulative housing price responses for majority of the
provinces (9 out of 12) are positive; the cumulative changes in housing price on average is 0.091
percent. The impact responses to similar shocks are also positive (averaging 0.107 percent): 9 out
of 12 provinces saw increment in the housing prices following an increase in the BI rate. The right
column of this table shows that five quarters after the initial shock, housing prices in all provinces
on average decrease by 0.001 percent. This table supports the previous findings on the asymmetric
impact of monetary policy across provinces and also serves as evidence (albeit a weak one) of the
asset price channel at the provincial level.
An increase in the BI rate should negatively affect housing prices. However, our findings show
that for the majority of regions, the immediate impact of similar shock is to increase housing
prices. The anomaly responses in part derived from a specific consumers’ characteristic which
assume housing as a safe investment. A contractionary monetary policy leads to lower consumer
expectation which then induce consumer to assign more of their assets in safe investment. Holding
the housing supply constant and/or inelastic, higher demand lead to increase price.
Figure 26a shows that approximately 70 percent of the housing responses across provinces fall
within one standard deviation away from the mean. Figure 26b, in which we plot the immediate
impact of BI rate on the housing prices, shows that the distribution is right skewed as more re-
sponses fall near one standard deviation below the mean. Figure 26c shows that the majority of the
second quarter (the trough period of aggregate housing prices response) responses fall within one
standard deviation away from the mean while only two provinces’ responses were well above the
mean (within two standard deviations).
Consumer Expectation
The impulse response function in figure 27 shows that the initial impact of a contractionary
monetary policy shock vary across regions. The impact of a surprise one standard deviation in-
crease in the BI rate is to reduce the level of consumer expectation in 3 out of 6 regions. Sumatra
and Sulawesi are anomalies as similar shocks significantly increase their consumer expectation
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level on impact. Even after twenty quarters, when all the other responses converge to the steady
state level the Sumatra’s response shows no sign of converging.
Table 25 shows that the initial impact of a one standard deviation increase in the BI rate is
to reduce the consumer expectation index in Java (by 0.152 percent), Kalimantan (by 0.498 per-
cent) and Nusa Bali (by 0.592 percent), while significantly increasing those in Sumatra (by 1.019
percent) and Sulawesi (by 1.041 percent). The large positive responses in Sumatra and Sulawesi
contribute to put the impact of BI rate on the aggregate consumer expectation on the positive side:
the immediate impact of similar shock is to increase the aggregate consumer expectation index by
0.182 percent.
Figures 28b - 28e show that for majority of provinces in Java the impact of a contractionary
monetary policy shock is to reduce consumer expectation level, except in West Java which shows
a slight increase on impact. This figure also shows that among provinces in Java, similar shocks
have the largest impact on Central Java. The consumer expectation level in East Java significantly
vary until ten quarters after the initial shock. Unlike Java provinces, we find larger disparities of
consumer expectation’s response among province in Sumatra (see figures 28f - 28i). However,
nine quarters after the initial shock the Sumatra provinces’ responses converge and tend to return
to the steady state level, except for South Sumatra. Figures 28j - 28m show large dispersion across
provinces in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Nusa Bali before the responses flatten in the twelve quarter
after the initial shock.
Table 26 shows that a contractionary monetary policy shocks has intended effects on reducing
consumer expectation. The cumulative and impact responses to a surprise one standard deviation
increase in BI rate on average are -0.233 percent and -0.138 percent, respectively. This table
supports the hypothesis of asymmetric impact of monetary policy across provinces in Indonesia. In
addition, this findings provide evidence of the expectation channel of monetary policy at provincial
level.
Figure 29a shows that the (20 quarters) cumulative responses of 9 provinces are within one
standard deviation away from the mean while three others are in the two standard deviation range
from the mean. The distribution of the immediate impact of BI rate on consumer expectation is
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slightly right skewed as more responses fall within one standard deviation below the mean (refer to
figure 29b). Figure 29c, in which we plot the provinces’ responses six quarters (the trough period
of aggregate consumer expectation response) after the BI rate increased, shows that approximately
83 percent of the responses fall within one standard deviation away from the mean.
2.6 What factors contribute to the asymmetric regional responses?
In this section, we examine select factors that may contribute to the different provincial re-
sponses to monetary policy actions. Carlino and DeFina (1998) provide evidence that the different
U.S. states responses to monetary policy shock in part can be explained by varying share of manu-
facturing and extractive industries across states. In our study, in addition to the share of manufac-
turing and mining we test whether trade, hotel, and restaurant sector has significant contributions
to the differential regional effects of monetary policy in Indonesia. Trade, hotel, and restaurant
sector has relatively large contribution to regions’ economy although it’s share varies across is-
lands, ranging from 14.04 percent in Sulawesi to 21.96 percent in Java (see table 17); this sector
accounted for approximately 17 percent of the country’s total GDP. In addition, we include the
following factors: the share of small firms to regional GDP to examine whether larger proportion
of small firms result in higher sensitivity to monetary policy actions; geographical location to ac-
count for the spillover effects from neighboring countries and control for the archipelagic nature
of Indonesian regions.
The independent variables of the regression in equation (2.4), IRi, include the following vari-
ables: (1)the cumulative impulse responses and (2)the same quarter responses from the baseline
specification (26 provinces); i represents provinces. The cumulative response is the total change
of regional GDP per capita over 20 quarters in response to a monetary policy shock. While the
same quarter response is the province’s response at a certain quarter which coincides with the
peak/trough period of the aggregate GDP response.
IRi =β0 + β1Manufaci + β2Miningi + β3Tradei + β4SmallF irmsSharei
+ β5DummyBorderi +
6∑
j=1
β6,jDummyIslandi,j + ui
(2.4)
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The regional responses to monetary policy actions are explained by the following indepen-
dent variables. The average share of manufacturing (Manufaci), mining (Miningi), and trade
(Tradei) sector to regional GDP. SmallF irmsSharei represents the share of small firms’ out-
put to regional GDP. We include two dummy variables to control for geographical location: (1)
DummyBorderi for regions which share the same island with foreign countries: Provinces in the
island of Kalimantan bordered with Malaysia, while the province of Papua share the island with
Papua New Guinea; (2)DummyIsland, a dummy variable which controls for provinces within
the same island (see figure 10).
Table 27 shows the estimation result of equation (2.4) with cumulative responses as the depen-
dent variable. This table shows that the shares of trade, hotel, and restaurant sector are statistically
significant in explaining the asymmetric provinces’ responses to monetary policy actions. The
results imply that given a contractionary monetary policy shock, regions’ economy with higher
share of trade, hotel, and restaurant sector have larger cumulative reduction in GDP per capita.
The results also show that higher share of manufacturing and mining sector induce larger regional
responses, however, the effects are not statistically significant. We also find that the composition
of small firms has no statistically significant impact on the regional responses to monetary policy
actions.
Table 27 also shows that geographical location in part explains the differential regional effetcs
of monetary policy in Indonesia. Provinces located on the same island bordering foreign countries
(Kalimantan and Papua) are less affected by monetary policy actions and the results are statistically
significant. We find that the responses of provinces in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Nusa Bali are not
statistically different to those Java.
Table 28 shows that the shares of mining and trade sector are statistically significant in ex-
plaining the 4th quarter provinces’ responses to monetary policy shock. Given an increase in the
monetary policy rate, higher shares of mining and trade sector induce larger reduction in GDP per
capita. This table also shows that the shares of mining and trade sector are statistically significant
in explaining the different 4th quarter provinces’ responses to monetary policy shock. Given an in-
crease in the monetary policy rate, higher shares of mining and trade sector induce larger reduction
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in GDP per capita. We find that the share of small firms is not statistically significant in explaining
the regional response to monetary policy actions. The results on the role of geographical loca-
tion provided in this table are consistent with the previous findings in table 20: provinces which
border with foreign countries (Kalimantan and Papua) are less sensitive to changes in monetary
policy; Provinces in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Nusa Bali have similar responses to those in Java,
while provinces in Kalimantan and Papua show weaker responses to monetary policy action than
Java’s provinces. We again find geography to be an important factor. The big jump in R2 due to
geography implies that there are unmodeled regional factors that explain the differences in IRFs.
2.7 Conclusion
We employ vector autoregression (VAR) model to investigate whether province respond differ-
ently to monetary policy shock. We estimate the role of regional banking system in the propagation
of monetary policy shocks. In addition, we document the changes in regional housing prices, con-
sumer expectation, and level of trade openness in response to monetary policy actions.
The findings show that the magnitude and duration of the impacts of monetary policy actions
vary across provinces providing evidence of the asymmetric regional effects of monetary policy
actions. We find that changes in the monetary policy rate have different impact on bank loans and
deposits across regions suggesting the existence of interest rate and credit channel at the regional
level in Indonesia. The findings also show that several provinces with large reduction in bank
loans due to a contractionary policy also experience much slower economic activities. This result
provides evidence of the significant role of banking system in the propagation of monetary policy
shocks. In addition, we find that the housing prices and consumer expectation change differently
across regions in response to monetary policy shock providing evidences of the asset price and
expectation channel at island and provincial level.
The findings suggest that the aggregate level analysis of monetary policy would provide an
incomplete depiction of the impact of monetary policy in Indonesia as the responses to mone-
tary policy actions are greatly vary across provinces. Provinces in Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra
have much larger responses than those in Kalimantan, Nusa Bali, and Papua. This findings imply
analysis on the regional impact of monetary policy provide more detail input needed by monetary
66
authority to evaluate the efficacy of its policy.
We further study factors that contribute to the different provinces’ responses to monetary policy
shock. We find that the shares of trade and mining are statistically significant in explaining the
asymmetric provinces’ responses to monetary policy shock. Given a contractionary monetary
policy shock, provinces with higher shares of trade and mining sector have larger reduction in
GDP per capita. However, we find that the share of manufacturing and the proportion of small
firms are not statistically significant in explaining the differential regional effects of monetary
policy actions. In addition, the findings show that the impact of the monetary policy shocks are
more muted for provinces which have land border with foreign countries. This results imply that
geography is a key factor in explaining the asymmetric provincial responses.
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CHAPTER 3
CRISIS, DEBT AND THE INDONESIAN POLICY RESPONSE: A BANK PORTFOLIO
ALLOCATION MODEL
3.1 Introduction
The 1997 Asian crisis marked the start of major overhaul of the Indonesian banking system.
The banking crisis which occurred during this period taught an invaluable lesson on the impor-
tance of a sound and healthy banking system. In order to resolve the bank crisis, the Indonesian
government conducted bank recapitalization and restructuring programs. On the policy side, BI
became an independent central bank which led to improved banking supervision. These episodes
strongly suggest that there was a structural break in the banking system between the pre-crisis and
post-crisis periods.
We construct a banking model based on Furfine (2001) with new features that define the specific
characteristics of banking system in Indonesia. Our model considers the impact of banking crisis
which potentially has shifted bank behavior in portfolio allocation. In addition, our model also
examines the role of bank debt in affecting bank decision to adjust its portfolio allocation. This
paper in part contributes to the efforts of better identifying bank behavior by providing a theoretical
model as a means to study bank portfolio reallocation in response to policy changes.
The model features a representative bank which maximizes its profit by choosing portfolio allo-
cation in risky assets, safe assets and debt given its balance sheet constraint and various adjustment
costs. We estimate the model’s parameters using nonlinear least square method on the banking
dataset which includes balance sheet information from 241 banks in Indonesia during the period
of April 1993 to July 2014. We divide the dataset into two sub-samples which represent the period
before and after the 1997 Asian crisis. We obtain two set of parameters which define banking
system in the pre and post crisis period. Given the estimated parameters, we find the solutions of
the models and conduct simulation to estimate bank portfolio reallocation in response to changes
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in the reserve rate, risk-based capital requirement, and loan demand.
The findings show that an increase in the reserve rate has the intended effects on curbing risky
assets growth. However, we find that during the post-crisis period a similar shock generates much
larger contractionary effects on risky assets allocation than those in the pre-crisis period. This result
suggest that the 1997 Asian crisis period created a structural break in bank’s behavior, marked a
shift in the structure of bank balance sheets in Indonesia, and was the impetus to significant changes
in the banking system in general.
The findings also show that an increase in the capital requirement reduces growth in risky
assets, but increases allocation in safe assets. The results are similar across sub-periods. The
findings support the hypothesis that higher capital requirement provides incentives for banks to
shift their portfolio toward safer assets. In addition, the simulation results show that reduced
loan demand, which represents an economic downturn, has the expected effects on bank portfolio
adjustments. Facing an economic downturn, bank perceives an increase in the risk of default thus
shifting its portfolio allocation away from risky assets towards safer assets.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2, which is adopted from Francis and
Wijoseno (2016), presents a description of the banking system in Indonesia. In section 3.3, we
describe the construction of the model and in section 3.4 we explain the data source and present
the approach to obtain the model’s parameters. We provide the simulation results in section 3.5
and concluding comments are presented in section 3.6.
3.2 Overview of Indonesian Banking System
The banking sector in Indonesia was strongly regulated by the government thus consisted of
only a few state and privately-owned banks until the implementation of Bank Liberalization Act
in October 1988. Following the Act, the banking sector in Indonesia has been growing rapidly.
The act allows private entities to establish new domestic and joint venture banking businesses in
Indonesia. The implementation of this act attracted a large number of new investors, both foreign
and domestic, to establish banking businesses in Indonesia. As a result, the number of banks
substantially increased from 111 in 1988 to 240 in 1994. However, despite the significant increase
in the number of banks following the 1988 Act, the top 10 private banks and the 6 state banks
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together account for 75 percent of total bank-system assets (Pangestu (2003)).
As the number of banks increased, the role of banks in economic development expanded signif-
icantly as banks became an important source of funding for the economy. The first column of table
29 shows that during the pre-crisis period, banks’ loans on average accounted for 60.78 percent
of total assets allocation, while deposits share averaged 57.02 percent of total assets. Thus banks
on average extended loans more than deposits collected. In order to offset the shortfall of funding
from deposits banks depended on external fundings, as shown by high level of banks borrowings
at 17.72 percent of total assets. As a consequence of its rapid loans expansion, banks maintained a
low excess reserves to total assets ratio at under 1 percent and invested only 2.02 percent of total
assets in securities.
Accompanying the rising number of banks were increasing problems related to weak banking
corporate governance, including collusive practices, violations of prudential regulations, and weak
accounting standard. The rapid increase in the number of banks was not accompanied by improved
bank regulation and supervision. During the early bank liberalization period, Bank Indonesia (BI)
was not independent thus banking supervision interferences were common especially for business
entities supported by powerful political groups. Bad banking practices, weak bank supervision and
regulation enforcement contributed to weakening banking fundamentals.
The bank indicators shown in the second column of table 29 suggest that banks were severely
hit by the crisis. The combination of weak demand and reduced supply of loans caused severe
contraction in banks loan. The averaged banks loan-to-asset ratio dropped from 60.78 to 46.97
percent. The majority of banks suffered huge losses which significantly decreased their capital
levels. The capital-to-asset ratio reduced from 14.45 to 9.89 percent. In addition, reserve-to-
asset ratio jumped from 2.81 percent during the pre-crisis period to 17.04 percent during the crisis
period.
The banking system went into major overhaul in which 70 banks were liquidated and 13 were
nationalized Laeven and Valencia (2008). The economic recovery program following the 1997
crisis gave BI its independence through the implementation of 1999 Central Bank Act. BI’s in-
dependence eliminated third party interferences that had been common prior to the crisis, thus
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improving the quality of banking supervision and regulation.
The significant differences of bank indicators between the pre-crisis and post-crisis suggest
that the 1997 Asian crisis may have significantly contributed to the changes of banks’ balance
sheet structure (refer to table 29). During the post-crisis period, on average, banks improved
prudent banking practices and allocated much higher share of low-risk type of assets compared
to the pre-crisis period: reserve-to-asset ratio increased from 2.81 to 22.33 percent; securities rose
from 2.02 to 8.01 percent of total assets; a significant reduction in debt-to-asset ratio from 17.72 to
2.47 percent. The huge jump in reserves and securities in part were contributed to the combination
of these two factors: First, bank loans had not yet returned to pre-crisis levels. In the post-crisis
period, loans were at 49.64 of total assets, far below the pre-crisis period of 60.78 percent. Second,
we find significant increases in the deposit-to-asset ratio from 57.02 percent in pre-crisis period to
74.95 percent in the post-crisis period. Having increased available funding while the credit market
had not yet recovered, banks shifted their excess funds into securities and reserves.
An interesting finding is that although the 1997 crisis had passed, banks on average still main-
tained high reserves ratio during the post-crisis period. Reserve holdings on banks balance sheets
were at 22.33 percent of total assets in the post 1997 crisis, much higher than the pre-crisis level
which was at 2.81 percent.
3.3 Data and Model
3.3.1 Bank panel data
The bank panel dataset, which were collected from the Central Bank of Indonesia, contains
selected monthly balance sheet information from 241 banks in Indonesia during the period of
April 1993 to July 2014.1 The bank dataset is an unbalanced panel as the total number of banks
varies during the 256-month sample period due to banks’ liquidations, mergers and acquisitions.
Since the paper aims at explaining the change of banks’ balance sheet over time, it is important
to base the estimation on a consistent data series. We apply the following criteria to ensure data
consistency.
1The dataset excludes balance sheet information of the Islamic and rural banks
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First, we exclude banks which were liquidated or founded after April 1993. Second, following
Peek and Rosengren (1995), we treat banks which merged during our sample period as one entity
as if the merger occurred at the beginning of the sample period. With these adjustments, we obtain
a balanced panel of 22,528 observations from 88 banks which represent more than 91 percent of
total bank assets in Indonesia over the period. We divide the sample into the pre-crisis (May 1993
- July 1997) and post crisis (June 2000 - July 2014) periods. The bank panel data consists of the
following balance sheets items:
Assets Liabilities
Required reserves (τtDt) Deposits (Dt)
Excess reserves (Xt) Capital (Kt)
Securities (St) Debt (Bt)
Loans (Lt)
The assets side of bank balance sheet includes the following items: Required reserves (τtDt)
is the minimum bank’s savings or claims to the Central Bank which is determined by the amount
of its deposits; Excess reserves (Xt) is the additional bank’s savings or claims to the Central Bank
above the minimum requirement; Securities (St) include marketable securities issued by non-bank
third parties and purchased/owned by bank; Loans (Lt) refer to all realized lending extended by
bank to non-bank third parties.
The liabilities side consists of the following items: Deposits (Dt) is the non-bank third par-
ties savings which includes demand deposits, savings deposits and time deposits; Capital (Kt) is
the total amount of bank’s capital; Debt (Bt) consists of securities issued (securities include all
short-term and long-term debentures issued by bank to non-bank third parties) and borrowings
(borrowings include all borrowings by bank from non-bank third parties) by banks.
In addition to bank balance sheets data, we use various interest rates data to calibrate the rate of
return on bank balance sheet items in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods (refer to table 30). We
use the average lending rate and deposit rate, which were obtained from the International Financial
Statistics-IMF over each sub-sample period to represent the rate of return on risky assets (rRt ) and
deposits (rDt ), respectively. The rate of return on safe assets (r
S
t ) was calibrated using the average
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money market rate, while the rate of return on debt (rBt ) is represented by the average interbank
rate; these data series were collected from the Central Bank of Indonesia.
3.3.2 Banking Model
We construct a banking model based on Furfine (2001) to demonstrate the impact of 1997 Asian
crisis on banks in Indonesia. In particular we study how banks adjust their portfolio allocation
in response to changes in the reserve rate, risk-based capital requirement, and loan demand. In
addition, our model also examines the role of bank debt in affecting bank decisions to adjust their
portfolios. Specifically, we are interested in whether or not banks are more sensitive to policy
changes in the more stringent, policy regulated post-crisis environment.
The model features a representative bank which maximizes its profit by choosing portfolio allo-
cation in risky assets, safe assets and debt given its balance sheet constraint and various adjustment
costs. We estimate the model’s parameters using nonlinear least square method on the Indonesian
banking dataset. Given the estimated parameters, we find the solutions of the model and simulate
the policy changes to estimate how banks reallocate their portfolios.
We introduce the following notations:
ARt = Lt
ASt = SXt + τtDt
where
SXt ≡ St +Xt
τt ≡ regulatory reserve rate
(3.1)
We assume the asset side of the representative bank’s balance sheet to contain only two types of
items: risky assets (ARt ) and safe assets (A
S
t ), while the liabilities sides include deposits (Dt),
capital (Kt), and debt (Bt). We define the safe assets to include securities (St), required reserves
(τtDt) and excess reserves (Xt), while the risky assets contain only loans (Lt).
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Balance sheet constraint
The balance sheet constraint is defined as the total of bank’s assets equal to the total of bank’s
liabilities. Using the definition of safe assets in equation (3.1) on (3.2), we get the balance sheet
constraint in equation (3.3).
ARt + A
S
t = Dt +Kt +Bt (3.2)
ARt + SXt = (1− τt)Dt +Kt +Bt (3.3)
Capital adjustment costs
Based on the risk-based capital requirement, bank is required to maintain a certain amount of
capital which depends on the risk level of its assets; higher risk-level assets requires a larger capital
holding. Since our model assumes only two type of assets: risky and safe assets, the calculation of
how much capital that bank needs to maintain in each period is simplified to equation (3.4).
kRt ≡
Kt
wRA
R
t + wsA
S
t
> dt (3.4)
In this equation, wR and ws represent the weights for risky and safe assets, respectively. Banks are
required to maintain their capital level above the minimum risk-based capital ratio, dt, which is set
by the Central Bank.
Given a violation of the minimum capital requirement, the Central Bank imposes sanctions
which vary from a simple case of being denied the ability to extend new loans to a more severe
punishment of being taken over or liquidated. The sanctions for capital requirement violations
impose real costs on banks. For simplicity, we assume that all banks incur the costs, regardless
their capital levels. However, given an increase in the regulatory minimum, banks with higher
capital level incur lower adjustment costs. The function Gt, in equation (3.5), specifies the capital
adjustment costs schedule.
Gt = (wRA
R
t + wsA
S
t )γ
Rg(kRt − dt) (3.5)
74
g(kRt − dt) = η0 − η1ln[k
R
t − dt] (3.6)
In this equation, parameter γR captures the potentially different sanctions imposed by the Central
Bank for a similar violation of capital regulation across sub-sample period; the differences may
occur based on the Central Bank’s judgment on the banking system and economic conditions.
For example, during a tight liquidity or overheat economy the Central Bank may enforce stronger
punishments for a violation of capital regulation to prevent banks taking excessive risk; during
this period γR would be higher than in the normal economic condition. The function of capital
adjustment cost includes multiplication by the total risk-weighted assets to capture the setting that
costs only apply to these portion of assets.
In equation (3.6), function g(·) calculates the costs for banks with capital level kRt to meet
the risk-based capital requirement, d. We expect to have the value of parameter η1 to be positive.
Therefore, given an increase in the parameter dt, banks with higher capital ratios will have smaller
capital adjustment costs than those with lower capital ratios.
Loan adjustment costs
We introduce the following setting to model how banks are subject to loan adjustment costs.
Banks incur costs when expanding loans higher than demand as they will likely need to accept
borrowers with lower credit ratings. Similarly, if banks reduce their loans when loan demands are
high, they will likely incur costs for losing the opportunity to net higher asset returns. In brief,
banks incur costs for adjusting loans at a different rate than loan demand. The function Jt in
equation (3.7) calculates the bank loan adjustment costs. In this equation, lt is defined as the gross
growth rate of risk-weighted assets, while ρt represents the loan demand. We use the average loan
growth at time t as a measure for loan demand.
Jt = (wRA
R
t + wsA
S
t )j(lt − ρt)
where
(3.7)
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lt =
wRA
R
t + wsA
S
t
wRA
R
t−1 + wsA
S
t−1
j(lt − ρt) =
1
2
α(lt − ρt)
2
The function j of loan adjustment cost includes multiplication by the total risk-weighted assets to
capture the setting that costs only apply to this portion of assets. The functions j, with parameter
ρt as a measure of loan demand, calculates the costs for banks to adjust their loans. We expect to
have the value of parameter α to be positive; higher α implies that deviations from loan demand
incur greater loan adjustment costs.
Debt adjustment costs
In the model, we introduce the setting that banks incur costs when their debt grows at a different
rate than the optimal level (b¯). The optimal level of debt is defined as the average bank’s debt-
to-asset ratio over the sub-sample period. Banks are likely to incur costs when debt is above
its optimal level as they are exposed to higher risks. Correspondingly, if banks maintain below
optimal debt levels, they will likely incur costs from losing additional funding. The functionHt in
equation 3.8 calculates the costs imposed on banks for changing debt. We define parameter bt as
the risk-based debt ratio. We expect to have the parameter θ to be positive; higher θ implies that
deviations from optimal debt levels incur greater costs.
Ht = (wRA
R
t + wsA
S
t )h(bt − b¯)
where
(3.8)
bt ≡
Bt
wRA
R
t + wsA
S
t
h(bt − b¯) =
1
2
θ(bt − b¯)
2
Similar to other costs schedules, the function of debt adjustment cost includes multiplication by
the total risk-weighted assets to capture the setting that costs only apply to these portions of assets.
Capital evolution
Equation 3.9 shows how bank’s capital changes over time. Bank capital accumulation depends
on the previous period’s capital and profits. Banks’ profits are obtained from return on portfolio
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allocation in risky and safe assets less its interest expenses on debt and deposits. In addition, banks
face uncertainty from portfolio allocation. We define this uncertainty as ǫt which is added to the
bank capital evolution equation.
Kt = Kt−1 + r
R
t A
R
t + r
x
tA
S
t − r
B
t Bt − r
D
t Dt + ǫt (3.9)
Bank maximization problem
Given balance sheet constraint, various adjustment costs, and capital evolution, bank maxi-
mizes its profit by choosing how much to allocate in risky assets (ARt ) and safe assets (securities
and reserves) (SXt).
2 In addition, bank also chooses how much fundings raised by issuing debt
(Bt).
max
ARt ,SXt,Bt
E
∞∑
t=1
βt{rRt A
R
t + r
x
t SXt − r
B
t Bt − r
D
t Dt −Gt − Jt −Ht} (3.10)
We abstract from modeling the uncertainty around asset returns, that is, the risk return trade-offs.
However, there are mechanisms in place to stop the banks from choosing only the high return risky
assets, namely the capital, loan, and debt adjustment costs. The capital adjustment costs defined in
equation (3.5) and (3.6) implies that banks incur higher capital adjustment costs (Gt) for a larger
share of portfolio in the risky assets; a larger allocation in the risky assets reduces bank’s risk-based
capital ratio (kRt ) thus bank incurs higher costs to meet the risk-based capital requirement (dt). In
addition, choosing only the high return risky assets will likely incur higher loan adjustment costs
(Jt; see equation (3.7)) and debt adjustment costs (Ht; see equation (3.8)); choosing only the high
return risky assets will likely result in large deviations from loan demand (optimal debt level) thus
incur high loan (debt) adjustment costs.
2Banks are unable to choose required reserves, τtDt (refer to equation 3.1)
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First order conditions
The first order condition with respect to ARt is as follows:
(
1− τt
1− τt − rDt
)(
rRt −
rDt
1− τt
)[
1− γRg′(kRt − dt)
]
−
(
wR + wS
∆ASt
∆ARt
)
γR
[
g(kRT − dt)− g
′(kRt − dt)k
R
t
]
−
(
wR + wS
∆ASt
∆ARt
)[
j(lt − ρt) + j
′(lt − ρt)lt
]
−
(
wR + wS
∆ASt
∆ARt
)[
h(bt − b¯)− h
′(bt − b¯)bt
]
= −β
(
wR + wS
∆ASt
∆ARt
)
j′(lt+1 − ρt+1)l
2
t+1
(3.11)
where
∆ASt
∆ARt
=
τt
1− τt
[
1−
(
1− τt
1− τt − rDt
)(
rRt −
rDt
1− τt
)]
The first order condition with respect to SXt is as follows:
(
1− τt
1− τt − rDt
)(
rXt −
rDt
1− τt
)[
1− γRg′(kRt − dt)
]
−
(
wS
∆ASt
∆SXt
)
γR
[
g(kRT − dt)− g
′(kRt − dt)k
R
t
]
−
(
wS
∆ASt
∆SXt
)[
j(lt − ρt) + j
′(lt − ρt)lt
]
−
(
wS
∆ASt
∆SXt
)[
h(bt − b¯)− h
′(bt − b¯)bt
]
= −βwS
∆ASt
∆SXt
j′(lt+1−ρt+1)l
2
t+1
(3.12)
where
∆ASt
∆SXt
= 1 +
(
τt
1− τt
)[
1−
(
1− τt
1− τt − rDt
)(
rRt −
rDt
1− τt
)]
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Finally, the first order condition with respect to Bt is as follows:
(
1− τt
1− τt − rDt
)(
rBt −
rDt
1− τt
)[
− 1 + γRg′(kRt − dt)
]
−
(
wS
∆ASt
∆Bt
)
γR
[
g(kRT − dt)− g
′(kRt − dt)k
R
t
]
−
(
wS
∆ASt
∆Bt
)[
j(lt − ρt) + j
′(lt − ρt)lt
]
−
(
wS
∆ASt
∆Bt
)[
h(bt − b¯)− h
′(bt − b¯)bt
]
− h′(bt − b¯)
= −βwS
∆ASt
∆Bt
j′(lt+1−ρt+1)l
2
t+1
(3.13)
where
∆ASt
∆ARt
=
τt
1− τt
[
− 1 +
(
1− τt
1− τt − rDt
)(
rBt −
rDt
1− τt
)]
3.4 Estimation
We estimate the model’s parameters based on the sub-samples surrounding the 1997 Asian
crisis.3 We obtain estimates of the model’s parameters using the following procedure. First, we
separately solve equations (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) using nonlinear least squares to get the initial
values. Second, we feed the initial values into the system of three equations (i.e., solve all three
simultaneously) and use nonlinear least squares to obtain the parameters estimates of regulatory
monitoring cost (γR), capital adjustment cost (η1), loan adjustment cost (α), and debt adjustment
cost (θ). During the estimation, we restrict the values of γR, η1, α, and θ to be non-negative.
Table 31 shows the estimated values of capital adjustment cost’s parameters, γR and η1, in the
pre-crisis period are substantially higher than in the post-crisis period. In the pre-crisis, the credit
market was booming and bank’s loans soared.4 In this period the banking system’s liquidity was
tight as banks competed to extend loans. The higher values of γR in the pre-crisis period indicates
3We failed to find model convergence when using the full sample and with the crisis period data. This seems to
imply that the 1997 Asian crisis caused a break in bank behavior; there are two economies at work, pre and post crisis
with no unifying model
4During the pre-crisis period, loan were approximately at 145 percent of total deposits and represented roughly 69
percent of bank’s assets
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that given a violation in the capital requirement, the regulator will likely impose higher sanctions
than for a similar case in the post-crisis period; in the pre-crisis period higher sanctions provide
larger barriers for banks to extend loans thus curbing the loan growth. The estimated values of η1
suggests that given an increase in the regulatory capital ratio, during the pre-crisis period banks
incur higher capital adjustment costs than those in the post-crisis period. During the pre-crisis
period, in which the banks’ liquidity was tight, it would likely to be more costly for banks to
obtain additional fundings to meet the new regulatory capital ratio.
The estimated values of parameters α and θ in table 31 indicate that given a deviation from
loan demand (optimal debt level), in the pre-crisis period banks incur higher loan (debt) adjustment
costs than in the post-crisis period. Higher parameter values in the pre-crisis period reflect larger
costs for banks if they fail to exploit the strong loan-growth or if banks were taking excessive risks
by extending loans (debt) more than loan demand (optimal debt level).
Given the model parameters in tables 30 and 31, we solve the model to obtain its steady state
values. Table 32 shows that during the pre-crisis period bank assets grows at substantially higher
rate than those in the post-crisis period. However, during the pre-crisis period we also find that
banks maintained a very high exposure to debt. In this period the steady state value of debt ratio
was 16.89 percent, a significantly higher ratio than the post-crisis value of 4.28 percent.
3.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the simulation results on how a bank adjusts its portfolio in response
to changes in the reserve rate, capital requirement, and loan demand. We provide estimates on how
a bank alters its portfolio in risky assets, safe assets, and debt during the pre-crisis and post-crisis
periods. The simulation also serves to test whether the crisis in part contributed in shifting bank
responses to policy changes or the change in the efficacy of said policies.
3.5.1 Responses to an increase in the reserve rate
We simulate the effect of a one percent increase in the reserve rate parameter, τt, to test the
hypothesis on whether an increase in the reserve rate is an effective measure to curb loan growth.
Given similar shock, we describe balance sheet adjustments in safe assets and debt. In addition,
we run two simulations using the estimated parameters of the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods to
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test whether the crisis has shifted bank responses over time.
Figures 30 and 31 show that the impact of an increase in the reserve rate on balance sheet
allocation varies across portfolio items and sub-periods. During the pre-crisis period a one percent
increase in the reserve rate reduces growth in risky assets by 0.020 percent on impact, while causing
only 0.008 percent reduction in safe assets-growth. A similar shock positively affects debt-growth,
although the magnitude is minuscule. In the post-crisis period, given a one percent increase in
the reserve rate a bank reduces its portfolio allocation in risky assets by 0.158 percent. A similar
shock induces deeper reductions in safe assets (by 0.916 percent), while lowering debt by only
0.002 percent.
In order to measure the relative importance of these results, we normalize the changes in port-
folio items with their average growth rate over the corresponding sub-sample period; the average
growth rates were calculated directly from the bank panel dataset. During the pre-crisis period the
banking system’s average growth in risky assets was 2.842 percent, while in the post-crisis period
risky assets grew at 0.899 percent. Given an increase in the reserve rate, during the post-crisis
period reduction in risky assets-growth represents 17.6 percent of the average system’s growth,
while in the pre-crisis reduction in risky assets-growth only accounts for 0.7 percent of the aver-
age growth. Given these statistics, our findings show that an increase in the reserve rate during
the post-crisis has substantially larger relative impact on reducing risky assets-growth than in the
pre-crisis period.
In addition, we find that the average growth in safe asset during the pre-crisis (at 5.614 percent)
is similar to the post-crisis growth (at 5.136 percent). However, given an increase in the reserve
rate, reduction in safe assets-growth in the post-crisis period explains 17.8 percent of the average
growth, while only representing 0.14 percent of the pre-crisis period’s average growth. These
findings show that the relative magnitude impact of an increase in the reserve rate on reducing safe
assets-growth during the post-crisis period is considerably larger than in the pre-crisis period.
The findings show that an increase in the reserve rate has the intended effects on curbing growth
in risky assets. However, we find that during the post-crisis period a similar shock generates much
larger contractionary effects on risky assets allocation than those in the pre-crisis period. In the
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pre-crisis period, given an increase cost of deposit fundings banks switch to debt as an alternate
source. In this period, the availability of non-deposit funding allows banks to have smaller reduc-
tion in risky asset-growth. In contrast, during the post-crisis period a higher standard of prudential
practices and more stringent banking supervision discourage banks from increased exposure to
debt. As a consequence, given an increase in the reserve rate during the post-crisis period we find
larger reductions in safe assets as banks liquidate their securities for additional funding.
This result suggest that the 1997 Asian crisis period created a structural break and marked a
shift in the structure of bank balance sheets in Indonesia and caused significant changes in the
banking system in general. In particular, we find that the shifted structure of bank balance sheet
contributes to explaining the larger impact of reserve requirement policy on bank portfolio allo-
cation during the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. Francis and Wijoseno (2016)
provides empirical evidences which suggest a similar conclusion; that an increase in the reserve
rate during the post-crisis period in Indonesia generates stronger contractionary effects on loans
than in the pre-crisis period.
3.5.2 Responses to an increase in the capital requirement
Figures 32 and 33 describe the simulated effects of a one percent increase in the capital re-
quirement parameter, d, on bank portfolio allocation. These figures show that during the pre-crisis
period a one percent increase in the risk-based capital requirement induces bank to decrease its
portfolio allocation in risky assets (by 0.124 percent). Similar shock causes a larger portion of
portfolio allocated in safe assets (by 12.321 percent), while having no compelling impact on debt
growth. We find similar results on the impact of capital requirement during the post-crisis period,
although its impact is slightly lower in magnitude than those in the pre-crisis period. A one per-
cent increase in the capital requirement in the post-crisis period causes a 0.110 percent reduction in
risky assets growth. The same sized shock increases growth in safe assets by 10.872 percent, while
having negligible impact on debt growth. During all sub-periods, debt seems to be unaffected by
changes in capital requirements. This is not surprising given these debt cannot be counted towards
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bank capital.5
The relative impact of an increase in the risk-based regulatory capital ratio on risky assets-
growth in the post-crisis period is substantially larger than in the pre-crisis period; the post-crisis
reduction in the growth of risky assets represents 12.2 percent of the average growth, while in
the pre-crisis period reduction in risky assets-growth only explains 4.36 percent of the average
growth. In addition, our findings show no significant differences on the relative impact of the
capital regulation on safe assets-growth across the two sample periods. Given an increase in the
risk-based regulatory capital ratio, in the post-crisis period increment in the growth of safe assets
represents 211.7 percent of the average growth, while the pre-crisis increment in safe assets-growth
accounts for 219.5 percent of the average growth. These results show that the model seems to be
overly sensitive to changes in the risk-based capital requirement.
The risk-based capital requirement which has been implemented in Indonesia since 1993 de-
mands higher percentage of capital per risky assets than per safe assets. Our simulation results
show that an increase in the capital requirement reduce growth in risky assets, but increases alloca-
tion in safe assets. The results are similar across sub-periods. The findings support the hypothesis
that higher capital requirement provides incentives for banks to shift away their portfolio toward
safer assets.
Our findings, which suggest that an increase in the regulatory capital ratio reduces bank risk-
taking behavior are similar to those found in Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) and Furfine
(2001). Hellmann et al. (2000) constructs a dynamic banking model with moral hazard feature
to study the interaction between financial liberalization and prudential regulation. Their find-
ings show that capital requirements induce prudent practices by reducing gambling incentives.
However, they argue that capital requirement needs to be implemented with additional policy (for
example, deposit-rate control; risk-based deposit-insurance premium) to yield Pareto-efficient out-
comes. Furfine (2001), which estimates a model based on panel data of large U.S. commercial
5Debt consists of securities issued and borrowings by banks
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bank between December 1989 and December 1997, shows that a one percent increase in the risk-
based capital ratio leads to 3.47 percent reduction in loan-growth (risky assets), but induces 35
percent higher growth in securities (safe assets).
3.5.3 Responses to reduction in loan demand (economic downturn)
We simulate the impact of economic downturn on bank portfolio allocation using the loan
demand parameter, ρ. Figures 34 and 35 show that a reduction in loan demand induces banks to
shift its portfolio away from risky assets. We find that the magnitude impact of this shock are
similar between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. A one percent reduction in loan demand
during the pre-crisis reduces risky asset growth by 0.138 percent, while increasing safe assets
growth by 0.137 percent. Similar shock in the post-crisis period induces bank to decrease its
risky asset by 0.122 percent, while raising safe asset growth by 0.107 percent. During both sub-
periods, a reduction in loan demand negatively affect debt growth, however, the magnitude of its
impact is negligible. The finding shows that reduced loan demand which represent an economic
downturn has the expected effects on bank portfolio adjustments. Facing an economic downturn,
bank perceives an increase in the risk of default thus shifting its portfolio allocation in risky assets
towards safe assets.
Given a sign of economic downturn, in the post-crisis period banks have deeper relative re-
duction in risky assets than in the pre-crisis period. In response to a one percent reduction in
loan demand, the post-crisis reduction risky assets-growth represents 13.6 percent of the average
growth, while the pre-crisis reduction in growth of risky assets only explains 4.9 percent of the
average growth. In contrast, we find no compelling differences on the relative impact of economic
downturn in the growth of safe assets across two sample periods. Given a one percent reduction in
loan demand, in the post-crisis period increment in the growth of safe assets represents 2.1 percent
of the average growth, while the pre-crisis increment in safe assets-growth accounts for 2.4 percent
of the average growth.
3.6 Conclusion
We construct a banking model to explain how bank adjusts its portfolio allocation in risky
assets, safe assets, and debt in response to changes in the reserve rate, capital requirement, and
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loan demand. In particular we examine whether the 1997 Asian crisis created a structural break in
bank behavior. We also examine the role of bank debt in affecting bank decisions to adjust their
portfolios.
We estimate the model’s parameters using nonlinear least squares method on a balanced panel
of 22,528 observations from 88 banks during the period of April 1993 to July 2014. We divide
the dataset into two sub-samples which represent the period before and after the 1997 Asian crisis.
We obtain two set of parameters which define banking system in the pre and post crisis period.
Given the estimated parameters, we find the solutions of the models and conduct simulation to
estimate how bank alters its portfolio in risky assets, safe assets, and debt during the pre-crisis and
post-crisis periods.
Our findings suggest that the 1997 Asian crisis created a structural break in bank behavior,
marked a shift in the structure of bank balance sheets in Indonesia, and was the impetus to signif-
icant changes in the banking system in general. We find that during both sub-periods, an increase
in the reserve rate has the intended effects on curbing risky assets growth. However, we find that
during the post-crisis period a similar shock generates much larger contractionary effects on risky
assets allocation than those in the pre-crisis period. In addition, we show that an increase in the
risk-based capital ratio reduces risky assets growth, but increases the growth of safe assets, thus
providing evidence that the risk-based capital requirement induces banks to shift their portfolio
away from risky assets toward safer assets.
Our findings also show that a reduction in loan demand which represent an economic downturn
has the expected effects on bank portfolio adjustments. Facing an economic downturn, bank per-
ceives an increase in the risk of default thus shifting its portfolio allocation in risky assets towards
safe assets. Given a sign of economic downturn, in the post-crisis period banks have deeper relative
reduction in risky assets than in the pre-crisis period, but we find no compelling differences on the
impact of economic downturn in the growth of safe assets across two sample periods.
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Tables
Table 1: The Composition of Bank Balance Sheet
(April 1993 - July 2014)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Assets
Reserves 15.72 0.00 96.59 16.00
Loans 54.61 0.00 489.10 21.41
Securities 6.52 0.00 92.29 11.20
Net Interbank 8.88 -74.91 91.68 16.84
Liabilities
Deposits 68.15 0.00 162.41 21.39
Capital 13.63 -170.98 99.61 13.48
Debt 7.93 0.00 207.93 18.56
Note:
Presented as percentage of total assets
Number of observations = 22,528
Net Interbank = Interbank Claims - Interbank Liabilities
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Table 3: The Composition of Balance Sheet of Banks by Asset Size
(April 1993-July 2014)
Small Banks (n = 11520)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Loans 54.33 0.00 489.10 24.01
Reserves 17.53 0.00 96.59 18.07
Excess Reserves 12.80 -10.49 96.59 17.69
Securities 4.52 0.00 92.29 9.13
Deposits 69.83 0.00 130.75 20.78
Capital 17.70 -170.98 99.61 14.89
Excess Capital 11.75 -184.28 99.34 15.34
Debt 3.90 0.00 207.93 13.96
Medium Banks (n = 8192)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Loans 54.79 4.72 118.06 18.35
Reserves 15.22 0.03 84.29 14.64
Excess Reserves 10.74 -7.29 83.34 14.01
Securities 5.50 0.00 61.94 8.11
Deposits 65.72 1.65 97.62 23.13
Capital 10.11 -49.39 80.26 7.07
Excess Capital 4.11 -59.16 78.85 7.06
Debt 11.73 0.00 112.12 22.95
Large Banks (n = 2816)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Loans 55.22 3.27 146.02 18.16
Reserves 9.78 0.01 56.55 6.32
Excess Reserves 5.00 -6.55 53.66 5.82
Securities 17.66 0.00 83.52 18.12
Deposits 68.35 11.72 162.41 17.58
Capital 7.21 -141.24 25.27 16.00
Excess Capital 0.81 -148.85 22.68 16.06
Debt 13.37 0.00 107.06 16.99
As percentage of total assets
n = number of observations
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Table 6: The Composition of Balance Sheet of Banks by Capital Level
(April 1993-July 2014)
Low-Capitalized Banks (n = 2304)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Loans 52.43 0.41 146.02 21.91
Reserves 11.86 0.15 88.13 9.11
Excess Reserves 7.79 -10.49 80.61 9.04
Securities 11.82 0.00 61.94 14.36
Deposits 57.22 3.51 162.41 23.13
Capital 2.56 -141.24 22.95 15.85
Excess Capital -3.75 -148.85 16.50 15.91
Debt 19.06 0.00 112.12 26.12
Adequately-Capitalized Banks (n = 1024)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Loans 52.68 3.27 115.57 18.51
Reserves 12.22 0.01 41.56 8.16
Excess Reserves 7.09 -4.93 35.86 7.31
Securities 18.22 0.25 73.61 19.49
Deposits 74.78 25.88 127.07 13.77
Capital 7.09 -124.52 16.59 9.78
Excess Capital 0.90 -130.99 9.22 9.67
Debt 8.78 0.00 78.85 13.57
Highly-Capitalized Banks (n = 19200)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Loans 54.97 0.00 489.10 21.48
Reserves 16.37 0.00 96.59 16.85
Excess Reserves 11.68 -9.49 96.59 16.39
Securities 5.26 0.00 92.29 9.49
Deposits 69.11 0.00 130.75 21.10
Capital 15.30 -170.98 99.61 12.58
Excess Capital 9.32 -184.28 99.34 12.89
Debt 6.55 0.00 207.93 17.20
As percentage of total assets
n = number of observations
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Table 9: The Composition of Balance Sheet of Banks by Ownership
(April 1993-July 2014)
Domestic Banks (n = 18432)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Loans 53.65 0.00 146.02 19.33
Reserves 16.32 0.00 95.16 16.66
Excess Reserves 11.32 -9.49 94.77 16.20
Securities 6.52 0.00 92.29 11.38
Deposits 73.96 0.00 162.41 15.58
Capital 14.16 -170.98 95.82 13.43
Excess Capital 8.20 -184.28 95.64 13.71
Debt 3.87 0.00 107.06 9.07
Foreign Banks (n = 4096)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Loans 58.92 0.00 489.10 28.60
Reserves 13.00 0.03 96.59 12.26
Excess Reserves 9.96 -10.49 96.59 12.15
Securities 6.53 0.00 79.53 10.38
Deposits 42.04 0.00 119.95 24.31
Capital 11.23 -135.14 99.61 13.44
Excess Capital 4.92 -152.00 99.34 13.71
Debt 26.21 0.00 207.93 33.41
As percentage of total assets
n = number of observations
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Table 12: The Aggregate Policy Impact on Bank Portfolio Allocation
Loans Securities Interbank Deposits
BI Rate -0.030* -0.010 -0.063* 0.026
(0.015) (0.006) (0.037) (0.025)
BI Rate 1 0.082** -0.006 -0.065* (0.046)
(0.018) (0.007) (0.037) (0.028)
BI Rate 2 -0.009 -0.016** 0.024 -0.095**
(0.019) (0.008) (0.035) (0.027)
BI Rate 3 -0.132** 0.026** 0.076** 0.164**
(0.026) (0.010) (0.034) (0.027)
BI Rate*Pre-Crisis97 0.001 -0.030 0.187 0.002
(0.088) (0.033) (0.163) (0.126)
BI Rate*Post-Crisis97 0.366** 0.001 -0.065 0.004
(0.113) (0.047) (0.122) (0.092)
Reserve Rate 0.036 0.028 -0.623** -0.052
(0.168) (0.088) (0.179) (0.142)
Reserve Rate 1 -0.103 -0.043 0.118 -0.400**
(0.102) (0.048) (0.125) (0.110)
Reserve Rate 2 -0.136 -0.017 -0.011 -0.537**
(0.309) (0.049) (0.304) (0.226)
Reserve Rate 3 -0.303** -0.009 0.289 0.518**
(0.093) (0.052) (0.459) (0.251)
Reserve Rate*Pre-Crisis97 -0.339 0.201* 0.062 -0.549
(0.219) (0.119) (0.524) (0.376)
Number of observations 22176 22176 22176 22176
R2 0.143 0.044 0.088 0.501
Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
Reference group for BI rate’s impact is the crisis period
Reference group for reserve rate’s impact is the post-crisis period
The regression controls for macroeconomic variables (economic growth, and inflation rate) and bank’s individual characteristics (ex-
cess reserves, asset growth, binding reserve requirement)
Full regression results are available upon request
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Table 13: The Policy Impact on Bank Portfolio Allocation - Bank by Size of Assets
Loans Securities Interbank Deposits
BI Rate -0.029* -0.010 -0.062* 0.026
(0.016) (0.007) (0.037) (0.025)
BI Rate 1 0.082** -0.006 -0.065* -0.046
(0.018) (0.007) (0.037) (0.029)
BI Rate 2 -0.009 -0.016** 0.023 -0.095**
(0.019) (0.008) (0.036) (0.027)
BI Rate 3 -0.141** 0.022* 0.115** 0.113**
(0.027) (0.011) (0.040) (0.029)
BI Rate*Pre-Crisis97 0.127 -0.045 0.021 -0.036
(0.136) (0.049) (0.218) (0.160)
BI Rate*Post-Crisis97 0.418** 0.008 -0.150 0.004
(0.173) (0.068) (0.187) (0.139)
BI Rate*Medium Bank -0.005 0.013* -0.083** 0.111**
(0.027) (0.007) (0.037) (0.032)
BI Rate*Large Bank 0.081 -0.005 -0.073** 0.088**
(0.063) (0.031) (0.034) (0.038)
BI Rate*Medium Bank*Pre-Crisis97 -0.201 0.021 0.475 0.161
(0.195) (0.066) (0.359) (0.280)
BI Rate*Large Bank*Pre-Crisis97 -0.149 0.058 -0.067 -0.188
(0.180) (0.064) (0.250) (0.351)
BI Rate*Medium Bank*Post-Crisis97 0.060 -0.109 0.146 -0.087
(0.257) (0.084) (0.265) (0.224)
BI Rate*Large Bank*Post-Crisis97 -0.499** 0.257 0.260 0.251
(0.240) (0.184) (0.234) (0.180)
Reserve Rate -0.096 0.028 -0.621** -0.050
(0.115) (0.088) (0.180) (0.143)
Reserve Rate 1 -0.095 -0.043 0.122 -0.396**
(0.103) (0.048) (0.126) (0.112)
Reserve Rate 2 -0.125 -0.017 -0.007 -0.533**
(0.309) (0.049) (0.306) (0.227)
Reserve Rate 3 -0.786** -0.050 0.047 1.155**
(0.166) (0.077) (0.858) (0.420)
Reserve Rate*Pre-Crisis97 0.606** 0.240 0.084 -1.068*
(0.262) (0.208) (0.963) (0.621)
Reserve Rate*Medium Bank 0.522** 0.046 0.536 -1.217**
(0.193) (0.117) (0.938) (0.507)
Reserve Rate*Large Bank 0.344* 0.194 0.376 -1.560**
(0.204) (0.126) (0.913) (0.474)
Reserve Rate*Medium Bank*Pre-Crisis97 -0.139 -0.040 0.088 1.268
(0.425) (0.260) (1.067) (0.788)
Reserve Rate*Large Bank*Pre-Crisis97 0.285 -0.199 -0.353 0.551
(0.355) (0.268) (1.140) (0.775)
Number of observations 22176 22176 22176 22176
98
R2 0.144 0.046 0.089 0.504
Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
Reference group is small bank in the crisis period
The regression controls for macroeconomic variables (economic growth, and inflation rate) and bank’s individual characteristics (excess reserves, asset growth,
binding reserve requirement)
Full regression results are available upon request
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Table 14: The Policy Impact on Bank Portfolio Allocation - Bank by Level of Capital
Loans Securities Interbank Deposits
BI Rate -0.029* -0.010 -0.063* 0.027
(0.016) (0.007) (0.037) (0.025)
BI Rate 1 0.082** -0.006 -0.065* -0.046
(0.018) (0.007) (0.037) (0.029)
BI Rate 2 -0.009 -0.016** 0.024 -0.095**
(0.019) (0.008) (0.036) (0.027)
BI Rate 3 -0.137** 0.030** 0.087** 0.157**
(0.025) (0.012) (0.036) (0.028)
BI Rate*Pre-Crisis97 0.009 -0.032 0.254 0.010
(0.096) (0.036) (0.186) (0.134)
BI Rate*Post-Crisis97 0.454** -0.052 -0.042 0.027
(0.122) (0.051) (0.132) (0.092)
BI Rate*Low Bank -0.009 -0.006 -0.073** 0.057
(0.056) (0.009) (0.029) (0.055)
BI Rate*Adequate Bank 0.115 -0.063 -0.072** 0.029
(0.132) (0.072) (0.022) (0.055)
BI Rate*Low Bank*Pre-Crisis97 0.196 -0.005 -0.588** -0.091
(0.281) (0.083) (0.251) (0.520)
BI Rate*Adequate Bank*Pre-Crisis97 0.121 0.047 -0.180 -0.064
(0.185) (0.107) (0.234) (0.184)
BI Rate*Low Bank*Post-Crisis97 -0.192 0.379** -0.251 -0.328
(0.275) (0.146) (0.456) (0.538)
BI Rate*Adequate Bank*Post-Crisis97 -1.257** 0.308** 0.070 0.240
(0.574) (0.128) (0.146) (0.286)
Reserve Rate -0.096 0.028 -0.622** -0.048
(0.115) (0.088) (0.180) (0.143)
Reserve Rate 1 -0.095 -0.044 0.120 -0.394**
(0.103) (0.048) (0.126) (0.111)
Reserve Rate 2 -0.124 -0.017 -0.009 -0.531**
(0.309) (0.049) (0.306) (0.227)
Reserve Rate 3 -0.536** 0.001 0.017 0.630**
(0.118) (0.049) (0.494) (0.270)
Reserve Rate*Pre-Crisis97 0.535** 0.191 0.205 -0.565
(0.213) (0.137) (0.586) (0.417)
Reserve Rate*Low Bank -0.169 -0.272 2.510 -0.744
(0.317) (0.248) (1.768) (0.987)
Reserve Rate*Adequate Bank 0.018 0.407* 0.344 -0.799**
(0.174) (0.225) (0.499) (0.394)
Reserve Rate*Low Bank*Pre-Crisis97 0.399 0.227 -1.358 0.296
(0.400) (0.307) (1.792) (1.394)
Reserve Rate*Adequate Bank*Pre-Crisis97 0.350 -0.319 0.036 0.052
(0.368) (0.209) (0.637) (0.836)
Number of observations 22176 22176 22176 22176
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R2 0.143 0.046 0.089 0.503
Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
Reference group is high-capitalized bank in the crisis period
The regression controls for macroeconomic variables (economic growth, and inflation rate) and bank’s individual characteristics (excess reserves, asset growth,
binding reserve requirement)
Full regression results are available upon request
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Table 15: The Policy Impact on Bank Portfolio Allocation - Bank by Type of Ownership
Loans Securities Interbank Deposits
BI Rate -0.030* -0.010 -0.062* 0.027
(0.015) (0.007) (0.037) (0.025)
BI Rate 1 0.082** -0.006 -0.065* -0.046
(0.018) (0.007) (0.037) (0.029)
BI Rate 2 -0.009 -0.017** 0.023 -0.096**
(0.019) (0.008) (0.036) (0.027)
BI Rate 3 -0.112** 0.021** 0.081** 0.130**
(0.024) (0.009) (0.036) (0.024)
BI Rate*Pre-Crisis97 0.019 -0.036 0.261 0.046
(0.098) (0.035) (0.189) (0.135)
BI Rate*Post-Crisis97 0.176 0.027 -0.098 0.108
(0.118) (0.050) (0.103) (0.090)
BI Rate*Foreign Bank -0.114** 0.032** -0.027 0.191**
(0.033) (0.010) (0.028) (0.036)
BI Rate*Foreign Bank*Pre-Crisis97 0.106 0.023 -0.420 -0.277
(0.209) (0.086) (0.272) (0.315)
BI Rate*Foreign Bank*Post-Crisis97 1.108** -0.147 0.187 -0.572*
(0.265) (0.133) (0.481) (0.323)
Reserve Rate -0.099 0.029 -0.621** -0.047
(0.114) (0.088) (0.180) (0.143)
Reserve Rate 1 -0.102 -0.042 0.122 -0.390**
(0.103) (0.048) (0.126) (0.111)
Reserve Rate 2 -0.131 -0.015 -0.007 -0.527**
(0.308) (0.050) (0.306) (0.228)
Reserve Rate 3 -0.648** 0.056 0.000 0.595**
(0.102) (0.047) (0.508) (0.276)
Reserve Rate*Pre-Crisis97 0.650** 0.202 0.163 -0.465
(0.211) (0.143) (0.605) (0.432)
Reserve Rate*Foreign Bank 0.529* -0.361** 1.586 -0.430
(0.271) (0.177) (1.177) (0.677)
Reserve Rate*Foreign Bank*Pre-Crisis97 -0.415 0.020 -0.501 -0.313
(0.493) (0.221) (1.201) (0.914)
Number of observations 22176 22176 22176 22176
R2 0.146 0.045 0.089 0.504
Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level
Reference group is domestic bank in the crisis period
The regression controls for macroeconomic variables (economic growth, and inflation rate) and bank’s individual characteristics (excess reserves, asset growth,
binding reserve requirement)
Full regression results are available upon request
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Table 16: The Islands and Provinces’ Selected Indicators
Islands Provinces Land Area Population in 2010 2012 GRP per capita Share to Total
(km2) (thousand) (thousand Rupiah) 2012 GDP (%)
Java 129,307 136,610,590 15,458.11 61.39
West Java (WJAV) 45,944 53,685,898 8,306.46 18.48
Jakarta (DKIJ) 740 9,607,787 45,565.70 17.91
East Java (EJAV) 46,690 37,476,757 10,348.78 15.69
Central Java (CJAV) 32,800 32,382,657 6,464.08 8.39
Yogyakarta (DIY) 3,133 3,457,491 6,605.54 0.93
Sumatra 446,687 50,630,931 9,179.21 20.93
RIAU 87,844 7,217,530 19,756.05 6.10
North Sumatra (NSMT) 72,428 12,982,204 10,135.62 5.35
South Sumatra (SSMT) 76,727 8,673,690 9,519.92 3.35
West Sumatra (WSMT) 42,225 4,846,909 8,824.30 1.75
Lampung (LMPG) 45,819 7,608,405 5,581.43 1.73
Aceh (NAD) 56,501 4,494,410 7,928.10 1.45
Jambi (JAMB) 45,348 3,092,265 6,270.13 0.81
Bengkulu (BGKL) 19,795 1,715,518 5,418.15 0.38
Kalimantan 502,412 13,787,831 14,366.99 8.33
East Kalimantan (EKLT) 194,849 3,553,143 31,383.69 4.76
West Kalimantan (WKLT) 120,114 4,395,983 7,605.67 1.35
South Kalimantan (SKLT) 33,884 3,626,616 9,128.23 1.37
Central Kalimantan (CKLT) 153,565 2,212,089 9,350.36 0.85
Sulawesi 193,847 17,371,782 7,085.07 5.00
South Sulawesi (SSLW) 62,904 9,193,427 6,930.33 2.61
North Sulawesi (NSLW) 26,096 3,310,760 7,230.05 0.98
Southeast Sulawesi (EWSLW) 36,757 2,635,009 5,140.79 0.56
Central Sulawesi (CSLW) 68,090 2,232,586 9,039.12 0.84
Nusa Bali 71,296 13,074,796 5,046.75 2.67
Bali (BAL) 5,449 3,890,757 8,083.23 1.32
West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) 19,709 4,500,212 4,173.68 0.77
East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) 46,138 4,683,827 2,883.34 0.57
Papua 511,811 6,165,396 5,984.57 1.79
Papua (PAP) 424,501 3,593,803 8,900.19 1.46
Maluku (MALK) 87,310 2,571,593 3,068.95 0.33
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Table 17: The Island’s Industrial Mix (2012 Regional GDP)
Island Agri Mining Mfg Electricity Construction Trade Transport Finance Services
Java 14.86 1.46 25.88 1.08 6.53 21.96 6.50 10.65 11.09
Sumatra 25.92 15.40 15.75 0.45 5.21 15.33 6.66 4.42 10.86
Kalimantan 23.43 15.59 20.13 0.36 5.36 15.89 7.08 4.43 7.73
Sulawesi 33.16 5.23 8.90 0.69 8.79 14.04 7.80 6.54 14.85
Nusa Bali 31.93 6.48 5.10 0.62 6.52 20.24 8.12 5.33 15.65
Papua 25.37 23.37 9.82 0.38 5.72 14.80 6.19 3.53 10.82
Table 18: The Average Share of Small Firms’ Output to Regional GDP
Percent
Java 29.29
Sumatra 16.06
Kalimantan 11.72
Sulawesi 28.38
Nusa Bali 59.20
Papua 16.06
Less than 19 employees
Table 19: Data Availability
Variable Name Type Start date End date Coverage Notes
Real GDP per capita Regional 1993Q2 2012Q4 26 provinces -
Bank loans Regional 1993Q2 2012Q4 26 provinces -
Bank deposits Regional 1993Q2 2012Q4 26 provinces -
Inflation rate Regional 1993Q2 2012Q4 66 Cities 26 provinces represented
Housing Prices Index Regional 2006Q2 2012Q4 14 Cities 12 provinces represented
Consumer Expectation Index Regional 2001Q2 2012Q4 18 Cities 12 provinces represented
Regional Trade Openness Regional 2000Q1 2012Q4 26 provinces -
BI Rate Aggregate 1993Q2 2012Q4 National -
Inflation rate Aggregate 1993Q2 2012Q4 National -
Exchange rate Aggregate 1993Q2 2012Q4 National -
104
Table 20: Regional (islands) responses to monetary policy shocks (%)
Bank Loans Bank Deposits GDP per capita
Cumulative Impact Q21 Cumulative Impact Q22 Cumulative Q23 Q34
Aggregate (Panel) -3.243 -0.586 -0.895 0.515 -0.043 -0.587 -0.797 -0.018 -0.183
Java -3.405 -0.464 -1.037 -0.133 -0.116 -0.532 -0.843 -0.007 -0.208
Sumatra -2.172 -0.594 -0.379 1.174 0.016 -0.548 -0.598 0.036 -0.157
Kalimantan -3.428 -1.120 -0.786 0.477 -0.232 -0.373 -0.173 0.099 -0.138
Sulawesi -2.464 -0.823 -0.051 0.426 -0.071 -0.231 -0.754 0.058 -0.192
Nusa Bali -1.769 0.023 -0.111 0.475 -0.233 -0.402 -0.167 0.085 -0.152
Papua -7.538 -2.814 -1.193 0.080 -0.546 -0.306 -0.115 0.068 -0.020
Mean -3.431 -0.911 -0.636 0.431 -0.175 -0.426 -0.492 0.046 -0.150
Minimum -7.538 -2.814 -1.193 -0.133 -0.546 -0.587 -0.843 -0.018 -0.208
Maximum -1.769 0.023 -0.051 1.174 0.016 -0.231 -0.115 0.099 -0.020
Standard Deviation 1.923 0.908 0.455 0.409 0.188 0.134 0.328 0.045 0.062
1The trough period of aggregate loans response (2nd quarter after the initial shocks)
2The trough period of aggregate deposits response (2nd quarter after the initial shocks)
3The lagged impact of MP shocks on GDP per capita
4The trough period of aggregate GDP per capita response (3rd quarter after the initial shocks)
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Table 21: Provincial responses to monetary policy shocks (%)
Bank Loans Bank Deposits GDP per capita
Cumulative Impact Q21 Cumulative Impact Q22 Cumulative Q23 Q44
West Java -4.973 -0.467 -0.776 1.346 0.299 -0.076 -0.718 -0.041 -0.089
Jakarta -2.679 -0.038 -1.038 -0.426 -0.150 -0.246 -0.572 -0.128 0.038
Yogyakarta -0.258 -0.307 0.052 0.553 -0.098 -0.074 -0.415 -0.019 -0.060
Central Java -1.557 0.022 -0.506 1.246 0.109 -0.115 -0.832 -0.018 -0.157
East Java -2.337 -0.406 -0.478 1.231 0.143 -0.314 -1.001 -0.050 -0.096
Bengkulu -2.465 -0.531 -0.284 0.511 0.222 0.408 -0.496 -0.027 -0.058
Jambi -3.835 -1.058 -0.417 1.093 -0.148 0.176 -0.193 0.055 0.001
Aceh -3.748 -2.160 -0.066 0.812 -0.271 -0.499 0.074 0.034 0.227
North Sumatra -2.009 -0.149 -0.340 0.961 0.158 -0.566 -0.602 0.071 -0.075
West Sumatra -0.055 -0.113 0.073 0.900 0.358 -0.303 -0.325 -0.043 -0.068
Riau -0.622 0.582 -0.026 1.839 -0.071 -0.555 -0.473 0.058 -0.013
South Sumatra -1.640 -0.711 -0.648 -0.369 -0.381 -0.534 -0.279 -0.004 -0.035
Lampung -3.805 -1.578 -0.034 0.392 -0.122 0.039 -0.194 0.029 -0.040
South Kalimantan -2.376 -0.875 -0.987 -0.505 -0.370 -0.364 -0.222 -0.010 0.012
West Kalimantan -7.291 -1.192 -0.799 1.723 -0.297 0.174 -0.741 0.079 -0.062
East Kalimantan -2.390 -0.562 -1.084 1.155 0.055 -0.579 0.191 0.129 0.105
Central Kalimantan -3.467 -1.238 0.319 0.903 0.149 -0.094 -0.910 0.109 -0.020
Central Sulawesi -1.005 -0.579 -0.076 1.285 0.056 0.587 -0.659 -0.046 0.005
South Sulawesi -3.835 -0.642 0.085 1.339 -0.102 -0.376 -0.733 -0.044 -0.097
North Sulawesi -2.787 -0.168 -0.467 0.817 0.318 -0.502 -0.816 0.072 -0.107
Southeast Sulawesi -0.879 -0.442 0.198 0.676 0.306 0.149 -0.620 0.001 -0.047
West Nusa Tenggara -2.051 -0.287 0.073 1.009 -0.295 -0.046 0.566 0.063 -0.015
Bali -2.494 -0.029 -0.356 1.061 0.029 -0.451 -1.064 0.034 -0.082
East Nusa Tenggara -0.755 -0.019 0.410 0.682 -0.130 -0.111 -0.395 0.074 -0.038
Maluku -14.710 -3.451 -1.301 0.308 -0.420 0.482 -2.167 -0.005 0.028
Papua -4.425 -1.431 -1.644 0.395 -0.554 -0.471 -0.046 0.247 0.010
Mean -3.017 -0.686 -0.389 0.805 -0.046 -0.164 -0.525 0.024 -0.028
Minimum -14.710 -3.451 -1.644 -0.505 -0.554 -0.579 -2.167 -0.128 -0.157
Maximum -0.055 0.582 0.410 1.839 0.358 0.587 0.566 0.247 0.227
Standard deviation 2.824 0.802 0.515 0.583 0.249 0.333 0.498 0.073 0.074
1The trough period of aggregate loans response (2nd quarter after the initial shocks)
2The trough period of aggregate deposits response (2nd quarter after the initial shocks)
3The lagged impact of MP shocks on GDP per capita
4The trough period of aggregate GDP per capita response (4th quarter after the initial shocks)
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Table 22: The top 10 cumulative loan responses to MP shock (%)
Provinces Cumulative
1 Maluku (MALK) -13.369
2 West Kalimantan (WKLT) -8.174
3 Lampung (LMPG) -7.587
4 Papua (PAP) -7.562
5 West Java (WJAV) -5.339
6 Aceh (NAD) -5.089
7 South Sumatra (SSMT) -4.699
8 South Sulawesi (SSLW) -3.919
9 Jambi (JAMB) -3.774
10 East Java (EJAV) -3.745
Table 23: The top 10 cumulative deposit responses to MP shock (%)
Provinces Cumulative
1 Jakarta (DKIJ) -0.079
2 Bali (BAL) 0.242
3 East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) 0.334
4 South Kalimantan (SKLT) 0.463
5 West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) 0.551
6 South Sumatra (SSMT) 1.057
7 West Sumatra (WSMT) 1.198
8 North Sulawesi (NSLW) 1.236
9 Maluku (MALK) 1.332
10 Yogyakarta (DIY) 1.472
Table 24: The top 10 cumulative GDP responses to MP shock (%)
Provinces Cumulative
1 Maluku (MALK) -2.135
2 East Java (EJAV) -1.877
3 Aceh (NAD) -1.303
4 North Sumatra (NSMT) -1.173
5 West Java (WJAV) -1.107
6 Southeast Sulawesi (SESLW) -1.085
7 Central Kalimantan (CKLT) -1.073
8 Yogyakarta (DIY) -1.030
9 North Sulawesi (NSLW) -1.026
10 Bali (BAL) -0.987
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Table 25: Housing Prices and Consumer Expectation Responses to MP (island level) (%)
Housing Price Consumer Expectation
Cumulative Impact Q91 Cumulative Impact Q61
Aggregate (Panel) 0.322 0.134 -0.027 -0.061 0.182 -0.147
Java 0.358 0.109 -0.004 -0.349 -0.152 -0.252
Sumatra -1.954 0.048 -0.114 -1.476 1.019 0.078
Kalimantan 0.424 0.237 0.003 -0.109 -0.498 -0.187
Sulawesi -0.061 -0.148 0.011 0.436 1.041 -0.007
Nusa Bali 0.227 0.468 -0.051 -0.627 -0.592 -0.097
Mean -0.114 0.142 -0.030 -0.364 0.167 -0.102
Minimum -1.954 -0.148 -0.114 -1.476 -0.592 -0.252
Maximum 0.424 0.468 0.011 0.436 1.041 0.078
Standard Deviation 0.917 0.205 0.047 0.648 0.722 0.121
1The trough period of aggregate housing price response (9th quarter after the initial shocks)
2The trough period of aggregate CE response (6th quarter after the initial shocks)
Papua’s data are not available
Table 26: Housing Prices and Consumer Expectation Responses to MP (provincial level) (%)
Housing Price Consumer Expectation
Cumulative Impact Q51 Cumulative Impact Q52
West Java 0.445 0.242 -0.093 -0.133 0.081 0.195
Jakarta 0.394 0.135 0.075 -0.383 -0.671 0.116
Central Java 0.085 0.051 0.008 -0.448 -0.616 0.173
East Java 0.402 0.078 -0.104 -0.253 -0.406 0.260
North Sumatra -0.608 -0.170 -0.193 -0.367 -0.308 0.881
West Sumatra 0.236 0.394 0.018 -0.252 0.739 -0.228
South Sumatra 0.023 -0.061 -0.021 -0.324 0.798 -0.331
Lampung 0.286 0.110 0.107 0.041 -0.156 0.179
South Kalimantan 0.424 0.237 0.032 -0.109 -0.498 -0.382
South Sulawesi -0.385 -0.216 -0.137 -0.059 0.436 0.038
North Sulawesi -0.441 0.019 0.377 0.113 -0.462 0.588
Bali 0.227 0.468 -0.087 -0.627 -0.592 -0.555
Mean 0.091 0.107 -0.001 -0.233 -0.138 0.078
Minimum -0.608 -0.216 -0.193 -0.627 -0.671 -0.555
Maximum 0.445 0.468 0.377 0.113 0.798 0.881
Standard Deviation 0.370 0.207 0.149 0.214 0.529 0.410
1The trough period of aggregate housing price response (5th quarter after the initial shocks)
2The trough period of aggregate CE response (5th quarter after the initial shocks)
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Table 27: Explaining the Asymmetric Responses to MP Shock (1)
Dependent variable: The (absolute value) cumulative responses of GDP per capita
Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4)
Constant −0.1002 −0.0276 −0.8808 −0.3211
(0.5337) (0.5280) (0.6860) (0.5017)
Share of manufacturing sector 0.0038 0.0038 0.0088 0.0025
(0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0096) (0.0109)
Share of mining sector 0.0011 0.0044 0.0072 0.0118
(0.0094) (0.0090) (0.0105) (0.0096)
Share of trade, hotel, and restaurant sector 0.0511 0.0517 0.0752∗∗ 0.0587∗∗
(0.0326) (0.0321) (0.0320) (0.0266)
Share of small firms 0.0011 −0.0008 0.0046 0.0032
(0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0045)
Border −0.3752∗ −1.5371∗∗
(0.2044) (0.3032)
Sumatra island 0.1859 −0.0695
(0.2567) (0.2454)
Kalimantan island −0.0718 1.2400∗∗
(0.2640) (0.3532)
Sulawesi island 0.5074 0.2510
(0.2929) (0.2308)
Nusa Bali island −0.2126 −0.3532
(0.3915) (0.3596)
Papua island 0.5123 0.9431∗∗
(0.5438) (0.2332)
Number of observations 26 26 26 26
Adj. R¯2 0.2308 0.2949 0.2868 0.4757
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Border (dummy) for province neighboring with another country
Island (dummy) for province located on the corresponding island
The reference group is Java island
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Table 28: Explaining the Asymmetric Responses to MP Shock (2)
Dependent variable: The (absolute value) 4th quarter responses of GDP per capita
Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4)
Constant −0.0286 −0.0167 −0.0471 −0.0804
(0.0650) (0.0631) (0.1062) (0.1256)
Share of manufacturing sector 0.0014 0.0014 −0.0006 −0.0003
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Share of mining sector 0.0008 0.0013 0.0031∗∗ 0.0028∗
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Share of trade, hotel, and restaurant sector 0.0050 0.0051 0.0090∗∗ 0.0100∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0043)
Share of small firms −0.0001 −0.0005 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Border −0.0615∗∗ 0.0913∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0419)
Sumatra island −0.0291 −0.0139
(0.0481) (0.0514)
Kalimantan island −0.0934∗ −0.1714∗∗
(0.0461) (0.0381)
Sulawesi island −0.0150 0.0002
(0.0544) (0.0606)
Nusa Bali island −0.1083 −0.0999
(0.0641) (0.0709)
Papua island −0.1094∗ −0.1350∗∗
(0.0620) (0.0479)
Number of observations 26 26 26 26
Adj. R¯2 0.0945 0.2474 0.4282 0.4502
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Border (dummy) for province neighboring with another country
Island (dummy) for province located on the corresponding island
The reference group is Java island
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Table 30: The calibrated model’s parameters
Parameters Description Pre-crisis Post-crisis
rR Rate of return on risky assets 0.194636 0.144562
rX Rate of return on safe assets 0.109182 0.073116
rB Rate of return on debt 0.126682 0.090616
rD Rate of return on deposit 0.163911 0.090586
wr Weight of risky assets 0.99 0.99
ws Weight of safe assets 0.01 0.01
β Discount factor 0.975 0.975
Pre-crisis (May 1993 - July 1997); post crisis (June 2000 - July 2014)
Table 31: The estimated model’s parameters
Parameters Description Pre-crisis Post-crisis
γR Regulatory monitoring cost 0.622957 0.182994
η1 Parameter of functional form g() in the capital adjustment costs 0.001307 0.000349
α Parameter of the loan adjustment cost 0.000498 0.000059
θ Parameter of the debt adjustment cost 0.020518 0.003102
Pre-crisis (May 1993 - July 1997); post crisis (June 2000 - July 2014)
Table 32: The steady-state values
Variables Description Pre-crisis Post-crisis
l¯ Growth rate of risk-weighted assets 3.24% 1.71%
k¯R Risk-based capital ratio 13.55% 16.90%
b¯ Debts to weigthed assets ratio 16.89% 4.28%
Pre-crisis (May 1993 - July 1997); post crisis (June 2000 - July 2014)
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Figures
Figure 1: Reserve Regulation in Indonesia 1993-2012
Figure 2: The average of aggregate banks’ reserve-to-asset ratio (in percentage)
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Figure 3: The average of reserve-to-asset ratio by asset size (in percentage)
Figure 4: The average of reserve-to-asset ratio by capital level (in percentage)
Figure 5: The average of reserve-to-asset ratio by type of ownership (in percentage)
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Figure 6: Comparing number of banks to the original dataset (unbalanced panel)
Figure 7: Comparing total assets to the original dataset (unbalanced panel)
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Figure 8: Comparing total loans to the original dataset (unbalanced panel)
Figure 9: Comparing total deposits to the original dataset (unbalanced panel)
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Banks by Size
The panel data contain 88 banks which then group into three size category: small, medium and large banks. Small
banks which consist of 45 banks have total assets below the 75th percentile and 11 banks belong to large group are
those above 95th percentile. Medium category include banks with assets between 75th and 95th percentile.
The obvious concern with the analysis using this type of grouping is that the result may be highly affected by
the fact that banks drift across categories. Overtime, banks may switch categories thus it may affect the results. The
transitions probabilities in table 33 suggest that our banks group by size is relatively consistent overtime. Banks that
once belong to small group would stay within the same group 98.6 percent of the time. Large banks consistently in the
same group 96.8 percent of the time. While medium banks switch categories to higher category in less than 1 percent
of the time and move down to small categories 7.8 percent of the time.
Table 33: Transition Probabilities of Banks by Size
Bank Size Small Medium Large Total
Small
#Obs. 1,372 20 0 1,392
% 98.56 1.44 0 100
Medium
#Obs. 26 305 1 332
% 7.83 91.87 0.3 100
Large
#Obs. 0 4 120 124
% 0 3.23 96.77 100
Total
#Obs. 1,398 329 121 1,848
% 75.65 17.8 6.55 100
Banks by Capital Level
The bank group by capital level are constructed in reference to the 8 percent capital minimum requirement of
Basel Accord. We divide banks into three groups: (1) Low-capitalized banks are those with less than 8 percent capital-
to-asset ratio; (2) Adequately-capitalized banks are those with capital-to-asset ratio between 8 and 10 percent; (3)
High-capitalized banks are those with capital-to-asset ratio more than 10 percent.
Table 34 show the transition probabilities for each categories. Banks in the high-capitalized category maintain
their capital-to-asset ratio more than 10 percent 94.17 percent of the time. Banks with capital-to-asset ratio between
8 and 10 percent stay within the same categories with 40.35 percent probability. Thus these banks are more likely
switching categories to either high or low-capitalized. Banks in low category maintain their capital under 8 percent
117
with 72.34 percent probability over the sample period.
Table 34: Transition Probabilities of Banks by Capital Level
Banks Capital Low Adequate High Total
Low
#Obs. 170 38 27 235
% 72.34 16.17 11.49 100
Adequate
#Obs. 29 69 73 171
% 16.96 40.35 42.69 100
High
#Obs. 28 56 1,357 1,441
% 1.94 3.89 94.17 100
Total
#Obs. 227 163 1,457 1,847
% 12.29 8.83 78.88 100
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Figure 10: Indonesian Provinces
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Figure 12: The islands’ IRFs of bank loans to one standard deviation increase in the BI rate
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Figure 13: The impulse response functions of bank loans to one standard deviation increase in the
BI rate
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Figure 13: The impulse response functions of bank loans to one standard deviation increase in the
BI rate
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(a) The provincial cumulative bank loans’ responses (b) The provincial immediate bank loans’ responses
(c) The provincial aggregate maximum bank loans’ re-
sponses
Figure 14: The frequency distribution of cumulative bank loan responses
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Figure 15: The regions’ impulse response function of bank deposits to one standard deviation
increase in the policy rate
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Figure 16: The impulse response functions of bank deposits to one standard deviation increase in
the BI rate
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Figure 16: The impulse response functions of bank deposits to one standard deviation increase in
the BI rate
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(a) The provincial cumulative bank deposits’ responses (b) The provincial immediate bank deposits’ responses
(c) The provincial aggregate maximum bank deposits’ re-
sponses
Figure 17: The frequency distribution of cumulative bank deposit responses
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Figure 18: The islands’ IRFs of real GDP per capita to one standard deviation increase in the policy
rate
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Figure 19: The impulse response functions of real GDP per capita to one standard deviation in-
crease in the BI rate
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Figure 19: The impulse response functions of real GDP per capita to one standard deviation in-
crease in the BI rate
130
(a) The provincial cumulative real GDP responses (b) The provincial aggregate maximum real GDP responses
Figure 20: The frequency distribution of cumulative GDP responses
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Figure 21: The island IRFs of trade openness to one standard deviation increase in the BI rate
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Figure 22: The provincial IRFs of trade openness to one standard deviation increase in the BI rate
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Figure 22: The provincial IRFs of trade openness to one standard deviation increase in the BI rate
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Figure 23: The frequency distribution of trade openness’ responses
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Figure 24: The islands’ IRFs of housing prices to one standard deviation increase in the policy rate
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Figure 25: The impulse response functions of housing prices to one standard deviation increase in
the BI rate
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(a) The provincial cumulative housing prices’ responses (b) The provincial immediate housing prices’ responses
(c) The provincial aggregate maximum housing prices’ re-
sponses
Figure 26: The frequency distribution of housing prices responses
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Figure 27: The islands’ IRFs of consumer expectation to one standard deviation increase in the
policy rate
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Figure 28: The impulse response functions of consumer expectation to one standard deviation
increase in the BI rate
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(a) The provincial cumulative consumer expectation’s re-
sponses
(b) The provincial immediate consumer expectation’s re-
sponses
(c) The provincial aggregate maximum consumer expecta-
tion’s responses
Figure 29: The frequency distribution of consumer expectation’s responses
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